Lennar Homes of Tex. Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Perry Homes, LLC

• Decision Date: 24 July 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H–14–1094.
• Citation: 117 F.Supp.3d 913
• Parties: LENNAR HOMES OF TEXAS SALES AND MARKETING, LTD., Plaintiff, v. PERRY HOMES, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

117 F.Supp.3d 913

LENNAR HOMES OF TEXAS SALES AND MARKETING, LTD., Plaintiff,

v.PERRY HOMES, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. H–14–1094.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Signed July 24, 2015.

William David Dunn, Connor G. Sheehan, John David Blakley, Dunn Sheehan LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Paul L. Mitchell, Kathryn Elizabeth Boatman, Joseph Webster Golinkin, II, Andrews Kurth LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Lennar Homes of Texas Sales and Marketing, Ltd. ("Lennar") brought this copyright action against Perry Homes, LLC ("Perry") alleging that two of Perry's townhome designs infringe on Lennar's copyrighted works. Pending before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 22). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and this action will be dismissed.

I. Background

Lennar and Perry are competing homebuilders. In 2013 Lennar contracted to build townhomes in Phase I of Creekside Park, a development in the Woodlands, Texas.¹ Lennar built two models of townhomes in Phase I, the Burgundy and the Bordeaux.² Each model was a modified version of an earlier Lennar design.³ In July of 2013 The Woodlands put lots in Phase II of Creekside Park up for bid.⁴ Homebuilders had two weeks to submit their bids, including proposed floor plans and elevations.⁵ Perry did not have preexisting townhome designs that fit the developer's criteria. Perry therefore prepared new designs, including the Perry 2249 and the Perry 2255, to submit with its bid.⁷ Five days before the bids were due, Perry's architect visited Lennar's townhomes under construction in Phase I and reviewed floor plans of the Burgundy and Bordeaux obtained from Lennar's salespeople.⁸ Perry submitted its plans, won the bid, and began construction. Lennar claims that Perry's 2249 and 2255 are infringing copies of the Burgundy and Bordeaux. Lennar registered its designs with the Copyright Office, and this litigation ensued.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Perry has moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. Primarily, Perry argues that Lennar's copyrights in the Burgundy and Bordeaux designs are invalid, that any similarity between Lennar's designs and Perry's is the fortuitous result of market conditions and developer's requirements, and that the elements of Lennar's designs that Perry is alleged to have copied are not protectable as a matter of law. Perry's invalidity arguments lack merit, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to raise a fact issue as to whether Perry copied Lennar's plans. However, even assuming that Perry copied Lennar's plans, any elements it copied were unprotectable as a matter of law, and Perry is entitled to summary judgment on Lennar's infringement claims.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Disputes about material facts are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party moving for summary judgment "must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 ). "If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Id. If, however, the moving party meets this burden, "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings" and produce evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553–54 ). The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

"In order to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific facts within the record that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." CQ, Inc. v. TXU Min. Co., L.P., 565 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir.2009). "The party must also articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim.... When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In reviewing the evidence "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

B. Analysis

Under the Copyright Act, copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An architectural work is an original work of authorship, § 102(a)(8), and may be embodied in various media including "a building, architectural plans, or drawings." § 101. The holder of a copyright in an architectural work has the exclusive right to reproduce the work. § 106. Anyone who violates that exclusive right is an infringer of the copyright of the author, and the legal or beneficial owner of the exclusive right is entitled to sue for infringement. § 501(a)-(b).

"To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove [1] ownership of a valid copyright and [2] copying of constituent elements of the work that are copyrightable." Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir.1994)supplemented, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir.1995). The first element, copyright ownership, is shown by (a) "proof of originality and copyrightability in the work as a whole" and (b) "compliance with applicable statutory formalities." Id. "To establish actionable copying (i.e., the second element), a plaintiff must prove: [a] factual copying and [b] substantial similarity." Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.2004), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). Factual copying may be established by direct evidence of copying, or it may be inferred from proof of access to the copyrighted work and "probative similarity" between the two works. Id. at 368. Substantial similarity is established by proof that the defendant's copying was legally actionable, i.e., that the defendant's work is substantially similar to protectable aspects of the original. See Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 550 (5th Cir.2015).

1. Ownership of Valid Copyright

" 'To establish "ownership," the plaintiff must prove that the material is original, that it can be copyrighted, and that he has complied with statutory formalities.' " Aspen Technology, Inc. v. M3 Technology, Inc., 569 Fed.Appx. 259, 268 (5th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (quoting Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (5th Cir.1991) ). In order to bring an infringement action a party must first register its work with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). "A certificate of registration, if timely obtained, is prima facie evidence both that a copyright is valid and that the registrant owns the copyright." General Universal Systems, Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir.2004) ; see § 410(c).⁹ "However, the presumption of validity and ownership that a certificate of registration creates is rebuttable." Interplan Architects, Inc. v. C.L. Thomas, Inc., No. H–08–3181, 2010 WL 4366990, at *24 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 27, 2010). "The effect of such a certificate is to place the burden of proof on the alleged infringer to disprove the validity of the copyright." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Perry argues that Lennar's non-compliance with statutory formalities invalidates Lennar's copyright certificates, the court will first address that issue and then turn to the issues of originality and copyrightability.

(a) Compliance with Statutory Formalities

Perry argues that Lennar's copyright is invalid because the Burgundy and Bordeaux are derivative works—based on preexisting Lennar designs—and that Lennar failed to disclose that fact to the Copyright Office. "Accordingly," Perry contends, "the Court should decline to enforce the copyright without even looking to the disputed plans."¹⁰ Although its arguments are difficult to disentangle, Perry's Motion for Summary Judgment raises three threshold issues: (i) whether failure to disclose the derivative nature of the Burgundy and Bordeaux designs invalidates their registrations; (ii) whether the court is required under § 411(2) to obtain an opinion from the Register of Copyrights as to the materiality of Lennar's failure to disclose;¹¹ and (iii) whether registration of a derivative work is sufficient to bring suit on the entire design, or only those elements that are new and unique to the derivative work.

(i) Lennar's registrations appear valid.

"A plaintiff complies with statutory formalities of copyright registration by submitting a complete...