Lepage v. Yeutter

• Decision Date: 30 October 1990
• Docket Number: D,No. 36,36
• Citation: 917 F.2d 741
• Parties: Lisa LEPAGE, Beverly Johnson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clayton YEUTTER, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and Veronica Celani, Commissioner of Social Welfare, Vermont, Defendants, Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 90-6043.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 741

917 F.2d 741

Lisa LEPAGE, Beverly Johnson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clayton YEUTTER, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and Veronica Celani, Commissioner of Social Welfare, Vermont, Defendants Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 36, Docket 90-6043.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Aug. 28, 1990.

Decided Oct. 30, 1990.

Katherine S. Gruenheck (Barbara C. Biddle, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., George J. Terwilliger III, U.S. Atty., Burlington, Vt., Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., on brief), for defendant-appellant.

Thomas F. Garrett (Jack McCullough, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, Vt., on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before FEINBERG and CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges, and CABRANES, District Judge. ^*

CABRANES, District Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellees have brought this class action to challenge the validity of certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture (the "Secretary") under the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011-2030 (the "Food Stamp Act"). The regulations at issue concern the so-called "voluntary quit" provision of the Food Stamp Act, under which a household is disqualified from receiving food stamps for a period of ninety days if the "head of the household" voluntarily quits his or her employment without good cause. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii); ¹ 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.7(n). ² In particular, plaintiffs-appellees challenge the Secretary's decision to define the term "head of household" as "the primary wage earner" for the purposes of the voluntary quit provision. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.1(d)(2). ³

The facts of this case are not disputed. Lisa Lepage is the mother of three minor children. During the relevant period of this lawsuit, Ms. Lepage did not work outside the home. She received food stamps from the Vermont Department of Social Welfare (the "Department") as well as assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 601-617 ("AFDC"). From December 1986 until March 1988, Carl Hale, an unrelated friend of Ms. Lepage, lived and ate with her family. Mr. Hale worked for a pool construction company in May 1987, and he quit after approximately three weeks. After Ms. Lepage reported the job loss, the Department determined that Mr. Hale had been the primary wage earner of the household and because he quit his job without good cause, ⁴ her entire household was disqualified for ninety days from receiving food stamps.

In 1986, Beverly Johnson lived with her four children, three of whom were minors. Ms. Johnson also received aid through the AFDC program. Although Ms. Johnson worked outside of her home, she earned less than her nineteen-year-old son, John Nichols, who worked for a roofing contractor. In April 1986, Mr. Nichols quit his job. Because of the subsequent loss to the household income, Ms. Johnson applied for food stamps. The Department denied her application based on the determination that Mr. Nichols was the principal wage earner and that he had quit his job without good cause.

The district court granted plaintiffs-appellees' motion for summary judgment and invalidated the regulations. Because we find that the Secretary's regulations do not contravene a clear congressional intention and that they are reasonable in light of his statutory authority to issue such regulations as he deems necessary and appropriate, we now reverse.

I.

When a court reviews an administrative agency's construction of the statute which the agency administers, the court faces two questions:

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, ... the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

In considering the regulations at issue in this case, the district court properly inquired into whether Congress had expressed a clear intention on the meaning of "head of household" for the purposes of the voluntary quit provision. Because the district court concluded both that Congress intended that the term "head of household" mean "the member of the household who was designated as being responsible for it in the Food Stamp Program" and that this intention was "evident" from the language of the statute and from the legislative history, Dubuque, 728 F.Supp. 303, 315 (D.Vt.1989), it never reached Chevron's second question of whether the Secretary's construction of the statute was "reasonable."

II.

In 1964, Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act "in order to promote the general welfare, [and] to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2011. The voluntary quit provision, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii), was enacted in 1977 as part of Congress's efforts to "eliminate the non-needy from the program," simplify administration, and reduce fraud and abuse. H.R.Rep. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. ("1977 House Report") 1-2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, 1978-79. The provision was intended to remove a perceived loophole in the Food Stamp Act, by preventing an individual from quitting work voluntarily in order to become eligible for food stamps.

Although the voluntary quit provision originally covered only applicants, Congress extended its coverage in 1981 to include households already receiving benefits. Pub.L. No. 97-98, Sec. 1311, 95 Stat. 1213, 1285 (1981). In 1982, the provision was amended to increase the period of ineligibility from sixty to ninety days. Pub.L. No. 97-253, Sec. 158(a), 96 Stat. 763, 777 (1982). In 1985, Congress moved in the opposite direction, amending the Food Stamp Act to limit the consequences to the household of any member's refusing to accept a reasonable job without good cause or to register for employment. Whereas prior to 1985, any "physically and mentally fit [household member] between the ages of sixteen and sixty" who refused to accept a job without good cause could disqualify the entire household from receiving food stamps, after 1985, the entire household could be disqualified only when the "head of the household" voluntarily quit his or her job. See Food Security Act of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-198, Sec. 1516, 99 Stat. 1354, 1572-73 (1985); see also H.R.Rep. No. 271, Pt. 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 313, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1103, 1417. ⁵

Congress did not define the term "head of household" in the original enactment of the voluntary quit provision in 1977. However, for purposes of administering the food stamp program, the Secretary had already defined "head of the household" as the "member of the household in whose name application is made for participation in the [Food Stamp] Program." 29 Fed.Reg. 16784, 16785 (1964). When Congress enacted the voluntary quit provision in 1977, currently codified at 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii), the House Agriculture Committee apparently had the Secretary's definition of "head of household" in mind when commenting on the loophole in the statute:

There is no prohibition, however, against the head of a household (that member in whose name application is made for participation in the program ) ... quitting work and thereby rendering the entire household eligible for food stamps.

1977 House Report at 168, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2138 (emphasis added).

In 1979, the Secretary promulgated a regulation adopting a specialized definition of "head of household" for purposes of the voluntary quit provision. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.7(c) (1979). The Secretary determined that defining "head of household" as the "primary wage earner" would best realize Congress's intent to prevent household breadwinners from voluntarily quitting work and then relying on the food stamp program for support. See 43 Fed.Reg. 47846, 47853 (1978). When Congress amended the voluntary quit provision in 1981 to apply to households already receiving food stamps, the legislative history acknowledged the Secretary's specialized definition of 1979. The House Conference Report stated the purpose of the provision:

The House amendment extends the scope of the existing law disqualifying applicant households for 60 days, if the primary wage earner has voluntarily quit a job without good cause, to include recipient households.

H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 377, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 218, reprinted in 1981 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2250, 2315 (emphasis in original). The report on the Senate's version of the bill was similar:

Household disqualification, if the primary wage earner has voluntarily quit a job without good cause, would be extended to include those already receiving food stamps (only applicants are now disqualified under this rule) and the period of disqualification for voluntarily quitting a job would be lengthened from 60 to 90 days.

S.Rep. No. 128, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981) (emphasis added). All discussions of subsequent amendments to the voluntary quit provision, however, have referred simply to "head of household" without further elaboration. ⁶

After reviewing this history of congressional consideration of the Food Stamp Act, the district court first recognized that the term "head of household," as used in the Food Stamp Act, did not "convey a plain or commonplace meaning" and that it "depart[ed] from the general[,] accepted and traditional meaning." Dubu...