Lennon v. L. A. W. Acceptance Corp. of R.I.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STEARNS, J.
• Citation: Lennon v. L. A. W. Acceptance Corp. of R.I., 48 R.I. 363, 138 A. 215 (R.I. 1927)
• Decision Date: 05 July 1927
• Docket Number: No. 6412.,6412.
• Parties: LENNON v. L. A. W. ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION OF RHODE ISLAND.

138 A. 215

LENNON

v. L. A. W. ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION OF RHODE ISLAND.

No. 6412.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 5, 1927.

Certified Question from District Court, Sixth Judicial District.

Action on the case for negligence, brought by James A. Lennon against L. A. W. Acceptance Corporation of Rhode Island. On certified question. Question answered, and papers sent back.

Littlefield, Otis & Knowles and Fred A. Otis, all of Providence, for plaintiff.

Hinckley, Allen, Tillingbast & Phillips, Roger T. Clapp, and Abbott Phillips, all of Providence, for defendant.

Charles P. Sisson, Atty. Gen., and Oscar L. Heltzen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Board of Public Roads.

Comstock & Canning, John E. Canning, William A. Graham, Albert A. Baker, and Lee & McCanna, all of Providence, amici curiæ.

STEARNS, J. This is an action on the case for negligence, which was brought in the Sixth district court and is now in this court on an order of certification by said court. G. L. 1923, c. 348, § 5.

Plaintiff sues to recover for damage to his automobile, caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by one Alfred H. Cann. The automobile, which was driven by Cann, was sold to him by an automobile sales company under a written agreement in the usual form of the so-called "conditional sales contract," whereby title to the automobile is retatned by the seller until full payment is made by the buyer and all other conditions are performed. After the sale on June 22, 1927, the sales company, for value received, indorsed and delivered to defendant the promissory notes of Cann, and assigned to defendant the agreement and all title and interest in the automobile. This action is brought against the defendant as the alleged owner of said automobile, under section 3, chapter 1040, Public Laws 1927:

"Sec. 3. Whenever any motor vehicle shall be used or operated upon any public highway of this state with the consent of the owner or lessee or bailee thereof, express or implied, or under any agreement with such owner or lessee or bailee, express or implied, the operator thereof, if other than such owner, shall in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle, and the agent of such lessee and of such bailee. The provisions of this section shall apply only to accidents which occur subsequent to the time when this act goes into effect."

Defendant demurred to the declaration, and after a hearing the following question has been certified to this court:

"If the owner of an automobile sells and delivers it under a so-called agreement of conditional sale, whereby the title to such automobile is reserved in such owner until payment is made by the purchaser of the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof (represented by an installment promissory note of such purchaser payable to such owner), and such owner thereafter assigns such conditional sale agreement and such reserved title to an automobile finance corporation purchasing for value such promissory note of the purchaser, is such automobile finance corporation thereupon to be deemed the 'owner' of such automobile, within the meaning of section 3 of chapter 1040 of the Public Laws of 1927, to the end that a person having suffered injury by reason of the negligent operation of such automobile upon a public highway in Rhode Island by such purchaser is entitled as a matter of law to recover damages from said automobile finance corporation for such injury?"

Chapter 1040, P. L. 1927, by section 5 is expressly declared to be supplementary and in addition to chapter 98, "Of Motor Vehicles and the Operation Thereof," and chapter 254, G. L. 1923, "Of Public Motor Vehicles," and all acts in amendment thereof and in addition thereto. Section 3 is thus made a part of said chapters and is to be construed in connection therewith. In section 1, paragraph 9, of chapter 98, the word "owner" is defined as follows: *

"'Owner' shall include any person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation holding title to a vehicle or...