Leonard v. Starkey
| Decision Date | 14 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-42 |
| Parties | PAULA L. LEONARD and ROBERT P. LEONARD, Plaintiffs, v. SARAH STARKEY, BRENDA WARE, TERRY WALKER, JULIE GARVIN, COTY SHINGLETON, JAMES J. MEDINA, II, and WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
(Judge Bailey)
Pending before this Court is Defendants Starkey, Ware, Walker, and West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [Doc. 73], which was filed April 30, 2015. The plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition [Doc. 82] on May 18, 2015. The DHHR defendants filed their Reply brief [Doc. 86] on May 26, 2015. Subsequently, this Court ordered the plaintiffs to submit a more definite statement [Doc. 87], which the plaintiffs filed on August 31, 2015 [Doc. 88]. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 73].
Robert Leonard ("Mr. Leonard") and Paula Leonard ("Mrs. Leonard") filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia, alleging parental abuse and/or neglect of the Leonards' two grandchildren. Julie Garvin ("Garvin") was appointed as the guardian ad litem for the children in the action ("the child abuse case"), and Sarah Starkey ("Starkey") and Brenda Ware ("Ware") were Child Protective Services ("CPS") workers assigned by their supervisor, Terri Walker ("Walker"), to the case [Doc. 50 at ¶ 4]. Upon conclusion of the child abuse case, the Leonards were granted physical custody of their grandchildren; the Leonards did not receive legal custody. [Id.].
The Leonards allege that "defendants Garvin and Starkey, and possibly Walker," had planned for Starkey to conduct a home visit without notice prior to March 14, 2012; Mr. Leonard refused entry, and "later asserted in court papers filed in the child abuse case . . . that he has a constitutional right to refuse a government agent's entry into his home if the agent does not have a warrant or court order authorizing the entry." [Id.].
Following Starkey's unsuccessful home visit, Starkey, Ware, and Garvin planned to "remove the children from the Leonards' lawful court-ordered physical custody by force aided by the assistance of law enforcement under color of CPS authority" [id. at ¶ 5], with "the approval of and under the direction of defendant Walker." [Id.]. Of import, on March 9, 2012, defendant Garvin reported the alleged "imminent danger" the plaintiffs posed to the children, yet no action was taken until five days later on March 14. This Court alsonotes that defendant Garvin, in her Motion to Dismiss, states that "abuse may have been occurring . . .." [Doc. 72 at p. 12] (emphasis added).
Starkey called the Harrison County Sheriff's Department, identified herself as a CPS worker, and requested assistance in the removal, indicating that "she anticipated problems at the residence." [Doc. 50 at ¶ 5]. Harrison County Deputy Sheriffs Shingleton and Medina were sent to meet Starkey, Ware and Garvin in the parking lot behind the Harrison County Courthouse to accompany them to the Leonards' home. [Id.]. The defendants all arrived at the Leonards' home around 6:21 p.m. [Id.]. The deputy defendants each arrived in their law enforcement vehicles, while Starkey, Ware and Garvin arrived in one car together. [Id.]. The deputy defendants, who were in their uniforms and armed, approached the Leonards' home, where Mr. Leonard was present. [Id. at ¶ 6]. The deputies asked Mr. Leonard to exit the home, but he refused. [Id.].
The deputies then opened the front door, reached inside, and forcibly removed Mr. Leonard from the residence. [Id.]. Once outside, the deputies handcuffed and searched Mr. Leonard. [Id.]. The Leonards allege that one of the two deputies "intentionally and maliciously choked" Mr. Leonard while he was restrained on the ground. [Id. at ¶ 7].1
After Mr. Leonard was restrained, Starkey, Ware, and Garvin entered the home and seized personal property, without the consent of the Leonards or other authorization.2 [Id.].Garvin and Shingleton took the children directly to the Harrison County Courthouse for emergency removal proceedings pursuant to W.Va. Code § 49-6-3(c). [Id.].
On March 12, 2014, the Leonards filed suit in this Court against Starkey, Ware, Walker, Garvin, Shingleton, Medina, and the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources ("WVDHHR") [Doc. 1]. On October 7, 2014, Judge Irene M. Keeley3 heard oral argument on the previous motions to dismiss [Doc. 43], and denied the same without prejudice. [Id.]. The Court ordered the Leonards to file an amended complaint, [Id. at 2], which they did on December 1, 2014, alleging the following [Doc. 50]:
On April 30, 2015, the DHHR defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Leonards did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or to overcome the defendants' sovereign and qualified immunity.
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Zak v. Chelsea, 780 F.3d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 2015)(citing Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. Bearing Point, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2009)). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. However, when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court may also consider "documents incorporated into the complaint byreference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss when they are "integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and . . . the plaintiffs do not challenge [their] authenticity." Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). "But in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)," so long as "all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.'" Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)). The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly stressed "the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation . . .." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); see Brockington v. Boykins
The Leonards' Amended Complaint [Doc. 50] alleges the following claims against the DHHR defendants: (1) violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) civil conspiracy. First, defendants argue that the Leonards' state law claims are barred by statutory immunity pursuant to the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va. Code § 29-12a-5(b) (the "Act"). Second, the DHHR defendants contend that the Leonards have failed to state a § 1983 claim, or in the alternative, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Third, they argue that the Leonards have failed to state plausible claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, defendants argue that because the Leonards have failed to state any plausible tort claim, the claim of civil conspiracy must fail as a matter of law.
As to any new allegations or...
To continue reading
Request your trial