Leon v. Detroit Harvester Co.
| Decision Date | 29 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 30,30 |
| Citation | 363 Mich. 366,109 N.W.2d 804 |
| Parties | Philip LEON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DETROIT HARVESTER COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Philip A. Gillis, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.
Crawford, Sweeny, Dodd & Kerr, Detroit, for defendant and appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
SOURIS, Justice (reversed and remanded).
Plaintiff and 49 others, for whom he sues as assignee, were employed by defendant company. The labor union which represented them had a collective bargaining agreement with defendant which covered the periods from September 29, 1952 to September 29, 1953 and from the date to September 29, 1954. Before the latter date negotiations commenced between the contracting parties for a new agreement and just prior to the expiration date it was extended by mutual agreement first, for a 30-day period, then for varying periods from time to time during continuing negotiations until it was allowed to expire on March 13, 1955. Thereafter, plaintiff and his assignors continued to work for defendant but without a collective bargaining agreement. It was stipulated at the trial that defendant's operations were unprofitable and that, for that reason, by the end of May, 1955 it had ceased operations and had discharged plaintiff and all of his assignors.
Suit was brought to recover unpaid vacation pay benefits claimed due under the expired collective bargaining agreement which provided, in part, as follows:
'Article 7--Annual Vacation
vacation with pay.
'(A) Employees who on said date have been in the employ of the Company Fifteen (15) Years or more, and who, during the preceding twelve (12) months have worked not less than seventy-five per cent of the available working time, shall receive Three (3) weeks' vacation, with pay.
'Vacation pay shall be computed by multiplying the employee's regular straight time hourly earnings by the number of hours the Plant is regularly scheduled to operate, not exceeding forty-eight (48) hours per week.
* * *'
Although the declaration is not entirely clear on the point, the pre-trial statement limited plaintiff's claims to vacation pay benefits on a pro rata basis for the period immediately preceding March 13, 1955, the expiration date of the agreement. In his brief on appeal, however, plaintiff claims he is entitled to benefits computed as of the date he and each of his assignors respectively terminated their employment with defendant. The circuit judge who tried the case on stipulated facts entered a judgment of no cause of action and did not squarely determine the scope of plaintiff's claims for relief. On appeal plaintiff asserts as one basis for recovery that if the contract is construed to require employment by defendant on July 1 as a condition precedent to qualification for vacation pay benefits, the condition should be deemed waived to permit payment on a pro rata basis, at the very least, because he and his assignors were prevented by their discharge by defendant, through no fault of their own, from compliance with the condition.
This argument overlooks the fact that at the time of discharge the collective bargaining agreement was no longer in effect. In the absence of any proof of an agreement, express or implied, by defendant to pay its employees vacation pay benefits during the terminal period from March 13, 1955 to the dates of their discharge, there is no basis upon which plaintiff can claim such benefits for that period. We conclude that plaintiff's claims must stand or fall upon the collective bargaining agreement for the period immediately preceding March 13, 1955, the date of the agreement's expiration.
Plaintiff contends in his brief that the language of section 1 of the agreement is ambiguous and, therefore, justifies construction to permit qualification for vacation pay benefits even in the absence of employment on July 1. Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff's contention of contractual ambiguity, his argument applies only to the collective bargaining agreement upon its execution and during the two full one-year periods it was in effect. But, on September 29, 1954 the parties thereto extended the agreement for 30 days, and again subsequently for varying periods of time until it was allowed to expire on March 13, 1955. We are not here concerned with what the parties intended in September of 1953. We are concerned with what the parties contemplated with reference to vacation pay benefits when the contract was extended in September of 1954 until October 29, 1954. It is, of course, as of the extension dates we must construe the language to determine the intention of the parties. Klever v. Klever, 333 Mich. 179, 52 N.W.2d 653, and Sobezak v. Kotwicki, 347 Mich. 242, 79 N.W.2d 471. The vacation pay provisions of the contract, considered as of the dates of extension, have no meaning whatever unless they are construed to require payment of pro rata benefits upon expiration of the extended agreement. That parties so intended logically follows analysis of the provisions of the contract as of the dates of its extensions.
