Lenz v. Washington

• Decision Date: 11 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-16.,05-16.
• Citation: 444 F.3d 295
• Parties: Michael William LENZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald K. WASHINGTON, Acting Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

444 F.3d 295

Michael William LENZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald K. WASHINGTON, Acting Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-16.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued February 1, 2006.

Decided April 11, 2006.

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ARGUED: Jennifer Leigh Givens, Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Bain Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James C. Turk, Jr., Stone, Harrison & Turk, P.C., Radford, Virginia, for Appellant. Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General of Virginia, Jerry P. Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney General & Chief, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINS and Judge LUTTIG joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge.

Michael Lenz was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally stabbing a fellow inmate at a Virginia state correctional facility. His guilt is not in dispute. He now appeals the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition, seeking review of four alleged constitutional violations arising out of his state trial: denial of effective representation based on the location and conditions of his incarceration, ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, improper exclusion of evidence at sentencing, and juror use of a Bible during sentencing deliberations. We have reviewed these claims with care, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

On the evening of January 16, 2000, petitioner Michael Lenz joined Brent Parker, Jeffrey Remington, and three other inmates at the Augusta Correctional Center for a meeting of a group known as the "Ironwood Kindred." Petitioner was an adherent of a religion known as "Asatru," and intended to lead an Asatru ceremony at the meeting. Petitioner and Parker had a history of conflict relating to the practice of Asatru. According to petitioner, Parker and others had thwarted his efforts to form an official group within the prison devoted to Asatru, and Parker had threatened his life on two separate occasions. Petitioner admitted that he planned to kill Parker that evening.

The Asatru ceremony began with petitioner performing some ritual incantations, reciting poetry, and calling upon an Asatru deity. Petitioner then called Parker to the altar. After petitioner and Parker had a brief conversation, petitioner and Remington attacked Parker with knives. The ensuing commotion alerted the only correctional officer present, who was stationed outside the meeting room. Through a window in the door, the officer observed petitioner and Remington repeatedly stabbing Parker, while Parker lay face-up on the floor between them "making a feeble attempt to defend himself" with his hands. The officer ordered them to stop, but they ignored him and carried on with their attack. He also called for backup, but did not attempt to intervene by himself because he was unarmed.

While the officer awaited assistance, petitioner and Remington continued their assault. The next officer to arrive observed Parker in a fetal position, making no attempt to defend himself, while petitioner stabbed him "over and over and over." This second officer also ordered petitioner and Remington to stop, but to no avail. Once sufficient additional personnel arrived, correctional officers entered the room and apprehended petitioner and Remington.

A prison nurse called to the scene found Parker alive, but in very critical condition. Despite her best efforts, Parker continued to bleed profusely, and he died at the Augusta Medical Center. An autopsy revealed that he had sustained sixty-eight stab wounds, all inflicted while he was still alive. These included seven stab wounds each to Parker's left lung and liver, either set of which would have been fatal even without his numerous additional injuries.

Petitioner was tried before a jury in Virginia state court and convicted of capital murder. See Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-31(3) (2004). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed his punishment at death, after finding each of two possible statutory aggravating factors: that his future violent acts "would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" and that his offense conduct "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." Id. § 19.2-264.2 (2004). On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. See Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 S.E.2d 299, 311(Va.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003, 122 S.Ct. 481, 151 L.Ed.2d 395 (2001).

Petitioner subsequently filed a state habeas petition, asserting several errors in his trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court of Virginia initially concluded that petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and thus granted the petition in part, denied it in part, and remanded for resentencing. See Lenz v. Warden, 265 Va. 373, 579 S.E.2d 194, 199 (2003). However, it granted the Commonwealth's motion for rehearing and issued a second opinion denying the petition in full. See Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305(Va.), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953, 124 S.Ct. 2933, 159 L.Ed.2d 836 (2004).

Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas petition in the district court for the Western District of Virginia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The district court denied the petition, and also denied petitioner's subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment. See Lenz v. True, 370 F.Supp.2d 446, 450 (W.D.Va.2005) (original order); Lenz v. True, 373 F.Supp.2d 606, 607 (W.D.Va.2005) (denial of motion). We granted a certificate of appealability on petitioner's claims.

Petitioner now presents four substantive constitutional claims for our review. Before we consider these four claims, we set forth the proper standard of habeas review and address petitioner's contention that the district court failed to apply it properly.

II.

The federal habeas statute "dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 125 S.Ct. 847, 853, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The required deference encompasses both the state court's legal conclusions and its factual findings.

A.

Where the state court has adjudicated a particular claim on the merits, federal habeas relief is appropriate only in two circumstances. The first occurs if the state court's judgment "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nonetheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir.2005). "An `unreasonable application' occurs when a state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] petitioner's case." Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Booth-El v. Nuth, 288 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir.2002).

The second circumstance where a federal court may grant habeas relief despite a state court decision on the merits is if the state court's judgment "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Moreover, in reviewing a habeas petition, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct" unless the habeas petitioner rebuts this presumption "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).

B.

The relation between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1) is a source of much dispute between the parties. Though he presents only one § 2254(d)(2) claim — relating to juror use of the Bible during sentencing — for our substantive review, petitioner pressed several such claims before the district court. He contends to us that the district court erred procedurally in applying the § 2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness in the course of adjudicating these claims. He points out, for example, that in assessing whether the state court's dismissal of his Bible claim rested upon an "unreasonable determination of the facts," the district court stated that it must "presume the state court's findings of fact to be correct unless the petitioner makes a clear and convincing showing to the contrary." Lenz v. True, 370 F.Supp.2d at 461. Petitioner argues that § 2254(e)(1) has no place in the § 2254(d)(2) inquiry, and that statements such as this compel us to remand the district court's decision in its entirety.

Petitioner's argument is undercut by both Supreme Court precedent and our own. In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court indicated that the two provisions interrelate:

[petitioner] may obtain relief only by showing the [state court's] conclusion to be "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, we presume the [state] court's factual findings to be sound unless [petitioner] rebuts the "presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence."...