Leonard v. McMorris
| Decision Date | 29 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 99N1306.,Civ.A. 99N1306. |
| Citation | 106 F.Supp.2d 1098 |
| Parties | Ralph T. LEONARD, Russell K. Myers, Paul E. Enzman, John R. Klaas, Michael E. Hogan, Ivan Roth, John R. Towner, Ronald Coffin, Alvin G. Larch, Paul R. Bishop, Ervin Rhoades, Henry Allen Prichard, Ralph Nelson, Darrell O. Porter, Larry Jacks, Leann Sandoval, Jennifer Clair, Merle W. Kiesel, Ryan Tarone, Cynthia Garcia, Yvonne Carsten, Rene Easter, Darlene Nicholas, Larry L Weickum, Anthony A. Sanchez, Todd Gardner, Dennis Craig, Clifford Elrod, Virgil Eggleston, James Goerig, Doug Hanevik, Donald Kneebone, Greg Cole, Tony Kmoch, Frank Hill, Michael Luxner, Creed Huff, Terry Harvey, Robert Wagenknecht, Steven G. Larghe, Richard Echtenkamp, Melvin G. Teter, Tyler U. Iungerich, Ronald F. Cooley, David Capshaw, Charles Bleakley, Larry Jones, Ted Schwartz, and Evan Howard, Plaintiffs, v. Jerry D. MCMORRIS, Harold R. Roth, George R. Roberge, James R. Feehan, Mike Hampton, Lester Smith, Neal Barkley, Robert Cline, Cal Wolfe, and Terry Jensen, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Evan S. Lipstein, Michael Bruce Levy, Lipstein & Mortimer PC, Lakewood, CO, John David Beckman, The Beckman Law Office, P.C., Golden, CO, for plaintiffs.
James E. Scarboro, Timothy R. Macdonald, Arnold & Porter, Denver, CO, Robert Dyer, Kip Shuman, Denver, CO, for defendants.
This is a labor dispute. Plaintiffs Ralph T. Leonard et al., (collectively, "plaintiffs") claim that Defendants Jerry D. McMorris et al. (collectively, "defendants") are liable for plaintiffs' unpaid wages pursuant to the Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 8-4-101 to 127 (1999) [hereinafter "Wage Act"]. This matter is before the court on: (1) "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" filed October 25, 1999; and (2) "Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" filed January 13, 2000. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b).
Defendants Jerry D. McMorris, Harold R. Roth, George R. Roberge, James R. Feehan, Neal Barkley, Robert Cline, Cal Wolfe, and Terry Jensen are corporate officers of NationsWay Transport Service, Inc. ("NationsWay").1 (Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2 [filed Oct. 25, 1999] [hereinafter ]; Mot. for Summ.J., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2 [filed Dec. 7, 1999] ].) NationsWay was one of the largest privately held trucking companies in the United States.
As of May 1999, NationsWay had more than 3200 employees in forty-three different States. Of these employees, more than 2000 were members of eighty-nine different local unions that have 144 different collective bargaining agreements (hereinafter, "CBA" or "CBAs") with NationsWay. The eighty-nine local unions are affiliated with the Intentional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("Teamsters"), which has its own nationwide CBA with NationsWay entitled the National Master Freight Agreement ("National Master CBA"). In addition, each of the eighty-nine local unions has entered one or more supplemental agreements with NationsWay modifying the National Master CBA. In this case, those of the named plaintiffs who are union members are subject to the Western States Area Supplement Agreements ("Western States CBA").
On February 11, 1999, the NationsWay board of directors executed a resolution authorizing Roth and William Ward, a NationsWay senior vice president, to execute a petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Concerning Pl.'s Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 [filed Dec. 27, 1999] [hereinafter ].) On May 20, 1999, NationsWay filed a petition for bankruptcy protection pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona. Later that day, NationsWay terminated the employment of most of its employees, including the plaintiffs herein. (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4; admitted at Pls.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4.)
On June 7, 1999, plaintiffs filed their complaint in Denver County District Court. On July 9, 1999, defendants removed the action to this court. (Id.) On August 11, 1999, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. (Am.Compl. [filed Aug. 11, 1999].) In the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants were liable for those wages which plaintiffs had earned at the time that their employment terminated but were unpaid, pursuant to the Wage Act.2 (Id. ¶¶ 13-20.) On October 12, 1999, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J. [filed Oct. 12, 1999].) Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because the Wage Act does not impose personal liability on individual corporate officers and, even if it does, there can be no personal liability if the corporation is not subject to liability by operation of the Bankruptcy Code. (Defs.' Br. at 5-20.) Defendants further argue that, even if the Wage Act imposes liability upon them individually, the Wage Act is preempted (1) by the Bankruptcy Code, and (2) by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) [hereinafter "LMRA"], for those of the plaintiffs who are subject to NationsWay's collective bargaining agreements with the Teamsters. (Id. at 21-34.) On January 13, 2000, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to defendants' liability only. ].) Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to defendants' liability under the Wage Act because: (1) the Wage Act imposes personal liability for earned but unpaid wages upon corporate officers; (2) plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the Bankruptcy Code; (3) the LMRA does not preempt the Wage Act claims of those plaintiffs who are subject to a collective bargaining agreement; and (4) none of the other miscellaneous affirmative defenses which defendants assert bar plaintiffs' first claim. (Id.)
Under rule 56(c), the court may grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Concrete Works, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir.1994). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter." Concrete Works, Inc., 36 F.3d at 1518 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, but must instead designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The court may consider only admissible evidence when ruling on a summary judgment motion. See World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir.1985). The factual record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Concrete Works, Inc., 36 F.3d at 1518 (citing Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 [10th Cir.1990]).
Plaintiffs contend that defendants violated the Wage Act by failing to pay wages which plaintiffs had earned prior to the termination of their employment, and they seek to hold the defendants personally liable for those wages. (Am.Compl.) Defendants contend that they are not personally liable for plaintiffs' earned but unpaid wages for several reasons. First, defendants contend that the plain language of the Wage Act itself does not permit the imposition of personal liability on corporate officers for wages which the corporation has failed to pay. (Defs.' Br. at 6-11.) Second, defendants contend that, even if the Wage Act can be read to create personal liability on corporate officers for earned but unpaid wages, such liability would not attach when the corporation itself is precluded from paying the wages by operation of the ...
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Leonard v. McMorris
...District Court, on summary judgment, found eight officers personally liable for unpaid wages and other compensation. Leonard v. McMorris, 106 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D.Colo.2000). The Federal District Court relied on three provisions of the Wage Claim Act: 1) section 8-4-101(6), 3 C.R.S. (2002), wh......
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