Leonard v. Leonard
| Citation | 529 N.W.2d 208 |
| Parties | Shari LEONARD, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lyle LEONARD, Defendant and Appellant. No. # 18775. . Considered on Briefs |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1995 |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
John E. Burke, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellee.
Karen L. Crew of Crew and Crew, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.
Lyle Leonard (Lyle) appeals a trial court order awarding his former wife, Shari Leonard (Shari), a one-half interest in the parties' marital home. We reverse.
The parties were divorced with the entry of a divorce decree on July 25, 1988. The divorce decree incorporated a stipulation and agreement between the parties dividing the marital assets. That agreement contained the following pertinent provisions concerning the marital home 8. [Shari] and [Lyle] are presently owners of a house and lot located at 2105 East Madison, Sioux Falls, South Dakota. [Shari] and [Lyle] agree that [Shari] shall be entitled to the exclusive possession of the house to live in until the children have graduated from high school or until [Shari] remarries, whichever comes first. [Shari] agrees to make all payments and repairs which come due during this period and to hold [Lyle] harmless therefrom.
9. Ownership of [the] home reverts to [Lyle] after graduation of youngest child from high school[.]
On November 23, 1993, Shari filed a motion for a show cause order seeking to rescind the provision of the divorce stipulation requiring reversion of ownership of the marital home to Lyle. In addition, Shari sought an order directing that the parties should share equally in the proceeds from any sale of the home. Along with her motion, Shari filed an affidavit averring that the only reason she agreed to sign over her interest in the home was to obtain Lyle's agreement to end an ongoing pattern of harassment and intimidation he had directed at her since her commencement of the divorce proceedings. Shari further averred that, contrary to his agreement, Lyle had continued harassing her throughout the time leading up to her filing of the show cause motion.
In response to the show cause motion, Lyle raised the rule prohibiting modification of property settlements and laches as defenses. Shari countered with another affidavit in which she averred that, in July 1990, she had entered into an oral agreement with Lyle that she would receive one-half of the proceeds from any sale of the marital home if she continued living in the house and paying for the repairs. As proof of that agreement, Shari provided a copy of a check for $250 that she had written to pay Lyle for her share of the costs of reshingling the residence. In his counter-affidavit, Lyle averred he had never agreed to forego his claim to the proceeds from any sale of the home and that no such agreement was ever discussed between the parties.
A show cause hearing was conducted and the trial court subsequently entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The trial court found: that the parties' stipulation for reversion of ownership of the marital home to Lyle was entered into on the basis of Lyle's agreement to curtail his harassment of Shari; that, contrary to that agreement, Lyle had continued harassing Shari after entry of the divorce decree; that the parties agreed in July 1990, that if Shari continued living in the marital home and taking care of the children and making repairs on the home, Lyle would agree to an equal division of the profits from the sale of the home; that this oral agreement constituted a novation of the parties' earlier stipulation and agreement for divorce; and, that the novation was evidenced by Shari's payment of one-half the costs of reshingling the home. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered that Shari should be awarded an undivided one-half interest in the marital home and in the net proceeds from any sale of the home. Lyle appeals.
A "novation" is, "the substitution by contract of a new obligation for an existing one and is subject to the rules concerning contracts in general." SDCL 20-7-5 (emphasis added). In this instance, it cannot be ignored that the "existing obligations" of the parties with regard to the marital home, although set forth in a stipulation and agreement (i.e., a contract), were ultimately incorporated in a final judgment and decree by a trial court. Thus, the "existing obligations" were not simply private, contractual obligations subject to the usual principles of novation, but obligations established by a trial court's final judgment and decree in a civil action subject to the rules concerning finality of judgments. See, Johansen v. Johansen, 365 N.W.2d 859 (S.D.1985) ().
Moreover, the "existing obligations" at issue in this case are obligations concerning the parties' rights in marital property, i.e., the marital home. This court has a well established rule on the finality of judgments regarding a division of marital property: "a divorce decree which incorporates a property settlement agreement is a final and conclusive adjudication which is not subject to later modification." Jeffries v. Jeffries, 434 N.W.2d 585, 588 (S.D.1989) (emphasis added).
Shari relies on Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863 (S.D.1985) for the proposition that, after a divorce decree is entered, the property rights set out in the decree may be modified by the bilateral agreement of the parties. While this statement of the rule is accurate, it ignores the procedural distinctions between what occurred in this case and the holding in Malcolm.
In Malcolm, the parties were divorced in 1979 and entered into a stipulation and property settlement agreement incorporated in the divorce decree. The agreement required the husband to pay child support to the wife in the amount of $112 per month. It also provided that the parties would remain joint owners of the marital residence until sold and that they would equally divide the net proceeds from any sale of the property. In January of 1982, the parties entered into an agreement in which the wife agreed to convey her interest in the marital residence to the mortgagee in exchange for the husband's agreement to pay her $200 per month until her remarriage or their youngest daughter's attainment of the age of eighteen. The husband made the $200 payments for a little over a year and stopped. The wife commenced a show cause proceeding for a contempt order requiring the husband to continue making the $200 monthly payments. The trial court concluded that the parties'...
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