Leonard v. Lennox

• Citation: 181 F. 760
• Decision Date: 21 September 1910
• Docket Number: 2,721.
• Parties: LEONARD v. LENNOX.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

181 F. 760

LEONARD v. LENNOX.

No. 2,721.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 21, 1910

Syllabus by the Court.

To entitle one to a patent under the public land laws it is essential, among other things, that he comply with all the requirements of the statute under which he seeks the title and the authoritative regulations of the Land Department thereunder.

When the right to a patent under such a law as the soldier's additional homestead law depends upon whether the land is agricultural or is known to be chiefly valuable for coal that question must be determined according to the conditions existing at the time when the applicant complies with all the requirements of the statute and the authoritative regulations. If at that time the land is not known to be chiefly valuable for coal, he acquires a right to a patent which will not be disturbed by a subsequent change in the conditions; but, if before such compliance it is discovered that the land is thus valuable for coal, nothing that he subsequently may do will give him a right to a patent because land known to be of that character is not subject to acquisition under such a law, but only under the coal land law.

Courts take judicial notice of the regulations of the Land Department, and when required to pass upon the existence of a particular regulation, as when ascertaining any other fact of which they take judicial notice, may resort to any source of information which in its nature is calculated to be trustworthy and helpful, always seeking first for that which is most appropriate.

The Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior, although powerless to adopt a regulation which is in any wise inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the public land laws, are empowered to enforce, by appropriate regulations, every part of those laws, as to which it is not otherwise specially provided.

The regulation of the Land Department prescribed November 19 1901, requiring applicants under the nonmineral laws to support their applications by a showing that the land applied for is nonsaline, is a valid regulation, and an applicant under the soldier's additional homestead law does not do all that he is required to do to entitle him to a patent until he complies with that regulation.

William V. Hodges (Clayton C. Dorsey, A. A. Hoehling, Jr., and C. W. Darrow, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph C. Helm and John R. Dixon (C. A. Roberts, on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN and VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM H. MUNGER, District Judge.

VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judge.

Under a patent from the United States issued to him under the coal land law (Rev. St. Sec. 2347 et seq. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p 1440)), the appellant holds the title to a parcel of land in Colorado which the appellee insists should have been patented to him under the soldier's additional homestead law (Rev. St. Sec. 2306 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1415)), and would have been so patented but for a material error of law committed by the Land Department in a contest between the appellant and the appellee relating to the character of the land.

Public lands known to be chiefly valuable for their deposits of coal are not subject to acquisition under the soldier's additional homestead law, but only under the coal land law, and, upon the evidence produced in the contest just mentioned, the Land Department found that the land now in question was known to be chiefly valuable for its deposits of coal and because of that finding rejected an application by the appellee to enter the land as a soldier's additional homestead and sustained an application by the appellant to purchase it as coal land. The appellee's application had been presented to the local land office on April 19, 1902, and, without allowance or rejection by that office, had been forwarded to the General Land Office at Washington for examination and consideration, as was required by an authoritative and long-existing regulation. As so presented and forwarded, the application was complete and perfect, in the sense that nothing remained to be done by the appellee to entitle him to a patent, unless it was incumbent upon him, under another regulation, to support the application by a showing that the land was not saline; that is, did not contain salt springs, or deposits of salt in any form, rendering it chiefly valuable therefor. The application was accompanied by a nonmineral affidavit, but not by a showing that the land was not saline. This omission, if it was such, was supplied after the hearing in the contest, but not before.

In the meantime the appellant, alleging that the land was chiefly valuable for its deposits of coal, made application to purchase it under the coal land law, and this led to the contest and a full hearing therein, as a result of which it was found that the land was chiefly valuable for its deposits of coal and was known to be so when the contest was initiated. This finding was rested principally upon evidence of exploration of the land and discoveries of coal therein by the appellant subsequently to the presentation of the appellee's application and prior to the initiation of the contest; and, whilst the appellee objected to the consideration of this evidence, effect was given to it because the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior were of opinion, as is disclosed by their decisions, that an authoritative regulation in force at the time of the appellee's application required him to support it by a showing that the land was not saline, that in the absence of such a showing his application was incomplete in the sense that he had not done all that he was required to do to entitle him to a patent, and that in consequence the character of the land was not to be determined solely by the conditions existing at the time the application was presented, but in the light of any subsequent exploration and discoveries which may have occurred while the application was still incomplete.

After these proceedings in the Land Department had resulted in the sale and patenting of the land to the appellant under the coal land law, the appellee by this suit sought to charge the appellant as a trustee and to obtain an enforced conveyance; the theory upon which the suit was brought being that the Land Department in considering and giving effect to the evidence of the subsequent exploration and discoveries committed a material error of law which resulted in the patenting of the land to the appellant when it should have been patented to the appellee. In the Circuit Court this theory prevailed, and the appellee obtained a decree which is challenged by this appeal.

The questions presented must be considered in the light of these well-settled rules relating to the administration and execution of the public land laws:

1. When a patent is issued by the officers of the Land Department, to whose supervision and control are intrusted the various proceedings incident to the disposal of the public lands, all reasonable presumptions are indulged in support of their action, and it is only when it is clear that some material error of law, imposition, or fraud has resulted in the issuance of a patent to one applicant when it should have been issued to another that the action of those officers successfully can be called in question and the patentee declared a trustee for the unsuccessful applicant and required to transfer the title to him.

2. To entitle an unsuccessful applicant to such relief, it is incumbent upon him affirmatively and clearly to show not merely that his claim to the land was older or better than that of the patentee, but that it was such a claim as in law should have been respected by the Land Department and, being respected, would have given him the patent.

3. When one becomes entitled to a patent, he is treated as the beneficial owner of the land, and the United States is regarded as holding the naked legal title in trust for him, and, if in this situation the Land Department transfers the title to another, he takes it charged with the trust.

4. To entitle one to a patent it is essential, among other things, that he comply with all the requirements of the statute under which he seeks the title and the authoritative regulations of the Land Department thereunder.

5. When the right to a patent under such a law as the soldier's additional homestead law depends upon whether the land is agricultural or is known to be chiefly valuable for coal, that question must be determined according to the conditions existing at the time when the applicant complies with all the requirements of the statute and the authoritative regulations. If at that time the land is not known to be chiefly valuable for coal, he acquires a right to a patent which will not be disturbed by a subsequent change in the conditions; but, if before such compliance it is discovered that the land is thus valuable for coal, nothing that he subsequently may do will give him a right to a patent, because land known to be of that character is not subject to acquisition under such a law, but only under the coal land law.

The bill of complaint charges that at the time of presenting his application to the local land office the appellee fully complied with all the requirements of the law and the regulations of the Land Department relating to such applications, that he then lawfully secured an entry of the land and became its equitable owner, that there was no authoritative regulation requiring him to support his application by a showing that the land was not saline, that even if there was such a regulation the local land officers waived compliance therewith by not insisting thereon, and that the finding...