Leo Foundation v. Cabelus

Decision Date26 May 1964
Citation201 A.2d 654,151 Conn. 655
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesThe LEO FOUNDATION v. Bernard E. CABELUS, Building Inspector of the Town of Berlin. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Anthony I. Wells, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

James F. Dawson, New Britain, for appellee (defendant).

Before KING, C. J., MURPHY, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ., and HOUSE, Acting justice.

MURPHY, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, a corporation, operates a private school in Berlin. The sole defendant is the town building inspector. The plaintiff seeks both prohibitory and mandatory injunctive relief against the defendant in his official capacity and at the same time maintains that the town does not have a legally appointed building inspector. In addition, the plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that the building code is invalid and that the town does not have a legally appointed building inspector. Finally, the plaintiff asks for a judgment validating a 1959 building permit which expired one year after date of issuance. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed.

Of the three assignments of error seeking corrections in the finding, the plaintiff has briefed only two and those only in part. The claims of error not briefed are considered to have been abandoned. West Realty Co. v. Ennis, 147 Conn. 602, 603, 164 A.2d 409. The claims of error which were briefed will be discussed later.

The unchallenged findings of fact recite that the plaintiff obtained a building permit on July 19, 1959, from the town engineer for the erection of a school building. The permit stated that it was void one year from date of issue. The permit was not renewed or extended. The foundation of the building was laid in 1959, but the major portion of the construction work was done after the permit expired. On March 12, 1960, the defendant was appointed building inspector by the board of selectmen. Thereafter, on three occasions prior to November 9, 1962, he sought to have the plaintiff obtain permits for work done on the building after the 1959 permit expired. On November 9, 1962, the plaintiff applied to the defendant for a new building permit to complete the construction of the building or, in the alternative, to extend the original permit to allow completion of the construction of the building. The plans for the building did not carry the seal required by General Statutes § 20-293 as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit.

From these facts, the court was justified in concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from requiring the plaintiff to obtain permits for the work done on the building after the 1959 permit expired or to a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to issue a new building permit as prayed for in the complaint as amended. Furthermore, the allegations in the amendment to the complaint state that it is the belief of the plaintiff that the defendant has no right to require the plaintiff to obtain permits for the work accomplished without permits nor to refuse to issue a new permit until the past due permits are obtained. An injunction is a harsh remedy. Where the application is based on information and belief without any clear and positive averment of facts sufficient to warrant the relief sought, it will not be granted. Wells v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 30 Conn. 316, 323; 1 High, Injunctions (4th Ed.) §§ 34, 35.

The finding does not contain any claims of law raised by the plaintiff in the trial court which it desires to have reviewed on appeal. Practice Book, 1963, §§ 223, 619. Nevertheless, in argument and in its brief, the plaintiff...

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17 cases
  • Stocker v. City of Waterbury
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 24, 1967
    ...605, 607, 87 A.2d 805; Zamatha v. Harak, 134 Conn. 480, 483, 58 A.2d 704. 'An injunction is a harsh remedy'; Leo Foundation v. Cabelus, 151 Conn. 655, 657, 201 A.2d 654, 655, and when an equitable injunction is the specific relief claimed, it is incumbent upon the party seeking relief to al......
  • Osorio-Fuentes v. Smith, No. CV04 0486751 S (CT 4/12/2004), CV04 0486751 S
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 12, 2004
    ...of an extraordinary power . . ." Scoville v. Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67, 74 (1971). "An injunction is a harsh remedy." Leo Foundation v. Cabelus, 151 Conn. 655, 657 (1964). "The requirements generally for a temporary injunction are (1) the establishment of a legal right, which involves a likeli......
  • Benz v. Walker
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 12, 1966
    ...of Town of Madison, 152 Conn. 262, 270, 205 A.2d 774; Brewster v. Brewster, 152 Conn. 228, 236, 206 A.2d 106; Leo Foundation v. Cabelus, 151 Conn. 655, 658, 201 A.2d 654; Connecticut Society of Architects, Inc. v. Bank Building & Equipment Corporation, 151 Conn. 68, 77, 193 A.2d 493; Corsin......
  • Anderson v. Latimer Point Management Corp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 12, 1988
    ...clear that the power of equity to grant injunctive relief may be exercised only under demanding circumstances. Leo Foundation v. Cabelus, 151 Conn. 655, 657, 201 A.2d 654 [1964].... 'Restraining the action of an individual or a corporation by injunction is an extraordinary power, always to ......
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