Lepper v. Lepper, 02S03-8707-CV-627

Decision Date01 July 1987
Docket NumberNo. 02S03-8707-CV-627,02S03-8707-CV-627
Citation509 N.E.2d 818
PartiesRebecca A. LEPPER, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. James W. LEPPER, Appellee (Defendant Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Terry L. Cornelius, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

John Bullman, Fort Wayne, for appellee.

CIVIL PETITION TO TRANSFER

DICKSON, Justice.

In this custody modification case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Lepper v. Lepper (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 820. Among the various issues addressed, the Court of Appeals held that modification of a previously established child support order does not necessarily require the trial court to consider evidence of all four factors set forth in Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-12(a). Appellant argues that this is in conflict with Tucker v. Tucker (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 321. For the sole purpose of resolving the possible conflict between these opinions of the Court of Appeals, we grant transfer. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 11(B)(3), we decline to address the remaining issues and summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals thereon.

The marriage of Rebecca A. Lepper and James W. Lepper was terminated by divorce in 1972, and the custody of the parties' son was placed with Rebecca. Various ensuing proceedings addressed modification of custody and support. Following the February 10, 1984, denial of his petition to modify custody, James again sought and obtained custody on June 3, 1985. Prior to the change of custody from Rebecca to James, the last prior support modification (June 12, 1984) had set James's child support obligation at $70.00 per week. In conjunction with the change of custody ordered June 3, 1985, the trial court ordered Rebecca to pay child support of $70.00 per week. At that time, the son was 17 years old.

The support modification by the trial court in the instant case appears to be an order sua sponte entered contemporaneously with a modification of custody. Neither party had filed a petition seeking support modification.

While the record is silent concerning the support needs of the child and the income of James, there was evidence of Rebecca's income at the time of the hearing, and the fact that it had increased approximately 7% since the previous hearing. Rebecca argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to modify support by imposing upon her a support obligation absent evidence on the remaining statutory factors.

The modification of child support is expressly authorized by Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-17(a) (Section 17) which provides in pertinent part:

17(a) Provisions of an order with respect to child support ... may be modified or revoked. Such modification shall be made only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable.

Section 17 does not identify any specific criteria to be considered in such modification proceedings. However, Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-12(a) (Section 12) prescribes certain factors for consideration in the initial determination of child support:

12(a) In an action pursuant to Section 3(a) [dissolution], 3(b) [child support], or 3(c) [legal separation] of this Chapter, the court may order either parent or both parents to pay any amount reasonable for support of a child, without regard to marital misconduct after considering all relevant factors including:

(1) the financial resources of the custodial parent;

(2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved or had the separation not been ordered;

(3) physical and mental condition of the child and his educational needs; and

(4) educational resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.

While noting that other cases such as Tucker, supra, may be construed to instruct that the trial judge must consider the four factors of Section 12 in a modification proceeding, the Court of Appeals concluded:

While the four factors of Section 12 may be relevant to modification of a child support order, and while a trial court therefore may appropriately consider them, a trial court does not necessarily commit reversible error by failing to expressly consider the four factors when modifying a child support order.

Lepper, 495 N.E.2d at 825.

We agree. The factors identified by Section 12 are applicable not only to initial child support determinations, but also may be relevant in modification proceedings. However, not every support modification hearing will require evidence upon each factor.

The standard of review applicable to support modification cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding changed circumstances of a substantial and continuing...

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10 cases
  • Marriage of Baker, In re
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 12, 1990
    ...finding will not be disturbed even though we might have reached a different conclusion had we been the triers of fact. Lepper v. Lepper (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 818, 821. There really is no dispute that there has been a change of circumstances affecting the need and amount of support. At th......
  • Neudecker v. Neudecker
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 13, 1991
    ...will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court. Lepper v. Lepper (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 818; Meehan v. Meehan (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 157. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Meehan, At......
  • Cavazzi v. Cavazzi, 49A05-9104-CV-123
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 19, 1992
    ...not contain a request for college expenses. It was error for the court to order relief not requested by the petition. See Lepper v. Lepper (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 818. Secondly, under I.C. 31-1-11.5-12(b), the court may order a parent to pay for a child's college "(b) The child support ord......
  • Smith v. Mobley
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 29, 1990
    ...and further the purposes of the changed circumstances rule. Kruse, supra, at 939. Support for this rule is found in Lepper v. Lepper (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 818. There, the Supreme Court recognized that, subsequent to a hearing on child custody, the noncustodial parent may wish to request ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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