Leonard v. Gittere
| Decision Date | 14 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:99-cv-0360-MMD-DJA |
| Parties | WILLIAM BRYON LEONARD, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM GITTERE, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Petitioner William Byron Leonard filed his first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus with leave of Court. (ECF Nos. 138, 184.)1 Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 151), arguing that Leonard's habeas claims are untimely, unexhausted, procedurally defaulted, not cognizable and/or not ripe in this proceeding. In conjunction with his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Leonard asks for leave to conduct discovery and an evidentiary hearing. (ECF Nos. 188, 190.)2 For reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss and deny Leonard's motions for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
In August 1989, a jury in the First Judicial District Court for Nevada found Leonard guilty of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a prisoner. (ECF No. 155-14.) In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found both aggravating factors alleged by the State: (1) the murder was committed by a person while he was under a sentence of imprisonment, and (2) the murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. (ECF No. 155-38.) The jury also found two mitigating factors: (1) the victim was a participant in the defendant's criminal conduct or consented to the act, and (2) at least one of the aggravating factors was committed while the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Id.) Finding the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the jury imposed the death sentence. (Id.)
A judgment of conviction was entered on August 29, 1989. (ECF No. 156-1.) Leonard filed a motion for a new trial that was denied. (ECF Nos. 156-22, 157-3, 157-28.) He then appealed his conviction. (ECF No. 157-33.) In January 1992, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Leonard's conviction and sentence. (ECF No. 158-15.) After the Nevada Supreme Court denied his petition for rehearing (ECF No. 158-19), Leonard filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (ECF No. 158-25). That petition was denied. (ECF No. 158-31.) The Nevada Supreme Court issued remittitur on September 21, 1992. (ECF No. 159.)
On September 2, 1992, Leonard filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus with the state district court. (ECF No. 158-36.) With the assistance of counsel, Leonard filed a supplemental petition. (ECF No. 159-17.) After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. (ECF Nos. 160-15, 160-16, 160-17, 160-18, 160-19, 161-23.) Leonard appealed. (ECF No. 161-25.)
In May 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the state district court's decision. (ECF No. 162-18.) Leonard filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 163-1, ECF No. 163-9.) The Nevada Supreme Court issued remittitur on March 10, 1999. (ECF No. 163-11.)
Leonard initiated this federal proceeding on March 25, 1999. (ECF No. 1.) This Court appointed Richard Cornell to represent Leonard, with the Federal Public Defender appointed as second counsel. (ECF No. 7.) Respondents filed an answer to Leonard's initial petition, which included the assertion of procedural defenses to a number of claims. (ECF No. 51.) At the direction of the Court, Respondents filed a supplement to their answer in May 2006. (ECF Nos. 77, 81.) Respondents argued that Grounds 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 23 of Leonard's petition were unexhausted. (ECF No. 81 at 1.) Leonard agreed that Grounds 15-19 had yet to be exhausted. (ECF No. 86 at 6-7.) On July 19, 2006, this Court found Grounds 15-19 and 23 unexhausted and ordered Leonard to abandon his unexhausted claims or file a motion for stay. (ECF No. 86.)
Leonard moved for stay and abeyance, which Respondents did not oppose. (ECF Nos. 87, 88.) On September 25, 2006, this Court granted Leonard's motion to stay these proceedings. (ECF No. 89 at 4.) On October 18, 2006, Leonard filed his second state habeas petition. (ECF No. 162-21.) The district court dismissed Leonard's second state petition on procedural grounds. (ECF No. 164-16.) Leonard appealed. (ECF No. 164-18.) The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the state district court's dismissal. (ECF No. 165-7.) Leonard filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 165-15, 165-19.) The Nevada Supreme Court issued remittitur on October 13, 2010. (ECF No. 165-20.)
Instead of moving to lift his federal court stay, Leonard filed a third state habeas proceeding on January 7, 2011. (ECF No. 165-26.) Once again, the state district court dismissed Leonard's petition on procedural grounds. (ECF No. 166-11.) Leonard appealed. (ECF No. 166-13.) The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court'sdismissal. (ECF No. 166-33.) Leonard filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 167, 167-5.) The Nevada Supreme Court issued remittitur on October 11, 2016. (ECF No. 167-6.)
In December 2016, this Court reopened these proceedings and entered a scheduling order that allowed Leonard 60 days within which to file an amended petition. (ECF No. 120.) Leonard then filed, in succession, a motion for leave to supplement petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 121), a motion to re-impose stay (ECF No. 124), and a motion for extension of time to file first amended petition pending resolution of motion to re-impose stay (ECF No. 127). The Court denied Leonard's motion to re-impose stay but permitted him to supplement his petition. (ECF No. 129.) Leonard filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision that the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 130, 133.)
On March 19, 2018, Leonard filed his first amended petition. (ECF No. 138.) In response, Respondents filed the motion to dismiss now before the Court for decision. (ECF No. 151.) As noted, Leonard opposed and filed motions for conduct discovery and an evidentiary hearing (ECF Nos. 188, 190).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a one-year filing period for § 2254 habeas petitions in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year period begins to run from the latest of four possible triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner's state court conviction became final (by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). See id. Statutory tolling of the one-year time limitation occurs while a "properly filed" state post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The Supreme Court's decision in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), limits ahabeas petitioner's ability to have newly-added claims "relate back" to the filing of an earlier petition and, therefore, be considered timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) in the habeas context, the Court held that an amended petition "does not relate back ... when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. Instead, an amended claim in a habeas petition relates back for statute of limitations purposes only if it shares a "common core of operative facts" with claims contained in the original petition. Id. at 664. The common core of operative facts must not be viewed at too high a level of generality, and an "occurrence," for the purposes of Rule 15(c), will consist of each separate set of facts that supports a ground for relief. Id. at 661.
Respondents concede that Leonard filed his initial petition within the one-year filing period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). They argue, however, that Leonard's amended petition was filed long after the one-year period had elapsed and that several claims in that petition are time-barred from federal court review because those claims do not "relate back" to his initial petition. Specifically, Respondents identify the following claims as untimely: Claims 1(G), 1(H), 1(K)(2), I(L), 1(M), 1(R)(2), 1(R)(3), 1(R)(4), 1(S), 1(T)(3), 3(A)(1)(c), 3(A)(1)(d), 3(A)(2)(a), 3(A)(2)(b), 3(B), 3(D) (in part), 3(F) (in part), 7(B), 9(A), 9(B), 9(C), 9(E), 10(B), 11, 12(B), 12(C), 12(D), 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19(C), 19(E), 19(F), 19(G), and 20.
Leonard does not dispute that his amended petition was filed beyond the one-year filing period under § 2244(d)(1)(A), but contends his claims are nonetheless timely because they relate back to timely filed claims, a different triggering date to the one-year period applies, and/or he is entitled to equitable tolling.
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Claim 1 alleges numerous ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") claims based on counsel's performance in the guilt phase of Leonard's trial.
Claim 1(G) - Leonard alleges counsel were ineffective in failing to meaningfully challenge certain items of the State's forensic evidence either through cross-examination and/or the use of an expert criminalist. (ECF No. 184 at 97-102.)3 Leonard contends this claim relates back to Ground 1 of his initial petition. In Ground 1, he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel relied on a self-defense theory in the guilt phase of his trial instead of asserting mutual combat, second degree murder and/or voluntary manslaughter. (ECF No. 3 at 8-21.) The factual allegations supporting Ground 1 make reference to some of the same physical evidence discussed in Claim 1(G)—in particular, a shank recovered from the sewer pipes and...
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