Lennon v. City of Carmel

• Decision Date: 06 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1:15-cv-02072-JMS-MJD,1:15-cv-02072-JMS-MJD
• Parties: LAWRENCE B. LENNON, ROBERT SANFORD, CORY R. BURNS, PATRICIA A. THOMAS, JASON C. BROWN, AMANDA D. ALFORD, ASHLEY L. WILLIAMSON, ERIN E. MURRAY, LIZA J. BARTON, MICHAEL S. FULLER, LINDA H. HUGHES, JACOB B. SWAIN, ROBERT H. HAWK, KENNETH I. MCCLUNG, ROBERT G. SPALLER, JACOB O. WHITHAM, NICOLE K. HUNT, and J. DERON GABRIEL, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CARMEL, INDIANA; RICK SHARP, ERIC SEIDENSTICKER, CAROL SCHLEIF, SUE FINKAM, LUCI SNYDER, RON CARTER, KEVIN RIDER, THE HONORABLE JAMES BRAINARD, TIMOTHY GREEN, and DOUGLAS C. HANEY, in their individual capacities; CARMEL CITY COURT; THE HONORABLE BRIAN G. POINDEXTER, in his official capacity as Presiding City Court Judge; and KENT W. ABERNATHY, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

LAWRENCE B. LENNON, ROBERT SANFORD, CORY R. BURNS,
PATRICIA A. THOMAS, JASON C. BROWN, AMANDA D. ALFORD,
ASHLEY L. WILLIAMSON, ERIN E. MURRAY, LIZA J. BARTON,
MICHAEL S. FULLER, LINDA H. HUGHES, JACOB B. SWAIN, ROBERT H. HAWK,
KENNETH I. MCCLUNG, ROBERT G. SPALLER, JACOB O. WHITHAM,
NICOLE K. HUNT, and J. DERON GABRIEL,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CARMEL, INDIANA; RICK SHARP, ERIC SEIDENSTICKER,
CAROL SCHLEIF, SUE FINKAM, LUCI SNYDER, RON CARTER,
KEVIN RIDER, THE HONORABLE JAMES BRAINARD,
TIMOTHY GREEN, and DOUGLAS C. HANEY, in their individual capacities;
CARMEL CITY COURT; THE HONORABLE BRIAN G. POINDEXTER,
in his official capacity as Presiding City Court Judge; and KENT W. ABERNATHY,
in his official capacity as Superintendent of Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-02072-JMS-MJD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

October 6, 2016

ORDER

In their third attempt at pleading their case, Plaintiffs assert that their civil rights were violated when they received traffic tickets for violating Carmel, Indiana City Ordinance § 8-2, which incorporated state law traffic violations by reference. It is important to note the context in which this case arose. Jason Maraman, who is not a party to this lawsuit, received a § 8-2 citation for speeding from the Carmel Police Department. When the Carmel City Court entered judgment against him, he requested a trial de novo and filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court. The

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trial court denied his motion to dismiss and, proceeding pro se, he appealed that decision to the Indiana Court of Appeals. See Maraman v. City of Carmel, 47 N.E.3d 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Specifically, Mr. Maraman challenged the validity of § 8-2 based on Indiana's "Home Rule" laws. Id. at 1221-22 (citing Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(8) (stating that municipalities do not have the "power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute")). The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Maraman, found that § 8-2 was invalid and reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, but did not make a determination regarding the constitutionality of § 8-2. Id. at 1224. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on December 11, 2015, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer on April 12, 2016.

In stark contrast to Mr. Maraman, none of the Plaintiffs here sought dismissal of their § 8-2 citations or challenged the end-result of their adjudications, by appeal or otherwise, at the state court level. Nevertheless, in an apparent attempt to piggyback onto Mr. Maraman's success, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit a few weeks after the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision, on December 30, 2015.

