Lengyel v. Peregrin

• Decision Date: 04 March 1926
• Citation: 104 Conn. 285,132 A. 459
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LENGYEL ET UX. v. PEREGRIN.

132 A. 459

104 Conn. 285

LENGYEL ET UX. v. PEREGRIN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 4, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action in the nature of ejectment by Sigmond Lengyel and wife against Albina Peregrin, tried to the court. Judgment for plaintiffs for possession and $90 damages, and defendant appeals. No error.

This action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover possession of the first-floor apartment in a three-tenement house and for rents and profits. The plaintiffs are husband and wife. The defendant is the wife of Peter Peregrin, who, on April 22 1913, acquired title by deed to a lot in Wallingford and a three-family dwelling thereon. Thereafter, until September 17, 1924 Peregrin and his wife occupied the first-floor apartment as their home, but for the last few years Peter Peregrin occupied one of the rooms and his wife the remainder. During all that time Peter Peregrin collected the rents for the second and third floor tenements and paid all the carrying charges on the property.

On July 3, 1924, Peter Peregrin agreed in writing to sell the property to the plaintiffs, and on September 17, 1924 executed and delivered to them a warranty deed. Peter Peregrin moved from the premises on September 18, 1924, but the defendant refused to vacate the first-floor apartment and continued to occupy it. The plaintiffs, since the date of the deed to them, have, without interference from the defendant, collected the rents from the second and third floors, and have paid all the carrying charges.

On May 12, 1923, the defendant brought an action against her husband, Peter Peregrin, claiming $4,000 damages or a judgment vesting title in her to an undivided one-half of the land and building in question. The real estate was attached, and a copy of the writ and complaint was filed in the office of the town clerk of Wallingford. On September 16, 1924, the superior court ordered a release of the attachment upon substitution of a bond, and certificate thereof was recorded in the town clerk's office on the same day.

Prior to July 3, 1924, one of the plaintiffs, Sigmond Lengyel, visited the premises and advised the defendant of his intention to purchase, and she exhibited to him part of the first-floor apartment. Later, and before the date of the deed, he again talked with the defendant concerning the contemplated sale of the premises by Peter Peregrin to the plaintiffs, and the defendant requested permission to remove a chicken coop which she claimed as her personal property. The defendant did not make any claim to the plaintiffs that Peter Peregrin had no right to sell the property to them until after they had paid to him the agreed purchase price and received the deed.

Cornelius J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellant.

Samuel A. Persky, of New Haven, for appellees.

HINMAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The claims of the appellant which are pursued on her brief and in argument are, in substance, that the grantor, Peter Peregrin, was so ousted of possession that his deed to the plaintiffs is void, and that, by reason of the state of the land records relating to the attachment of the real estate, the plaintiffs had constructive notice of and took title subject to the claim of the defendant as made in the complaint in her action against her husband.

In order to render a deed void under section 5098 of the General Statutes, the grantor must have been ousted by an entry and possession under a claim of right; the possession must be an actual, exclusive possession as owner, holding the record owner and all other persons out--such a possession as, if continued for 15 years, would make a perfect title by adverse possession. Sherwood v. Waller, 20 Conn. 262; Merwin v. Morris, 42 A. 855, 71 Conn. 555; Mead v. Fitzpatrick, 51 A. 515, 74 Conn. 521; Skinner v. Hale, 56 A. 524, 76 Conn. 223; Searles v. De Ladson, 70 A. 589, 81 Conn. 133.

Theretofore ouster as well as adverse possession is a question of fact, and the conclusion of the trial court, necessarily involved in its determination of this issue, that the defendant's possession was not such as to constitute ouster of the plaintiffs' grantor, is not reviewable by this court unless it appears, and is not the case here, that the subordinate facts found are legally or logically inconsistent with or are insufficient to support that conclusion. Twining v. Goodwin, 77 A. 953,83 Conn. 500, Ann.Cas. 1912A, 845; Standard Co. v. Young, 96 A. 932, 90 Conn. 133.

The second question is whether the plaintiffs purchased the property with such notice of the claimed rights of the defendant that they are properly to be held to have taken subject thereto. If one purchases land with notice of an equitable right or claim of a third person affecting the subject-matter of the purchase, or if the purchaser had notice, actual or constructive, of facts which are sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry, which, if prosecuted with reasonable diligence, would certainly lead to discovery of a conflicting claim, equity...