Leppert v. Leppert
Decision Date | 15 January 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 20060872-CA.,20060872-CA. |
Citation | 200 P.3d 223,2009 UT App 10 |
Parties | Mark F. LEPPERT, Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Catherine L. LEPPERT, Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-appellee. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Kellie F. Williams and Jared T. Hales, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee.
David C. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and DAVIS.
¶ 1 Catherine L. Leppert (Wife) appeals the district court's orders dated August 25, 2006, and November 20, 2006, as well as its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Order and Judgment Supplementing Decree of Divorce, both dated February 7, 2007. Mark F. Leppert (Husband) cross-appeals other aspects of these same documents. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
¶ 2 The parties were married in 1972. Husband filed a complaint for divorce and a verified motion for a bifurcated decree of divorce in 2004. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim as well as a motion for temporary support. The parties stipulated to a bifurcated decree of divorce, and the district court entered a bifurcated order, granting a Decree of Divorce and reserving other issues for further hearing. Additionally, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding temporary support matters. Based on the parties' stipulation the district court ordered Husband to pay Wife $1100 per month for expenses, noting that the payment could be characterized as alimony but was not to be tax deductible by Husband or taxable as income to Wife. The court also ordered Husband to pay various household expenses of Wife, including the mortgage payment, home maintenance, phone expenses, life insurance, utilities, auto payment and insurance, etc.
¶ 3 In 2006, Husband filed a Motion for Modification of Temporary Order and Other Relief requesting, in part, that the total amount payable to Wife not exceed $2000 per month and that the money paid to her be deemed alimony for tax reporting purposes. The district court held a hearing on Husband's motion and after considering both the tax consequences of the temporary order and the average monthly amount Husband paid to Wife, ordered Husband to pay taxable temporary alimony of $5708 per month to Wife until further order of the court. The district court also ordered that Wife would be responsible for payment of the trust deed notes on the marital residence, as well as utilities and other personal expenses.
¶ 4 In 2006, the district court held a trial to determine alimony and the division of property, debt, and royalty payments. At trial the court received evidence from Husband, Wife, several medical doctors, a vocational expert, a certified public accountant, and several other experts and lay witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the court noted that, although there was conflicting testimony as to whether Wife was capable of working, that Wife was, in fact, capable of employment earning $9 an hour and imputed $1560 per month to Wife. The court also attributed an additional $375 per month of income to Wife as her one-half share of anticipated income from patents and royalty payments Husband had received during the marriage. The court provided within the order for any patents or royalties Husband was to receive within two years of the date of the order, requiring that they be subject to division based upon a Woodward style analysis. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
¶ 5 Regarding financial needs, the court reviewed the parties' claimed needs and found that each had included amounts and items that were not reasonable. In particular, the court cited certain amounts of Wife's claimed needs as unreasonable and reduced each as the court saw fit. Ultimately, the court determined that Wife had a need for $4293 per month to meet her reasonable expenses. Thereafter, the court concluded that Wife had a need for alimony in the amount of $2358,1 and that Husband had the ability to pay that amount. The court determined that alimony should continue until Husband retired. The court also determined that upon Husband's retirement Wife would receive $2111 per month from the parties' retirement account and ordered that alimony would be reduced by that same amount at that time. The court ordered that alimony was to terminate when Wife turns sixty-six and becomes eligible to receive social security. In addition, the court determined that Wife did not have the means to pay her attorney fees and ordered Husband to pay $8000 toward the fees Wife had incurred.
¶ 6 Wife filed a Motion to Clarify and Amend the Order. In November 2006, the district court made various clarifications to the previous order and directed Husband to file an Amended Findings and Conclusions incorporating the clarifications. On February 7, 2007, the court entered an Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order and Judgment Supplementing Decree of Divorce.
¶ 7 Wife first claims that the district court erred by imputing monthly income of $1560 to her despite the testimony of multiple witnesses that she was not employable. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining a spouse's income, and determinations of income will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 19, 985 P.2d 255 ().
¶ 8 Wife also argues that the district court erred in the amount, retirement reduction, and duration of the alimony awarded to Wife.
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and [determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. We review a trial court's conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards for correctness, according no deference to the trial court. If, however, we are charged with the task of reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous.
Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ¶ 7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 9 Next, Wife contends that the district court erred in its division of personal property, royalty payments, and debts. On cross-appeal, Husband argues that the court erred in awarding Wife a portion of the interest based upon a Woodward style analysis Husband would be entitled to receive for patents or royalties awarded for a two-year period after the date of the order.2 Husband, also argues that the court erred in its amended ruling fixing the date for establishing marital debt as the date of separation rather than the divorce date.
We afford the trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 10 Lastly, Wife asserts that the district court erred in its failure to award costs and in awarding only $8000 of her attorney fees. On cross-appeal, Husband argues that the court erred in awarding Wife any attorney fees. The district court has broad discretion in determining whether attorney fees and costs should be granted. See id. ¶ 14.
¶ 11 Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring or mischaracterizing the testimony of multiple witnesses concerning Wife's medical and psychological disabilities pertaining to her ability to work and ultimately imputing income to Wife in the amount of $1560 of earnings and $375 as her share in royalty payments per month. The district court did not ignore witness testimony. Indeed, the court agreed that there was "conflicting testimony on whether [Wife] is capable of working." But the court also found that "[n]early all the experts testified that [Wife] was capable of work and in fact several felt it would result in an improvement in her life."
¶ 12 The district court's determination that Wife is capable of employment is within the sound discretion of the trial court since the court is in an advantaged position to weigh the evidence, determine the persuasive value of the evidence, and make determinations based on the evidence. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). The district court entered detailed findings of fact, citing the witnesses' testimony as to Wife's capabilities and employability, which adequately support the court's decision to impute income to Wife. For example, the court cited the testimony of Dr. Daniel Clegg, who has been treating Wife since 1981, and stated that "there is no physical basis for her complaints; she has no physical disabilities." The court also referred to Wife's psychologist, stating that "Dr. Gregory does not believe [Wife] is unemployable." The court specifically found that "[e]ven [Wife] stated that she would like to be employed." Finally, the court cited Kristy Farnsworth, an employment specialist, who testified that although Wife has not worked since 1981, she is capable of generating employment income at the minimum wage level. Generally, when a trial court enters detailed findings of fact that support its decision to impute income to a party, we will hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by imputing income. See Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, ¶ 15, 138 P.3d 84 (...
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