Lenz v. Prescott

• Decision Date: 12 May 1887
• Citation: Lenz v. Prescott, 144 Mass. 505, 11 N. E. 923 (Mass. 1887)
• Parties: LENZ v. PRESCOTT and others.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

144 Mass. 505

11 N.E. 923

LENZ v. PRESCOTT and others.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

May 12, 1887

COUNSEL

Rollin Mathewson and E.H. Bennett, for plaintiff.

The bill is brought to establish the plaintiff's equitable title to a trust fund under an assignment to her, her title being denied by the trustee and by the assignor, and the fund being claimed adversely to her; for an account of said fund for a decree charging the several defendants into whose hands said fund has come as her trustees for the same, they having received it with full notice of her rights; for discovery and for an injunction.

Plaintiff is entitled to this relief in equity.

The bill is grounded upon a trust. Bartlett, as administrator, is a trustee of the estate, "in favor of heirs, legatees, creditors, and others interested in the settlement of the estate." Stone v. Hobart, 8 Pick. 464, 466; Holland v. Cruft, 20 Pick. 321 326; 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 593; 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 1067.

Prescott received all the money he did receive solely as trustee upon the trusts of the assignment to him.

The money in hands of Bartlett, administrator, being trust money the trust attached to it into whosesoever hands it came with notice. Prescott and Welcome are thus both chargeable as plaintiff's trustees for the money they rereceived. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. §§ 533, 534.

Plaintiff's title is an equitable title. Welcome's assignment to her is only an equitable assignment. He had conveyed to Prescott his legal title to his own legacy, and he had only an equitable title to Roscoe's and Alfred's legacies.

Plaintiff has no action at law against Bartlett, and none against Prescott in her own name, if at all; and whatever remedies she may have at law, as Prescott and Bartlett and Welcome all deny her title, she can bring them into equity in the first instance. Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass. 241, 243; Angell v. Stone, 110 Mass. 54; Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327, 332; Story, Eq.Pl. § 153, and notes; 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 1057a.

Where trustee is bound to account, bill lies, though there be a remedy at law. First Congregational Soc. v. Trustees, 23 Pick. 153; Badger v. McNamara, 123 Mass. 117.

Other grounds of equity jurisdiction are, because here are conflicting claims to the same property, and the bill is in the nature of a bill of interpleader, and because, if there is any remedy at law, the remedy in equity is more plain and complete. Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray, 348; Pool v. Lloyd, 5 Metc. 528; East Sudbury v. Belknap, 1 Pick. 517; Peabody v. Tarbell, 2 Cush. 231.

But the plaintiff has no remedy at law, because the amount which she is entitled to receive of either defendant cannot be determined in a court at law. These accounts can only be taken in equity. The bill asks for an injunction against Bartlett, and for a discovery. Plaintiff has no standing in a probate court. Probate courts do not take cognizance of assignments by legatees or heirs of their interests. Hewitt's Appeal, (Conn.) 1 Atl.Rep. 815; Knowlton v. Johnson, 46 Me. 489; Wood v. Stone, 2 Chand. (N.H.) 572; Pond v. Pond, 13 Mass. 413; Procter v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 81-93; Osgood v. Breed, Id. 355; Hancock v. Hubbard, 19 Pick. 167.

The bill is not multifarious. In the taking of the accounts, all persons interested in them, or in the fund, must be made parties, in order that multiplicity of suits may be prevented, and that the rights of all parties may be adjusted and settled, and that all persons having any interest in the subject-matter of the suit may be bound by the decree. Story, Eq.Pl. § 72 et seq.; Id. §§ 218, 219; Calv. Parties, 1-11. Each of the defendants is interested in one or all of these accounts. Plaintiff cannot split her claim against any defendant, and sue him for a part of her claim only. She must sue for the whole of her claim, if she sues at all. Story, Eq.Pl. § 287; 1 Daniell, Ch.Pr. 330, and note 2,337; 337; Story, Eq.Pl. §§ 76c, 218, and notes. Joining these parties does not make the bill multifarious. Story, Eq.Pl. § 278a, and notes; Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Mylne & C. 603; Percival v. Blower, 1 Law J.Ch. 1; Knye v. Moore, 1 Sim. & S. 61; Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 377; Carr v. Silloway, 105 Mass. 550. If the case is entire as to one defendant, it is not multifarious as to another. Parr v. Attorney General, 8 Clark & F. 409, 434; Attorney General v. Poole, 4 Mylne & C. 17; Carrier v. Sears, 4 Allen, 341.

