Leonard v. Suthard, Civ. A. No. 89-0043-C.
| Decision Date | 22 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-0043-C. |
| Citation | 737 F. Supp. 921 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | B.T. LEONARD, Jr., Plaintiff, v. R.L. SUTHARD, in his official capacity as the current Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, Defendant. |
John C. Lowe, Charlottesville, Va., for plaintiff.
John M. McCarthy, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendant.
Plaintiff in this action is a Sergeant with the Virginia State Police. He alleges that his transfer from a duty station in Charlottesville to one in Richmond, as well as the handling of his grievance of that action, violated his constitutional rights. Defendant has moved to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. Both parties submitted briefs and were heard at oral argument on May 15, 1990. This motion is now ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff has been a member of the Virginia State Police ("VSP") for some time and, until recently, was stationed in Charlottesville. In the latter part of 1988 the plaintiff was issued a "Group One offense" for violation of weight guidelines set forth in the State Police Manual. On November 28, 1988, he filed a grievance of this action pursuant to the state employee grievance procedure. During the initial stages of the grievance the sanction was affirmed, however, on February 13, 1989, the defendant, as the highest supervisor in the grievance system, determined that the grievance was appropriate for consideration by a grievance panel. The panel ultimately returned a decision in plaintiff's favor.
On February 14, 1990, the same day that plaintiff requested a panel hearing, the defendant notified Leonard that he was being transferred to a different unit located in Richmond effective two days hence. On March 8, 1989, the plaintiff filed a grievance concerning this transfer. At all levels of review the complaint was found to be nongrievable. Plaintiff ultimately appealed this finding to the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County pursuant to state statute. On October 10, 1989, Judge Shelton of the Circuit Court entered an Order finding that the plaintiff's transfer was not disciplinary and therefore not grievable. Under Va. Code § 2.1-114.5:1(E) Judge Shelton's decision is final and unreviewable.
Plaintiff's four count Amended Complaint alleges in Counts I and II that the defendant's decision denying grievability violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection. Count III alleges that the transfer itself violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights and Count IV that the transfer violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Defendant argues that since the issues raised in the Amended Complaint have already been decided by the state courts, or are inextricably intertwined with matters decided in the state courts, this court does not have jurisdiction to review them.
In several respects this case is similar to another action arising from an employee grievance proceeding which this court dealt with recently, Dennison v. County of Frederick, 726 F.Supp. 137 (W.D.Va.1989). In Dennison, the plaintiff alleged that he had been involuntarily discharged and filed a grievance under the county grievance procedure.1 Dennison's supervisors ultimately determined the discharge to be nongrievable. Dennison appealed this finding to the state Circuit Court which entered an Order affirming the finding that the plaintiff's discharge was nongrievable. This court found that, as to the constitutional issues presented in plaintiff's federal case, the Circuit Court's decision on grievability was res judicata and awarded summary judgment against to the defendant on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Id at 140-141. The present case is somewhat different in that defendant does not argue that the Circuit Court's decision is res judicata, but that under District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the decision by the state court.
Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that in Counts I and II he seeks to have this court review the decision of the state court, an action contrary to the holding of Feldman. He argued that the strictures of Feldman should not apply for two reasons. First, he contended that the Feldman rationale is faulty and this court should adopt the reasoning of Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Feldman. This argument may be dealt with expeditiously; even were this court to find the reasoning of the dissent more persuasive, this court's position in the judicial hierarchy prevents it from ignoring established precedent from the Supreme Court. Secondly, plaintiff argued that Feldman is limited by its facts only to application where the court is reviewing decisions relating to state bar matters. This too is plainly not the case; Feldman is not so limited by its own language, nor has it been so limited in application by the courts. See e.g., Phinizy v. Alabama, 847 F.2d 282, 283-284 (5th Cir.1988) (); Dennison, 726 F.Supp. at 140 (). In light of the strictures of Feldman, Counts I and II of the complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff contends that Counts III and IV are not as easily dispensed with as they do not seek direct review of the state court decision but allege constitutional violations arising from the transfer itself. Here again, the Dennison decision is helpful. In the present case, plaintiff's transfer was not grievable unless it was disciplinary; in Dennison the plaintiff's discharge was not grievable unless it was an involuntary or constructive discharge. In both cases the disciplinary actions were ultimately found to be nongrievable and the plaintiffs appealed those findings to the Circuit Court. In both cases the Circuit courts affirmed the findings of nongrievability. Finally, in each case, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court alleging that the disciplinary actions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. In both Dennison and the present action the question faced by the court is to what extent the state court's decision on the issue of grievability forecloses action by the federal court on the underlying issues.
While Feldman was not a res judicata action there is a similarity between the rationale of the two types of cases. Part of the res judicata analysis is a determination of whether particular issues were raised, or could have been raised, in the previous proceeding. Dennison, 726 F.Supp. at 139. If the issues could not have been raised before then they are not given any res judicata effect; however, if they were raised, or could have been raised but were not, and the plaintiff obtains an adverse judgment, he will be precluded from litigating those claims in the future. This type of analysis seems largely to parallel that in Feldman where the court stated that the District Courts are precluded from reviewing issues "inextricably intertwined" with those actually decided by the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-484, n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315-16, n. 16. Thus, as the court stated in Feldman, if the plaintiff could have raised his constitutional claims below but did not, that in itself will not give him access to federal court. Id. at 484, 103 S.Ct. at 1316.
Where the Circuit Court decision establishes certain facts essential to its decision on grievability, which facts in turn are essential to, or in other words inextricably intertwined with, this court's decision on constitutional issues, the parties in the state case will be barred from obtaining further review of those facts in the federal forum either because a dismissal will enter on res judicata grounds or because of a dismissal under Feldman. In Dennison it was clear that the Circuit Court's decision foreclosed the federal action. The state court decided the precise factual and legal questions which this court would have to have addressed, and the state court cited federal cases in arriving at its conclusion. The Order of the Circuit Court in Dennison made all of this explicit. In the present case the Circuit Court's Order is more laconic.
In his Order Judge Shelton stated that he was faced with "a bare legal issue of whether the transfer ... is grievable." The court concluded the Order by stating "the Court...
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Leonard v. Suthard, 90-2908
...counts. The district court dismissed all four counts; Leonard challenges the dismissal of Counts III and IV on appeal. Leonard v. Suthard, 737 F.Supp. 921 (W.D.Va.1990). Count III alleges that the transfer violated Leonard's first amendment right to redress grievances against the government......