Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2
| Citation | 788 P.2d 1119 |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-102,89-102 |
| Parties | 59 Ed. Law Rep. 534, 5 IER Cases 537 Jean LEONARD, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CONVERSE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Patrick E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for appellant.
J.N. Murdock of Reeves & Murdock, Casper, and Mark R. Stewart of Hickey & Evans, Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Appellant Jean Leonard commenced an action against Appellee Converse County School District No. 2, seeking reinstatement as a counselor, recovery of damages, and attorney's fees. The suit arose from the Converse County School Board's decision not to offer Leonard a contract as a continuing contract teacher after she had completed three years of employment as an initial contract teacher. The School District moved for a summary judgment, which the district court granted.
We affirm.
Leonard raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether it is arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge an employee for reasons contrary to fundamental state policy?
2. Whether it is arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge a teacher by a procedure which violates the district's own rules and regulations?
3. Whether Appellant established a proper cause of action for breach of an express contract?
4. Whether Appellant established a proper cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
5. Whether a teacher has a cause of action for breach of a statutory duty?
6. Whether Appellant has established a valid claim for violation of substantive constitutional rights?
7. Whether Appellant has established a claim for violation of due process?
8. Whether material issues of fact exist as to each of the claims precluding summary judgment?
The materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the School District's motion for summary judgment reveal the following facts. In the fall of 1982, Leonard began working for the School District as a guidance counselor at the Glenrock Middle School. The School District hired Leonard as an initial contract teacher, and she worked as such for three consecutive years. 1 During Leonard's employment, the School District maintained a policy and regulation prescribing an evaluation procedure. The policy stated that all professional staff would be evaluated to ensure a quality educational program, and it defined the specific areas which would be evaluated. The regulation required that the program and procedure for the evaluations and a written summary of expected standards be presented to the staff within two weeks of the beginning of the school year. It also contained provisions for informal and formal probationary periods for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations. Both the regulation and Wyo.Stat. § 21-3-110(a)(xvii) (1977) required that initial contract teachers be evaluated in writing twice a year and receive copies of their evaluations.
In 1983, Leonard received a copy of her evaluation which indicated she needed improved professional rapport. The following year, her evaluation noted improved rapport and indicated that all areas of performance were satisfactory. During her third year as a counselor, Leonard was not evaluated, and, through a letter dated March 15, 1985, the School District informed Leonard that it would terminate her initial contract at the end of the school year. Leonard was never placed on probation under the terms of the evaluation regulation.
Leonard filed a grievance with the School Board, seeking renewal of her contract. After a hearing, the School Board denied Leonard's request, and on September 5, 1986, she filed a complaint with the district court. The complaint alleged that the School District and its employees: (1) breached a legal duty owed to Leonard by failing to follow the evaluation and probationary procedures set out in Wyo.Stat. §§ 21-3-110(a)(xvii) and 21-3-111(a)(vi)(B) (1977) and in its policies and regulations; (2) denied Leonard procedural due process at her grievance hearing and failed to provide her with sufficient reasons for her dismissal; (3) discriminated against her because of her sex and marital status; (4) retaliated against her because of her personal life; (5) violated her substantive due process rights by arbitrarily and capriciously dismissing her; (6) denied her right to academic freedom; (7) violated her right to continued employment; and (8) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Leonard sought reinstatement, damages, and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 2000 (1982). Leonard also sought reinstatement and damages for the School District's negligence, breach of contract, and violation of her constitutional rights.
The School District answered, generally denying the allegations, and filed a motion for summary judgment. The School District's memorandum in support of its motion maintained that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Leonard, as an initial contract teacher, had no entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of, reemployment. On April 12, 1989, the district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the School District. In its decision letter, the court, relying upon Roberts v. Lincoln County School District Number One, 676 P.2d 577 (Wyo.1984), stated that Leonard was an "untenured" initial contract teacher whose employment was properly terminated. The court further explained that the School District's administrative rules could not abrogate the School Board's authority to terminate the employment of initial contract teachers. 2 This appeal arose from that decision.
The party moving for a summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. If the movant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy an opposing party's burden. Nelson v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo.1989); Jones Land and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo.1987).
Leonard contends that the School District's decision not to offer her a new contract was arbitrary and capricious because the School District failed to follow the evaluation requirements set out in its policy, its regulation, and § 21-3-110(a)(xvii). In Roberts, 676 P.2d 577, this Court upheld a school district's decision to terminate the employment of an initial contract teacher despite its failure to follow required evaluation procedures. We explained:
The only statutory requirement for terminating an initial contract teacher is that [the teacher] be notified of the termination no later than March 15 of each year. An initial contract teacher has no statutory right to a statement of reasons for termination or to a hearing. They do not have a claim, entitlement, or reasonable expectation of re-employment. Therefore, they do not have a property interest under state law or otherwise.
Id. at 579 (footnote omitted). 3 This Court also stated that the evaluation regulations established by the district did not alter the initial contract teacher's rights because they "were primarily for the benefit of the school district in performing its operational and supervisory duties." Id. at 581.
In this case, the School District argues that it adopted the evaluation policy primarily for use in performing operational and supervisory duties and not for the primary purpose of protecting initial contract teachers. We agree. The evaluation rules did not protect initial contract teachers from dismissal because, as teachers without tenure, they could be dismissed even after receiving favorable evaluations. Id. In addition, the policy stated that the primary purpose for teacher supervision and evaluation was to develop staff and improve teaching. We hold that, even if the evaluation rules had a secondary purpose relating to termination or retention, they did not give initial contract teachers a claim to, entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of reemployment. Id. at 580 (citing Willis v. Widefield School District No. 3, 43 Colo.App. 197, 603 P.2d 962 (1979)). The School District's failure to follow the evaluation requirements did not result in an arbitrary and capricious decision to terminate Leonard's employment.
Leonard also asserts that the School District's policy and regulation were incorporated into her employment contract and that the School District breached the contract by failing to follow them. 4 In Roberts, 676 P.2d 577, this Court addressed the same breach of contract issue which was premised on similar contractual provisions. We held that, "[a]lthough the contract is specifically subject to the 'policies, rules, and regulations of the school district,' these particular provisions did not operate to afford appellant any contractual right of employment." Id. at 582. We also stated that the board could not abrogate its statutory authority to terminate initial contract teachers. Id.
In this case, Leonard's contract and Wyo.Stat. § 21-7-112 (1977) incorporated the evaluation policy and regulation, but those rules did not create a contractual right of employment. A contrary result would be in conflict with a school district's authority to terminate the employment of initial contract teachers. Wyo.Stat. § 21-7-105 (1977); Roberts, 676 P.2d 577. Section 21-7-112 specifically states that school district policies, rules, and regulations cannot be in conflict with Wyoming laws. Thus, we hold that the School District's violation of its evaluation policy and regulation and of § 21-3-110(a)(xvii) did not constitute an actionable breach of contract.
Leonard also asks this Court to adopt and apply the...
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