Presently pending before the Court are: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Carmel City Court, the Honorable Brian Poindexter, and Kent Abernathy, Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") (collectively, "the Driving Record Defendants"), [Filing No. 56]; (2) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants City of Carmel, Indiana, Rick Sharp, Eric Seidensticker, Carol Schleif, Sue Finkam, Luci Snyder, Ron Carter, Kevin Rider, the Honorable James Brainard, Timothy Green, and Douglas Haney (collectively, "the Carmel Defendants"), [Filing No. 58]; (3) a Motion to Strike Carmel Defendants' Exhibits 1-19 and § II of Their Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Convert Carmel Defendants'

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Motion to Dismiss Into Summary Judgment Motion filed by Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 61]; (4) a Motion for Leave to File Surreply Brief in Opposition to Driving Record Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 68]; and (5) a Motion to Impose Sanctions filed by the Carmel Defendants, [Filing No. 72].¹

The pending motions all relate to the sufficiency of the Third Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") - the operative complaint in this matter. [Filing No. 45.] Even the Carmel Defendants' Motion to Impose Sanctions turns on that issue. The Court will first consider the pending Motion to Strike, [Filing No. 61], because it relates to the information the Court will consider in analyzing the Motions to Dismiss.

I. THE MOTION TO STRIKE

In their Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs request that the Court strike exhibits 1 through 19 submitted by the Carmel Defendants in support of their Motion to Dismiss, and the discussion related to those documents in their response brief. [Filing No. 61 at 1.] In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the Carmel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Filing No. 61 at 1.] The documents Plaintiffs seek to strike are the state court records relating to each Plaintiff's traffic citation, including the tickets themselves, [see, e.g., Filing 60-1 at 2], the state court dockets related to the disposition of the tickets, [see, e.g., Filing No. 60-1 at 3], and, for some Plaintiffs, deferral agreements, [see, e.g., Filing No. 60-5 at 3-6]. In the Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs argue that although they agree there is a public records exception to the rule

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that extraneous material should not be considered in connection with a motion to dismiss, this situation is different because the Carmel Defendants are "asking the Court to use documents which are the subject of dispute as a basis for determining the merits of the suit." [Filing No. 61 at 4.] Plaintiffs go on to discuss the substance of the documents, and argue that they contain hearsay and are "subject to interpretation." [Filing No. 61 at 4-5.]

In response, the Carmel Defendants argue that the exhibits are public judicial records, and are permitted in connection with a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). [Filing No. 70 at 1-2.] They also assert that the Court can take judicial notice of public records in deciding a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [Filing No. 70 at 3.]

On reply, Plaintiffs argue that the exhibits "add no new dispositive information that is not the subject of reasonable dispute, or alternatively, that is not already contained in the Complaint." [Filing No. 71 at 1.] They contend that the Carmel Defendants "do not limit the use of the extrinsic evidence's disputed facts to their 12(b)(1) arguments...." [Filing No. 71 at 2.]

When presented with a factual challenge to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings in order to make the necessary factual determinations to resolve its own jurisdiction. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). The Carmel Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss, among other things, that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and so their claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). [See Filing No. 59 at 12-16.] As discussed more fully below, the exhibits reflect whether each particular Plaintiff had a judgment entered against them, which is integral to the Court's analysis of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may preclude it from exercising subject-matter

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jurisdiction. Accordingly, because the exhibits directly relate to the portion of the Carmel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), they are properly considered by the Court.

Additionally, the Court can consider the exhibits in connection with the portion of the Carmel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The exhibits are part of the state court proceedings involving Plaintiffs, and so are public records of which the Court may take judicial notice. See White v. Keely, 814 F.3d 883, 886 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016) ("We may take judicial notice of public records, including public court documents, in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)"); Olson v. Champaign County, Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (same principle).

The Court finds Plaintiffs' position regarding the exhibits somewhat ironic. On the one hand, the tickets, how they came about, and how they were resolved is the primary basis for Plaintiffs' case. On the other hand, Plaintiffs do not want the Court to consider the actual tickets and the records of the state court proceedings because they fear the Carmel Defendants are misrepresenting their meaning. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. The exhibits are properly considered because they are integral to the Carmel Defendants' dismissal arguments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and because they are public records and so may be considered in connection with the Carmel Defendants' dismissal arguments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because the Court can properly consider the exhibits, converting the Carmel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment is not warranted. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Carmel Defendants' Exhibits 1-19 and § II of Their Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Convert Carmel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Into Summary Judgment Motion filed by Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 61], is DENIED.

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II. THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS

The Driving Record Defendants and the Carmel Defendants have moved separately to dismiss this matter, both arguing that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [See Filing No. 57; Filing No. 59.]

A. Standard of Review

"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that subject-matter jurisdiction exists for his or her claims. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003).

A...