Lennon v. MacGregor, 78-369-A

Decision Date12 December 1980
Docket NumberNo. 78-369-A,78-369-A
PartiesDoreen M. LENNON v. Linda MacGREGOR et al. ppeal.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case is before us on appeal brought by Doreen Lennon (plaintiff), from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Linda and Edwin MacGregor (defendants) by a justice of the Superior Court. The plaintiff argues that the personal injury release, upon which summary judgment was predicated, contained an ambiguity concerning whom the parties intended to release. Therefore, she contends a genuine issue of material fact existed in regard to the scope of the release, thus precluding summary judgment. We agree.

The plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Thomas S. Ey on April 11, 1975, when it was in a collision with an automobile driven by Linda MacGregor and owned by Edwin MacGregor. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of this accident, the treatment of which required prolonged hospitalization, extensive corrective surgery, and comprehensive physical therapy. During plaintiff's recuperation, her parents retained counsel to pursue actions on behalf of both Doreen and themselves.

Their attorney entered into separate settlement negotiations with a representative of Public Service Mutual Insurance Company (P.S.M.I. Co.), the carrier of coverage on the Ey motorcycle, and a claim representative of Aetna Casualty and Life Insurance Company (Aetna), the carrier of coverage on the MacGregor vehicle. Negotiation with the representative of P.S.M.I. Co. proved successful. Thomas Ey's insurer, P.S.M.I. Co., offered to pay policy limits in the amount of $20,000 to plaintiff. Upon proof of the policy limits, plaintiff accepted the $20,000 payment and executed a document entitled "Joint Tortfeasor Release," the first paragraph of which purportedly released "THOMAS S. EY and all other persons, firms or corporations from all claims * * *."

Subsequently, the negotiations with Aetna proved fruitless, and plaintiff commenced suit against the MacGregors. The MacGregors filed a third-party complaint against Thomas S. Ey, the driver of the motorcycle. Mr. Ey produced the release obtained on his behalf by his insurance carrier as a bar to the suit. The MacGregors, upon becoming aware of the release, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the "Joint Tortfeasor Release," heretofore unknown to them, in fact released them from liability, as well as the specifically named party, Thomas S. Ey.

The plaintiff's attorney objected to the motion, arguing that the release was ambiguous and therefore the intent of the parties must be ascertained by extrinsic evidence. Counsel submitted his affidavit to the trial court in which he stated that the parties to the release and their representatives intended to extinguish only the liability of Thomas S. Ey.

The trial justice granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants and in so doing, he ruled, inferentially, that the release was unambiguous as a matter of law. See O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 633, 359 A.2d 350, 353 (1976); Cassidy v. Springfield Life Ins. Co., 106 R.I. 615, 619, 262 A.2d 378, 380 (1970). It is our task on appeal, as it was the task of the trial justice, to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. 1 Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., R.I., 410 A.2d 986, 990 (1980); O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. at 633, 359 A.2d at 353.

Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs the availability of summary judgment. It provides in pertinent part:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as (a) matter of law."

We summarized the holdings of earlier cases concerning the requisite analysis when considering a motion for summary judgment in Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., R.I., 410 A.2d 986 (1980) as follows:

"(W)hen ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not pass on the weight or credibility of evidence. Palazzo v. Big G Supermarkets, Inc., 110 R.I. 242, 245, 292 A.2d 235, 237 (1972), but must consider affidavits and pleadings in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Marandola v. Hillcrest Builders, Inc., 102 R.I. 46, 49, 227 A.2d 785, 787-88 (1967)." Id. 410 A.2d at 990.

On appeal, we focus review upon issue finding. If we discern a genuine issue of material fact, we have no alternative but to reverse the order granting summary judgment. O'Connor v. McKanna, supra.

A release in a personal injury case is a contract, Julian v. Zayre Corp., R.I., 388 A.2d 813, 815 (1978). Whereas the construction of a clear and unambiguous contract presents an issue of law which may be resolved by summary judgment, Cassidy v. Springfield Life Ins. Co., supra, an ambiguous contract may not properly be resolved on summary judgment, O'Connor v. McKanna, supra. This court has held that when a written agreement is ambiguous, the intent of the parties who executed it must be ascertained by extrinsic evidence. Waterman v. Waterman, 93 R.I. 344, 175 A.2d 291 (1961); Davis v. Manchester, 17 R.I. 577, 23 A. 1016 (1892). When the pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits indicate a dispute as to intent, then a genuine issue of material fact exists, which cannot be resolved upon a motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff argues that the "Joint Tortfeasor Release" that she executed and gave to Thomas S. Ey is ambiguous regarding whether the parties...

To continue reading

Request your trial
360 cases
  • McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-0422-S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • 14 Enero 1986
    ...of `all persons, firms and corporations' is effective to release unnamed third persons not parties to the release." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 821 n. 1 (R.I. 1980). To the contrary, the state's highest tribunal has twice expressly declined opportunities to decide the question becaus......
  • Feller v. Miriam Hospital
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • 30 Octubre 2009
    ...but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980). During a summary judgment proceeding, "the justice's only function is to determine whether there are any issues involving mat......
  • Feller v. Miriam Hospital
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • 30 Octubre 2009
    ...but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980). During a summary judgment proceeding, "the justice's only function is to determine whether there are any issues involving mat......
  • Feller v. Miriam Hospital
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • 30 Octubre 2009
    ...but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980). During a summary judgment proceeding, "the justice's only function is to determine whether there are any issues involving mat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT