Lenoble v. Best Temps, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 3:02CV1673(DJS).,3:02CV1673(DJS).
• Citation: 352 F.Supp.2d 237
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Beth L. LENOBLE, Plaintiff, v. BEST TEMPS, INC., Photos Temps, Inc., and Robert J. Rosa, Defendants.

352 F.Supp.2d 237

Beth L. LENOBLE, Plaintiff, v. BEST TEMPS, INC., Photos Temps, Inc., and Robert J. Rosa, Defendants.

No. 3:02CV1673(DJS).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

January 14, 2005.

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William B. Barnes, Rosenstein & Barnes, Fairfield, CT, for Plaintiff.

Russell Atkinson Green, Giovanna T. Weller, Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

SQUATRITO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Beth L. Lenoble brings this action against defendants Best Temps, Inc. ("Best Temps"), Photos Temps, Inc. d/b/a Best Temps, Inc. ("Photos Temps"), and Robert J. Rosa pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ("Title VII"); the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-60 & 81c ("CFEPA"); and Connecticut's common law. Lenoble alleges the defendants discriminated against her in the workplace by disparaging her race, religion, and sexual orientation. Photos Temps has filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.# 53). For the reasons set forth herein, Photos Temps's motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTS

Through the causes of action alleged in her complaint, Lenoble seeks to hold defendant Photos Temps, which is a licensee of defendant Best Temps, liable for the torts of an agent of Best Temps. Best Temps functions as a headhunter of temporary personnel for employers. Best Temps shares its industry expertise and resources with other employment agencies through licensing agreements, wherein Best Temps agrees to provide the use of its trade name and "know-how" in exchange for royalties. Photos Temps is a licensee of Best Temps, and does business under the Best Temps trade name.

Aside from the licensing agreement, Best Temps and Photos Temps have different corporate structures and ownership. Robert Rosa formed and incorporated Best Temps, Inc. on September 28, 1995. As owner, president, and treasurer, Rosa controls all aspects of business at Best Temps, which includes the hiring and firing of its employees. Richard Photos formed and incorporated Photos Temps, Inc. d/b/a Best Temps, Inc. in March of 1996. Milford, Connecticut is the principal place of operation for Photo Temps. Photos is the owner, president, and treasurer of Photos Temps. Rosa has no ownership interest in Photos Temps. Likewise, Photos has no ownership interest in Best Temps. In addition, neither owner holds a position as an officer, director, or shareholder in the other owner's corporation. When considering the traditional formalities of corporate structure, Best Temps and Photos Temps are, on paper, undeniably two different business entities.

On February 22, 1996, a licensing agreement was executed between Best Temps and Photos Temps. The non-exclusive license agreement allows Photos Temps to use the trade name, symbols, logos, and methods of the licensor, Best Temps. A provision of the license agreement provides that "[t]his agreement does not in any way create the relationship of a joint venture, partnership or principal and agent between [Best Temps] and [Photos Temps]."

Lenoble is a New York citizen. Rosa hired Lenoble to act as a recruiter for Best Temps at its principal place of business in Monroe, Connecticut. Lenoble maintained this position at Best Temps between April 22, 2002 and July 11, 2002. Before and during her period of employment at Best Temps, Lenoble was Jewish and was a lesbian. For reasons yet to be determined by the trier of fact, Lenoble ceased to be employed by Best Temps on July 11, 2002.

II. DISCUSSION

Lenoble brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), Sections 46a-60 & 81c of the Connecticut General Statutes, and Connecticut's common law. The Amended Complaint sets forth the following claims: Count One alleges a deprivation of contractual rights (resulting from racial discrimination) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Count Two alleges a hostile and abusive work environment (workplace discrimination based on race and religion) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2(a); Counts Three and Four allege sexual orientation, religion, and gender discrimination in violation of Sections 46a-60 & 81c of the Connecticut General Statutes; and Counts Five through Ten seek relief available through state tort law. Photos Temps denies liability for-and seeks summary judgment on-all ten counts for the following reasons: it was never Lenoble's employer; it had no control over any aspect of Lenoble's employment at Best Temps; the corporate defendants cannot be considered a single or joint employer, joint enterprise, or partnership; and there was no agency relationship between the two corporations. (Dkt.# 53).

A. STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The burden is on the moving party `to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" American Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir.1975)). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The court must view all inferences and ambiguities in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982(2d Cir.1991). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Id.

B. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Photos Temps claims that Lenoble relies upon inadmissible hearsay in her opposition papers. Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the submission of affidavits in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary judgment. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd., v. William Gluckin & Co., 353 F.2d 946, 952 (2d Cir.1965)(holding that "conclusory statements and statements not made on personal knowledge do not comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and, therefore, may not be considered"). "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). "Hearsay testimony that would be inadmissible if testified to at trial may not properly be set forth in a Rule 56 affidavit accompanying a summary judgment motion." Spector v. Experian Info. Services, 321 F.Supp.2d 348, 353-54 (D.Conn.2004).

Some of the evidence Lenoble relies upon is indeed inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, should not be considered by this court when ruling on this summary judgment motion. See Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 71 (providing that "a district court deciding a summary judgment motion must be provided with admissible evidence demonstrating the truth of the non-movant's assertions"). In an interrogatory answer, Lenoble recounts inadmissible statements made by Jeff Soss, who was a fellow employee at Best Temps, and Anthony Osias, who was a former bookkeeper for Best Temps and Photos Temps. (Dkt. # 67, Ex. 2 at 10 ("While I worked for defendants Jeff Soss told me that the companies shared policies, procedures, financing and management."); Id. at 10-11 ("Mr. Osias said that defendant Rosa allocated expenses between the companies and had him move money between company accounts, not according to the name on the account, but according to convenience. Mr. Osias said that defendant Rosa had some of Osais'[s] expenses charged to a defendant Photos Temps account though he nominally worked for defendant Best Temps.")). These statements fit the definition of hearsay, and no exception applies to permit their admission. As such, these statements are excluded from evidence in this case.

The court also notes Photos Temps's arguments regarding the authentication of certain exhibits Lenoble relies upon. (Dkt.# 73). For the purpose of deciding this motion, however, the court will presume that Lenoble could properly authenticate the documents at issue at trial.

C. STATUTORY CLAIMS (COUNTS ONE THROUGH FOUR)

Lenoble, in Counts One through Four, alleges workplace discrimination in violation of federal and state statutes. Photos Temps avers that Rosa and Best Temps employed Lenoble at all relevant times, and that Lenoble had no legal relationship with Photos Temps. Photos Temps contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because it was never Lenoble's employer and, therefore, cannot be held liable for workplace discrimination.

1. Title VII and CFEPA (Counts Two through Four)

Photos Temps argues that it was not Lenoble's "employer" as that term is defined in Title VII. If Photos Temps was not Lenoble's "employer," then it cannot be held liable for workplace discrimination under Title VII or CFEPA.¹ This court uses the single and joint employer analyses to determine whether a non-employer has sufficient ties to a plaintiff or her employer to impose liability for workplace discrimination under Title VII and...