The foregoing considerations establish that equity has jurisdiction of the case made by the bill; that plaintiff has neither an adequate remedy, nor any remedy, but in equity; and that the bill is not multifarious,--which answers all the demurrers.

Upon the question of multifariousness, it may be further observed: The bill has but one single object, viz., to collect, by a sort of equitable trustee process, a single debt due, from Welcome to plaintiff, out of his interest in his uncle Thomas Greene's estate. Every allegation, every party summoned, every decree asked for, is auxiliary to that one object. "Demurrer for multifariousness will hold only when the plaintiff claims several matters of a different nature, and not where one general right is claimed by the plaintiff, although the defendants may have separate and distinct rights." See Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 377. The assignment of Welcome to the plaintiff conveyed every dollar of his interest in Thomas Greene's estate, after paying Bird's debt, and the interest so conveyed cannot possibly be reached without making all the defendants parties.

C.W. Clifford and F.C.S. Bartlett, for defendants.

The amended bill is multifarious. The bill presents three entirely distinct cases: (1) A claim for Welcome A. Greene's legacy under the will of Thomas A. Greene; (2) a claim for Welcome A. Greene's legacy under the will of Roscoe Greene; (3) a claim for Welcome A. Greene's distributive share as heir of Alfred Greene, deceased. If it is claimed that the agreement between certain parties to this bill, set out in amended bill, section 13, distinguishes the amended bill from the original one, and avoids the objection of multifariousness which was formerly open to us, it is sufficient to say that, so far as it relates to the question whether the bill is multifarious as to Prescott, that neither Prescott nor Bird are alleged to have been parties to said agreement, and therefore, if the bill was multifarious as to Prescott before, the amended bill must still be multifarious as to both Prescott and Bird. The test of multifariousness, so far as it can be stated, seems to be as follows: If a defendant can say, "I am called upon to answer a bill containing two distinct subject-matters, with one of which I am concerned, and am associated with other defendants not concerned with that issue, and solely concerned with the other," then he may demur for multifariousness. Drewry, Eq.Pl. 42. This seems to be the rule in England and this commonwealth. Cousens v. Rose, L.R. 12 Eq. 366; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Cambridge WaterWorks v. Somerville Drying Co., 14 Gray, 193. Several distinct matters are sometimes considered in one bill, when, however, there exists some connecting link rendering a combination of them convenient. Heard, Eq.Pl. with precedents, p. 44.

Is Welcome A. Greene's legacy under Thomas A. Greene's will a vested or contingent interest? Thus far this case has been presented upon the theory that the interest which said Welcome has under the will of said Thomas is a vested interest, as alleged, and not a contingent one, as we contend it is; in which latter event the plaintiff's assignment is invalid, as the estate would not be a contingent estate covered by Pub.St. c. 126, § 2, and hence would not be assignable. See Gibbens v. Gibbens, 140 Mass. 102, 3 N.E. 1.

The case at bar is distinguishable from the Gibbens Case. (1) In the Gibbens Case the bequest was to the testator's own children, here it is to the children of the testator's brother; (2) in the Gibbens Case the class was finally determined at the death of the testator, here it may not be finally determined until long after the termination of the life-estate. The effect of this difference is very noticeable. In the Gibbens Case the death or the survival of the children could not change the descent of the property from the objects of the testator's bounty. Under that decision his children or his grandchildren, if he had any must necessarily take; but in this case the result may directly violate the clear intentions of the testator. Suppose a child of Welcome A. Greene should outlive the testator, and then die during the life-tenancy of the widow without issue, its share would then go, if it were a vested legacy, to the father, Welcome A. Greene, if living, as its heir, or to its mother, if living, if its father were dead, to the exclusion of its brothers and sisters. But can the court have any doubt that the testator intended that in case a child of Welcome A. Greene died during the widowhood of Mrs. Thomas A. Greene, without issue, that its share should be divided among its brothers and sisters? And, to carry the case a little further, suppose, under such circumstances, the father were dead, and the mother survived, and then died, it would carry the property to her heirs, though no blood relation existed to Thomas A. Greene whatever. While the decision in the Gibbens Case is, of course, the law of this commonwealth, I am sure that the court will hesitate before extending that doctrine an iota; and the language of the court in that case, in its reference to the special language of the will, and to the arguments to be drawn therefrom, indicate very strongly that the court did not intend that the decision should be precedent for a case where there was a substantial...