On September 29, 1954, when it was mutually extended for one month, both parties knew that article 7 quoted above could never be fully implemented for any of the defendant's employees because the extension was scheduled to expire before the next June 1, the first date any employee could claim full vacation pay benefits under section 3. In construing this contract as of the various dates of its extensions, we must give effect to all of its provisions of it is possible to do so. Galperin v. Michelson, 301 Mich. 491, 3 N.W.2d 854; Duval v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 304 Mich. 397, 8 N.W.2d 112; City of Detroit v. A. W. Kutsche & Co., 309 Mich, 700, 16 N.W.2d 128; Singer v. Goff, 334 Mich. 163, 54 N.W.2d 290; Burton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 341 Mich. 30, 67 N.W.2d 54; Associated Truck Lines, Inc. v. Baer, 346 Mich. 106, 77 .n.W.2d 384. It does no violence to the language of article 7 to construe it, as we do, to require payment of pro rata vacation pay benefits earned by defendant's employees up to the dates of expiration of the various extension agreements culminating with the final extension which expired on March 13, 1955. Not to construe the extension agreements in that fashion would require us to say that the parties attributed no rational meaning to the words of Article 7.
Our ruling in this case is not inconsistent with our ruling or our reasoning in Treloar v. Steggeman, 333 Mich. 166, 52 N.W.2d 647. In that case, this Court held the contractual language specifically required an employee to be on the company's seniority list on a specified future date as a condition precedent to qualification for compensation in lieu of vacation. The future date specified in the contract, on the date of its execution, was clearly within the contemplation of the parties a date which would occur within the normal term of the contract. The fact that the contract was terminated legally prior thereto cannot alter the meaning of the language as intended by the parties when the contract was made. In the case at bar, our concern is likewise with the parties' intention, but that must be determined as of the time of extension, not as of the time the contract was first made.
We have been referred to a substantial number of authorities in other jurisdictions which seem to be in irreconcilable conflict (many of which are assembled in 30 A.L.R.2d 351). Differences in contractual language used makes citation of these cases as authority extremely risky unless caution and discrimination are exercised. No case has been cited to us, and we have found none, which involves construction of a similar contractual provision as part of a short term extension agreement.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff.
The parties are not in disagreement as to the material facts involved in this controversy. It is conceded that during the year beginning September 29, 1953, there was in force and effect a collective bargaining agreement between defendant company and Local 155, UAW-CIO, representing defendant's employees at its Warner Division. By the terms of said agreement, which was comprehensive in its provisions, various matters pertaining to the employment relation were governed, including wages, grievance procedure and other details.
Article 7 of said contract, directly involved in the instant case, related to the matter of annual vacations. Insofar as material, it read as follows:
Article 7--Annual Vacation...
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...must be interpreted as a whole, so as to give each of its provisions the meaning intended by the parties. Leon v. Detroit Harvester Co., 363 Mich. 366, 109 N.W.2d 804 (1961). Reading a contract as a whole is necessary in determining whether ambiguity reasonably exists. Fireman's Fund Ins. C......
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...have given relief on employee suits where the court's jurisdiction was not challenged. See, for example, Leon v. Detroit Harvester Co. (1961), 363 Mich. 366, 109 N.W.2d 804. Suits seeking to enforce collective bargaining agreements in industries affecting commerce must be decided on the bas......
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In re Service Merchandise Co., Inc., 399-02649.
...must be interpreted as a whole, so as to give each of its provisions the meaning intended by the parties. Leon v. Detroit Harvester Co., 363 Mich. 366, 109 N.W.2d 804 (1961). In construing a contract, under Michigan law, the court will select the construction that gives meaning to each of t......
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