Lenz v. Milwaukee County
| Decision Date | 21 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-C-1261.,95-C-1261. |
| Citation | 961 F.Supp. 1268 |
| Parties | Michael LENZ and Ronald Listl on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY, a county corporation, and Milwaukee County Employees' Retirement System, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Mark A. Grady, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel, Milwaukee, for Plaintiffs.
Kenneth J. Dunlap, Milwaukee, for Defendant.
DECISION and ORDER
On November 24, 1995, the plaintiffs, fifty-six former Milwaukee County employees, all of whom had retired between January 1, 1994, and November 29, 1994, filed a complaint in the circuit court for Milwaukee County against Milwaukee County ["the County"] and the Milwaukee County Pension Board ["the Board"]. The complaint, as amended, alleges that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by granting additional retirement benefits to employees of the County who retired on or after November 30, 1994. In addition, the amended complaint contains two state law claims.
The County removed this action to federal court on December 13, 1995, on the ground that the case involves a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over which this court has original jurisdiction. By decision and order of December 10, 1996, the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed with this case as a class action. The certified class [hereinafter collectively referred to as the "plaintiffs"] consists of no less than 203 former employees of the County who retired between January 1, 1994, and November 29, 1994.
Presently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion will be granted.
Summary judgment may be awarded only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying "those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). A movant may satisfy this burden by presenting specific evidence on a material issue, or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. Where, as here, the plaintiffs are opposing the motion for summary judgment, they are then obligated to come forward with affirmative evidence supporting their allegations. Id. See also Local Rule 6.05(b)(1) and (d).
Local Rule 6.05 outlines the parties' respective obligations with respect to motions for summary judgment; it provides (emphasis added):
(a) Motion. The moving papers must include either (1) a stipulation of facts between the parties, or (2) the movant's proposed findings of fact, or (3) a combination of (1) and (2).
(1) The movant must present only the factual propositions upon which there is no genuine issue of material fact and which entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law, including those going to jurisdiction and venue, to the identity of the parties, and to the background of the dispute.
(2) Factual propositions shall be set out in numbered paragraphs, with the contents of each paragraph limited as far as practicable to a single factual proposition.
(b) Response. Any materials in opposition to a motion filed under this rule must be filed within 30 days from service of the motion and must include:
(1) A specific response to the movant's proposed findings of fact, clearly delineating only those findings to which it is asserted that a genuine issue of material fact exists. The response must refer to the contested finding by paragraph number and must cite evidentiary materials which support the claim that a dispute exists.
* * * * * *
(d) In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court will conclude that there is no genuine material issue as to any proposed finding of fact to which no response is set out.
In compliance with Local Rule 6.05(a), the defendants — the movants — filed proposed findings of fact which identified those facts upon which there is no genuine issue. For the most part, the defendants cited evidentiary materials to support their factual propositions. The plaintiffs have filed a response to the defendants' proposed factual findings. However, my examination of the response reveals that it is deficient under Local Rule 6.05(b) as it merely states whether the plaintiffs agree or disagree with a particular proposed finding of fact identified by the defendants. As to the contested findings, the plaintiffs' response fails, with one minor exception, to refer to any evidentiary materials which support their contention that a dispute exists. See Local Rule 6.05(b)(1) and (d). Moreover, on the one occasion in which the plaintiffs cite evidentiary material, the evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs does not contradict the defendants' version of the fact at issue. (Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact ["DPFF"] ¶ 42; Dobbert Aff. ¶ 6; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact ["PR"] ¶ 42.)
Local Rule 6.05(d) is clear as to the consequences of the failure of the non-movant to submit an appropriate response to a movant's proposed finding of fact: the court may conclude that there is no genuine issue of material issue as to that factual finding. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs have not contested any of the factual findings propounded by the defendants as contemplated under Local Rule 6.05, I am permitted to conclude that the facts, as identified by the defendants in their proposed findings of fact, are undisputed. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-922 (7th Cir.1994). ("We have ... repeatedly upheld the strict enforcement of [local rules regarding summary judgment obligations], sustaining the entry of summary judgment when the non-movant has failed to submit a factual statement in the form called for by the pertinent rule and thereby conceded the movant's version of the facts.").
Based on the above, the undisputed facts are as follows. The plaintiffs are members of a class certified by the court on December 10, 1996, consisting of former employees of the County who retired between January 1, 1994, and November 29, 1994. (Amended Complaint ¶ 6.) The County is a political subdivision of the state of Wisconsin and the Board is a state-created agency with authority and control over the County's employees' retirement system which was also created by state law. The court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The County owned and operated John L. Doyne Hospital ["Doyne"], a public facility, for approximately the past 100 years. (Grady Aff. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Froedtert Hospital ["Froedtert"], a private facility, has been operated in close proximity to Doyne and as a complimentary facility for approximately the last 30 years. (Id.) Numerous studies performed over the past two decades have concluded that the governance of Doyne should be restructured to increase its independence from County operations. (Id.) Those studies also made recommendations designed to achieve that objective, none of which were pursued prior to October 1994. (Id.) The division of clinical services between Doyne and Froedtert had resulted in two "half hospitals" each of which found it increasingly difficult to compete effectively with other hospitals in the community. (Id.)
Over the several months prior to October 1994, various County officials studied several different possible governance models for Doyne, including a management contract, a lease or sale of its assets to Froedtert, a transfer of Doyne operations to another private corporation and the formation of a new parent corporation over both Doyne and Froedtert. (Id.) In analyzing these alternatives, the County board of supervisors reached the preliminary conclusion that the development of a parent hospital corporation for both Doyne and Froedtert was the best of all available options. (Id.) On October 17, 1994, the County board of supervisors recommended the formation of a hospital management group to develop a definitive agreement to combine Froedtert and Doyne under a single parent hospital corporation board. (Id.)
County executive F. Thomas Ament submitted his proposed budget for 1995 to the board of supervisors on October 1, 1994, which provided for the continued operation of Doyne in 1995. (Grady Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The budget did not recommend that the County discontinue operating Doyne as a County facility. (Id.)
During late October and early November 1994, the hospital management work group met weekly to facilitate the board of supervisor's resolution regarding the formation of a single parent hospital corporation board. On November 30, 1994, the hospital management work group submitted a report to the board of supervisors proposing a definitive agreement between Doyne and Froedtert to implement a combined hospital structure. (Grady Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. C.) The report also noted that employee and labor relations issues would have to be analyzed in greater depth and that the proposed definitive agreement allowed for the flexibility of a sale or lease of all of Doyne's assets to Froedtert as an alternative to forming a combined organization with a single parent corporation board. (Id.)
An early retirement incentive plan was not discussed or proposed by senior management officials with authority to implement the change prior to November 30, 1994. (DPFF ¶¶ 16 and 17; PR ¶¶ 16 and 17.) A specific proposal for an early retirement...
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Listle v. Milwaukee County
...County employees were first affected by layoffs due to the downsizing or consolidation of Doyne with Froedtert. Lenz v. Milwaukee County, 961 F.Supp. 1268, 1274 (E.D.Wis.1997). For these reasons, the court concluded that the county and its pension board were entitled to summary judgment on ......