Leonard v. Planning Bd. of Union Vale

• Decision Date: 04 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13-cv-6034 (NSR),13-cv-6034 (NSR)
• Citation: 154 F.Supp.3d 59
• Parties: E. Deane Leonard, Robert O. Dryfoos, and Steven Habiague, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. The Planning Board of the Town of Union Vale, Paul Heslin, Eugene Simco, and Arthur F. Brod, Jr., all such Town Officials joined here in their personal capacity, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

154 F.Supp.3d 59

E. Deane Leonard, Robert O. Dryfoos, and Steven Habiague, Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

v.The Planning Board of the Town of Union Vale, Paul Heslin, Eugene Simco, and Arthur F. Brod, Jr., all such Town Officials joined here in their personal capacity, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 13-cv-6034 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed January 4, 2016

Steven Habiague, Steven Habiague, Law Office, Poughquag, NY, for Plaintiffs-Petitioners.

Terry August Rice, Rice & Amon, Suffern, NY, for Defendants-Respondents.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMAN

, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs-Petitioners E. Deane Leonard, Robert O. Dryfoos, and Steven Habiague (“Plaintiffs”) assert due process and takings claims against the Planning Board of the Town of Union Vale (the “Board”), Paul Heslin, Eugene Simco, and Arthur F. Brod, Jr. (together with the Board, “Defendants”) arising out of the Board's rescission of a negative declaration¹ relating to Plaintiffs' proposed subdivision of a 950 acre parcel in Union Vale (the “Project”). Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background²

In 1986, Plaintiffs Leonard and Habiague applied to have their property located on East Mountain in the Town of Union Vale designated an open development area under New York Town Law § 280–a(4)

. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs' application was granted, which allowed the property to be subdivided into private lots serviced by private roads. (Id .) The first section of the project, “East Mountain,” was approved in 1987. (Id .) In 1987, the Board made a determination under the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) that the Project would result in no significant adverse impacts on the environment (the “Negative Declaration”). (Id . ¶ 6.)

In 2009, Plaintiffs applied for a subdivision of the next section of the Project, known as “East Mountain North.” (Id . ¶ 17.) Similar to the 1987 proposal, the plan provided for large single-family homes. (Id .) According to Plaintiffs, East Mountain North conforms to Union Vale's Master Plan and Conservation Density rules set forth in UV Code § 192-25. (Id . ¶ 19.) By 2009, Plaintiffs reached an agreement with the Board as to the layout of North End Road, the proposed access from the north end of the property. (Id . ¶ 85.) Subsequently, however, the Board introduced a 200 foot minimum radius requirement for all curves on North End Road during a March 16, 2010 meeting. (Id . ¶ 86.) The construction of the road with these requirements would double the level of ground disturbance. (Id . ¶ 88.)

In March 2012, the Board rejected Plaintiffs' application for East Mountain North. (Id . ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs sued the Board in New York State Supreme Court, Dutchess County. (Id . ¶ 27; Ex. 2.) The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint; found that the Board's 2012 resolution rescinding the Negative Declaration was invalid; and determined that the Board's rejection of Plaintiffs' application for preliminary plat approval was arbitrary and capricious. (Id . at Ex. 2.)

Thereafter, the Board called a public hearing to determine (i) the applicability of the Negative Declaration to East Mountain North and (ii) whether the Negative Declaration should be amended or rescinded. (Id . ¶ 34.) The Board opened the hearing at its regularly scheduled meeting on May 15, 2012 and convened a workshop to discuss East Mountain North on June 5, 2013. (Id . ¶ 36.) After requesting comments from various agencies, including the Town's Conservation Advisory Council (“CAC”), the Board held a final public hearing on June 19, 2013. (Id . ¶ 37.) CAC, in its report, advised the Board to keep the Negative Declaration in place. (Id . ¶ 41.) At the conclusion of the June 19 hearing, the members of the Board adopted a resolution to rescind the Negative Declaration (the “Resolution”) without discussion. (Id . ¶ 44.)

According to the Second Amended Complaint, the Resolution identifies no change in the Project that would have a significant adverse impact. (Id . ¶ 45.) Moreover, the changes in laws and regulations cited in the Resolution as grounds for rescission of the Negative Declaration all result in a lower environmental impact. (Id . ¶ 46.) The Resolution identifies a host of other issues with the Project, such as the safety of a main road and potential dangers to students, that Plaintiffs assert are meritless. (Id . ¶¶ 50–60.) The Resolution contains the full text of Section 617.7 of the SEQRA Regulations, which is the provision governing rescission of a negative declaration. (Id . ¶ 67.) Prior to the Board's adoption of the Resolution, Plaintiff Habiague objected on the grounds that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond to the rescission. (Id . ¶ 70.)

II. Procedural History

On or about May 9, 2012, Plaintiffs commenced an action in state court by the filing of a summons with notice and verified complaint (“Leonard I ”). The complaint was subsequently amended twice and asserted the following: The April 18, 2012 resolution adopted by the Board was improper, and the Board's March 21, 2012 rejection of Plaintiffs' application should be aned. The complaint also contained a due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. On or about August 17, 2012, the Board moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. By decision and order dated March 12, 2013, Justice Maria G. Rosa of the New York State Supreme Court, Dutchess County, found that the Board's Resolution was adopted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner in violation of 6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 617.7(e) and (f). The Board timely filed a notice of appeal on April 4, 2013 and perfected the appeal on November 4, 2013. The Board moved to reargue the portion of its motion that sought dismissal of Plaintiffs' due process claims. By decision and order dated November 8, 2013, the Court granted the Board's motion to reargue and thereafter granted the Board's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' due process claims.

Following the Board's rescission of the Negative Declaration, Plaintiffs institute a second action in state court on or about August 9, 2013 (“Leonard II ”). Defendants removed the action from New York State Supreme Court, Dutchess County, to federal court by notice dated August 21, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) By a memorandum and order dated January 16, 2014, this Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Article 78 and state law claims and remanded such claims to state court. (ECF No. 16.) Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 21.)

STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS

On a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

, dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ); accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir.2010)

. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937

. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Determining whether a complaint states a facially plausible claim upon which relief may be granted is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

DISCUSSION

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss (1) Plaintiffs' due process claims³ and (2) Plaintiffs' claim that the conservation easement constitutes a “taking.”⁴ Before turning to the merits of Plaintiffs' due process claims, the Court first addresses whether those claims are ripe for review.

I. Ripeness

“In order for claims to be justiciable under Article III, courts have long recognized that the controversy, as an initial matter, must be ripe.” Kittay v. Giuliani , 112 F.Supp.2d 342, 348 (S.D.N.Y.2000)

aff'd , 252 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Marchi v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469 at 478 (2d Cir.1999) (“ripeness is a constitutional prerequisite to exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts.”) (internal quotations omitted); Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 34 (2d Cir.1998) ). “Particularly, as here, where the dispute involves administrative and zoning regulations, the ripeness doctrine restrains courts from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over policies, freeing agencies from judicial interference until an actual administrative decision has been formulated and its effects concretely realized.” Kittay , 112 F.Supp.2d at 348 (citing

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds,

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) ; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10, 108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (“We have found it particularly important in takings cases to adhere to our admonition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual factual...