Lennane v. Adt, LLC

• Citation: 380 N.C. 483,869 S.E.2d 243
• Decision Date: 11 March 2022
• Docket Number: 3A21
• Parties: In the MATTER OF Frank LENNANE, Petitioner ADT, LLC, Employer and North Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, Respondent
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

380 N.C. 483

869 S.E.2d 243

In the MATTER OF Frank LENNANE, Petitioner ADT, LLC, Employer and North Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, Respondent

No. 3A21

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed March 11, 2022

Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Joseph Franklin Chilton, Cindy M. Patton, Charlotte, John R. Keller, and Celia Pistolis, Raleigh, for petitioner-appellant.

North Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, by Elias W. Admassu, R. Glen Peterson, and Sharon A. Johnston, Raleigh, for respondent-appellee.

BARRINGER, Justice.

¶ 1 In this case, we consider whether to uphold the determination that petitioner Frank Lennane is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. To guide the interpretation and application of unemployment benefits under Chapter 96 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, the legislature has declared the public policy of this State for nearly ninety years as the following:

Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.

Unemployment Compensation Law, ch. 1, sec. 2, 1936 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws (Extra Sess. 1936) 1, 1 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 96-2 (2021) ).

¶ 2 This declaration guides our analysis of the issue before us: whether Lennane's leaving work was attributable to his employer as required by N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a) to avoid disqualification for unemployment benefits. See N.C.G.S. § 96-2. Having considered the legislature's declared public policy, the plain language of the applicable statute, and the binding findings of fact, we conclude that Lennane failed to show that his leaving work was attributable to his employer as required by N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a).

I. Background

¶ 3 Lennane left work on 16 November 2018. Lennane filed an initial claim for unemployment benefits on 11 November 2018. An adjudicator held Lennane disqualified for benefits, and Lennane appealed. Thereafter, an appeals referee conducted a hearing on the matter. The appeals referee affirmed the prior decision and ruled that Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he failed to show good cause attributable to the employer for leaving as required by N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a). Lennane then appealed to the Board of Review for the North Carolina Department of Commerce. The Board of Review adopted the appeals referee's findings of fact as its own and concluded that the appeals referee's decision was in accord with the law and the facts. Accordingly, the Board of Review affirmed the appeals referee's decision. Lennane next appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Review's decision. Lennane then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

¶ 4 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's order. In re Lennane , 274 N.C. App. 367, 372, 852 S.E.2d 650 (2020). When considering whether the superior court erred by affirming the Board of Review's determination, the Court of Appeals compared this case with the Court of Appeals decision in Ray v. Broyhill Furniture Industries , 81 N.C. App. 586, 344 S.E.2d 798 (1986). In re Lennane , 274 N.C. App. at 370, 852 S.E.2d 650. In Ray , the Court of Appeals "held that the claimant proved her reason for leaving was attributable both to the employer's action (the threat to fire her if she went over her supervisor's head) and inaction (her supervisor's failure to put in her transfer request)." Id. (cleaned up). Unlike Ray , the Court of Appeals explained that, in this case, the employer acted to help Lennane. Id.

¶ 5 The Court of Appeals then considered whether competent evidence supported the challenged findings of fact and whether those findings of fact supported the conclusion of law. Id. at 370–72, 852 S.E.2d 650. The Court of Appeals concluded that competent evidence supported the challenged findings of fact and that the findings of fact supported the conclusion that Lennane "failed to establish that his good cause for leaving work was attributable to the employer." Id. at 372, 852 S.E.2d 650 (cleaned up).

¶ 6 To the contrary, the dissent contended that:

It is not [Lennane]’s fault that his knee suffers from osteoarthritis

, nor is it his fault that his employer's "business needs" precluded accommodations that would not require him to sacrifice his health. He

was thus rendered "unemployed through no fault of [his] own[,]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-2.

Id. at 373, 852 S.E.2d 650 (Inman, J., dissenting) (second and third alterations in original).

¶ 7 According to the dissent, like in Ray , Lennane's employer's inaction "placed [him] in the untenable position of having to choose between leaving [his] job and becoming unemployed or remaining in a job which ... exacerbated [his medical] conditions." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ray , 81 N.C. App. at 592–93, 344 S.E.2d 798 ). Thus, the dissent, relying on N.C.G.S. § 96-2 and Ray , would have held that Lennane left work for good cause attributable to the employer. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion of law but did not identify any findings of fact as being unsupported by competent evidence. Id. at 372–73, 852 S.E.2d 650.

¶ 8 Lennane appealed based on the dissenting opinion. Accordingly, we now consider the issue Lennane identified as distinguishing the majority and dissenting opinions: "whether his leaving was attributable to the employer."

II. Standard of Review

¶ 9 "The standard of review in appeals from the [Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security], both to the superior court and to the appellate division, is established by statute." Binney v. Banner Therapy Prods., Inc. , 362 N.C. 310, 315, 661 S.E.2d 717 (2008). In these judicial proceedings, "the findings of fact by the Division, if there is any competent evidence to support them and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law." N.C.G.S. § 96-15(i) (2021) ; see also N.C.G.S. § 96-15(h) (establishing procedure for judicial review of a decision of the Board of Review); Binney , 362 N.C. at 315, 661 S.E.2d 717. When no challenge to a finding of fact is made, an appellate court presumes that the finding of fact is supported by the evidence, and the finding of fact is binding on appeal. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Emp. Sec. Comm'n of N.C. , 363 N.C. 562, 564, 681 S.E.2d 776 (2009) ; State ex rel. Emp. Sec. Comm'n v. Jarrell , 231 N.C. 381, 384, 57 S.E.2d 403 (1950). We review de novo whether the Division's findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Carolina Power , 363 N.C. at 564, 681 S.E.2d 776.

III. Analysis

¶ 10 Article 2C of Chapter 96 of the North Carolina General Statutes sets forth when benefits are payable for unemployment and when an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits. N.C.G.S. §§ 96-14.1 to -14.16 (2021). As relevant to this appeal, subsection 96-14.5(a) mandates that "[a]n individual does not have a right to benefits and is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Division determines that the individual left work for a reason other than good cause attributable to the employer." N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a). "When an individual leaves work, the burden of showing good cause attributable to the employer rests on the individual and the burden may not be shifted to the employer." N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a). Good cause exists when an individual's "reason for [leaving] would be deemed by reasonable men and women valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work." In re Watson , 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968). "A separation is attributable to the employer if it was produced, caused, created or as a result of actions by the employer." Carolina Power , 363 N.C. at 565, 681 S.E.2d 776 (cleaned up).

¶ 11 Since the Division conceded on appeal that Lennane had good cause to leave work, the only question before us is whether the findings of fact support the conclusion of law that Lennane's leaving work was not attributable to his employer. See N.C.G.S. § 96-14.5(a). We cannot, as the Court of Appeals’ dissent did, substitute our view of the evidence for the findings of fact before us. See In re Lennane , 274 N.C. App. at 373, 852 S.E.2d 650 (Inman, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the findings of fact concerning the employer's attempt to make accommodations but dismissing them based on the dissent's interpretation of the manager's testimony and making its own findings concerning the detriment to Lennane's health from performing the equipment installations, Lennane's ability to perform the number of installations required of him by his employer, and Lennane's fault).

¶ 12 All findings of fact by the Division are as follows:

1. The claimant filed an initial claim for unemployment insurance benefits on November 11, 2018.

2. The claimant last worked for ADT LLC on November 16, 2018 as a service technician.

3. The Adjudicator issued a determination under Issue No.

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