Lentz v. City of Cleveland
| Decision Date | 18 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:04CV0669.,1:04CV0669. |
| Citation | 410 F.Supp.2d 673 |
| Parties | Edward LENTZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, et. al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
David G. Oakley, Edward G. Kramer, Kramer & Associates, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
Gail D. Baker, Kevin J. Gibbons, City of Cleveland, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.
On March 22, 2004, Edward Lentz, Plaintiff, filed the above-captioned case in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas alleging discrimination, retaliation, § 1983, unlawful disclosure, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims. On April 8, 2004, the City of Cleveland, Public Safety Director Sanford Watson, and Chief of Police Edward Lohn (collectively "Defendants"), invoked this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and removed this action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
On September 16, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 23.) All issues have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The Court defers a ruling on the invasion of privacy claim until it rules on the pending motion to compel.
Edward Lentz, Plaintiff, is a police officer for the City of Cleveland ("Cleveland"). On December 06, 2001, he was guarding the home of then-Mayor-elect Jane Campbell. At approximately 8:30 a.m., a blue station wagon sped down the street and came to a screeching halt. As Lentz approached the vehicle, it backed away. He ordered the driver to stop, but the vehicle backed up, hit a tree, and drove towards him.
At some point, Lentz ended up on the roof of the vehicle. There are varying accounts as to how this happened.1 According to Lentz:
[B]efore the car took off directly at me at a high rate of speed, I attempted to get out of the way, as the vehicle struck me. It threw me up over the hood, and my weapon came out of my hand, landing on top of the roof of the car. I continued tumbling over the windshield and towards the driver's side of the vehicle, at which time my left arm got hung up on the luggage rack located on the rear roof of the vehicle.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 2, at 2.) However, three eyewitnesses dispute this account. According to them, he was not struck by the vehicle, but rather grabbed onto it on his own free will. (Defendants' Ex. A, at 9-10, 17 & 30.)
While Lentz was on the roof, the vehicle sped away in a "zig-zagging" fashion towards a busy intersection. After securing his weapon, Lentz shot fourteen rounds into the roof of the vehicle. As he indicated, "In fear of my life, as well as the numerous people and school children on the street, I put myself in the best position possible to fire down into the car, and not hit the passenger." (Plaintiff's Ex. 2, at 2.)
The vehicle continued through the intersection and crashed into a yard. Lentz immediately commanded both occupants out of the vehicle and onto the ground. He asked if either occupant was hit. The driver had been struck. He then called for backup, requested an ambulance, and began administering first aid.
It was later determined that the driver of the vehicle was Lorenzo Locklear, a 12 year-old African American male. He had stolen the vehicle and had illegal drugs in his possession. His wounds were nonfatal. The passenger, Dontez Torres, a 14 year-old African American male, was not harmed.
Immediately following the incident and pursuant to departmental policy, Lentz was given an automatic three-day administrative leave. Thereafter, and also pursuant to departmental policy, he was assigned to police gymnasium duty pending an investigation.2 (Plaintiff's Ex. 11.) On February 6, 2002, the Use-of-Deadly-Force ("UDF") investigation team completed its investigation and sent its report to First Assistant Prosecutor Edward Buelow. On March 11, 2002, Mr. Buelow submitted the case to the grand jury. (Plaintiff's Ex. 23.) However, in April of 2002, Lt. Robert Klimak of Internal Affairs requested the file back to re-interview witnesses and canvass the neighborhood. (Buelow Depo., at 42-44; Klimak Depo., at 160-64.) In October of 2002, the report was re-submitted to Chief Prosecutor Sanford Watson. (Watson Depo., at 38; Defendants' Ex. A-1.)
On February 5, 2003, Lentz was charged with felonious assault and a misdemeanor charge for providing false information to the UDF investigation team. On April 2, 2003, the grand jury returned an indictment on the misdemeanor falsification charge, but not on the felonious assault charge. On July 27, 2003, after the state presented its case, the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas judge dismissed the misdemeanor charge on a Rule 29 motion. The judge reasoned that the state's witnesses either had an obstructed view of the incident rendering their testimony unreliable; or that their testimony tended to support the notion that the vehicle struck Lentz. (Plaintiff's Ex. 46, at 284-86.)
On August 29, 2003, the Police Department filed departmental charges against Lentz for (1) violating the "use of force" policy, (2) alleging untruthful accounts of the shooting incident, and (3) "failing to notify" dispatch before he approached the vehicle.3 On September 4, 2003, Lentz entered a plea of no contest to the "failure to notify" charge and the Police Department dismissed the other charges. (Defendants' Ex. GG-1, at 6.) On September 8, 2004, he received a 3-day administrative leave. (Defendants' Ex. GG-2, at 4-5.) On September 17, 2003, he was reinstated and received back pay. Id.; (Plaintiff's Ex. 52.) In sum, he spent 652 days on gymnasium duty.
On December 7, 2001, Michael Tobin, from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, and Lisa Lowry, from WKYC-TV, submitted public records requests regarding the shooting incident. (Plaintiff's Exs. 8 & 10.) Pursuant to these requests, the Police Department released Lentz' personnel file.
On December 21, 2001, Lentz filed a grievance alleging that the Police Department released confidential and personal information in violation of the Police Department's collective bargaining agreement with the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association. (Plaintiff's Ex. 16.) On January 8, 2002, Chief Mary Bounds denied the grievance stating that the Police Department "does not release personal service records." (Plaintiff's Ex. 19.)
On April 19, 2002, Mr. Tobin published an article about the Locklear shooting in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The article included personal medical information about Lentz. Specifically, the article published the results of Lentz' pre-employment psychological evaluations conducted by Cleveland. (Defendants' Ex. H-5, at 2.)
On July 17, 2002, Lentz filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Cleveland for unlawful disclosure of medical records in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). (Plaintiff's Ex. 28.) In response, Cleveland filed a position paper admitting that it released the information. (Plaintiff's Ex. 30.) However, it has since recanted and now claims that the admission was in error. (Defendants' Ex. YY-1.)
On September 5, 2002, the EEOC issued a determination that Cleveland violated the ADA by releasing Lentz' pre-employment psychological evaluations. (Plaintiff's Ex. 30). On December 4, 2003, it issued a "right to sue" letter. (Defendants' Ex. Z-1.) On December 15, 2003, Lentz signed an acknowledgment of receipt. (Defendants' Ex. BBB.) On March 22, 2004, the current litigation was filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, (Defendants' Ex. Z-2.), and removed to federal court on April 8, 2004. (Docket No. 1.)
Alleging discrimination, retaliation, § 1983, unlawful disclosure, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims, Lentz is seeking back pay for lost overtime, compensatory damages, attorney fees, legal costs, and injunctive relief.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to either (1) present affirmative evidence negating an element of the non-movant's claim or (2) demonstrate "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once that burden is met, the non-movant must set forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Klepper v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir.1990). To avoid summary judgment, the non-movant must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
All reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual disputes between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Indeed, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence is...
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