Lerner N.Y., Inc. v. United States

• Citation: 908 F.Supp.2d 1313
• Decision Date: 01 May 2013
• Docket Number: Slip Op. 13–56.,Court No. 07–00361.
• Parties: LERNER NEW YORK, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of International Trade

908 F.Supp.2d 1313

LERNER NEW YORK, INC., Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Slip Op. 13–56. Court No. 07–00361.

United States Court of International Trade.

May 1, 2013.

Frances P. Hadfield, Alan R. Klestadt and Robert B. Silverman, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, of New York, NY, for plaintiff.

Beverly A. Farrell, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Justin R. Miller and Karen V. Goff), of New York, N.Y., for defendant United States. With her on the briefs were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General and Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office. Of counsel on the briefs was Michael W. Heydrich, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of New York, NY.

OPINION

STANCEU, Judge:

Plaintiff Lerner New York, Inc. (“Lerner”) ¹ brought this action to contest the tariff classification that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) applied to a women's garment made of predominantly-nylon knitted fabric and containing an interior fabric insert marketed as a “shelf bra.” The garment, Lerner style number 9843233, was marketed under the description “Bodyshaper” and imported by Lerner in July 2005. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 15 (Oct. 10, 2007), ECF No. 2; Pl.'s Ex. 1. The garment is worn on the upper body, has narrow straps, and has no shoulder or neck coverage. Id. ¶¶ 16, 21, 24. Defendant United States maintains that the Bodyshaper is properly classified in a residual provision for knitted garments made of man-made fibers, as Customs determined upon liquidation. Answer 4 (Mar. 13, 2008), ECF No. 7. Plaintiff claims classification of the Bodyshaper as a “brassiere” or similar article.

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein, reached following a bench trial, the court concludes that the tariff classification determined by Customs upon liquidation, and advocated before the court by defendant, is correct.

I. Background

Lerner entered a shipment of Bodyshapers on May 27, 2005 at the Port of Long Beach, California on entry number 113–3085123–6. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3; Summons (Jul. 12, 2007), ECF No. 1 (Court No. 07–00260).² The commercial invoice described the garment as “Ladies 92 pct nylon 8 pct spandex knitted top bodyshaper w/ shelf bra.” Joint Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 4 (Nov. 29, 2011), ECF No. 52 (“JPO”). Upon liquidating the entry on April 7, 2006, Customs classified the merchandise in subheading 6114.30.10, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (2005) (“Other garments, knitted or crocheted: Of man-made fibers: Tops”), at 28.2% ad val.³ Compl. ¶ 9; Answer 4. Lerner timely protested the determination of classification on June 27, 2006 (protest no. 2704–06–101253). Summons 3. Customs denied the protest on February 2, 2007 without issuing an official ruling. Id. On August 12, 2007, Lerner timely filed its summons, id., and on November 21, 2007, Lerner filed its complaint, claiming classification in subheading 6212.90.00, HTSUS (“Brassieres, girdles, corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts thereof, whether or not knitted or crocheted: Other”), at 6.6% ad val., Compl. ¶¶ 10–25.

Due to the presence of common issues of fact, the court directed that this case be tried jointly with Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, Court No. 07–00347.⁴ The parties submitted identical post-trial briefing in the Victoria's Secret and Lerner actions. Pls.' Post–Trial Br. (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 67 (“Pl.'s Mem.”); Def.'s Post–Trial Mem. of Law (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 66. Plaintiff responded to defendant's post-trial brief on March 23, 2012. Resp. to Def.'s Post–Trial Br. (Mar. 23, 2012), ECF No. 70 (“Pl.'s Resp.”).⁵

II. Discussion

The court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).⁶ In cases contesting the denial of a protest, the court makes its findings of fact de novo based upon the record made before the court, 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the government's classification of the subject merchandise was incorrect but does not bear the burden of establishing the correct classification; instead, it is the court's independent duty to arrive at “the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984). In making this determination, the court “must consider whether the government's classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer's alternative.” Id. While “[t]he proper scope and meaning of a tariff classification term is a question of law[,] ... determining whether the goods at issue fall within a particular tariff term as properly construed is a question of fact.” Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

On questions of law, a classification decision of Customs may be accorded a “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’ ” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). But when Customs has summarily denied a protest of the classification without issuing an official ruling, the court considers the parties' arguments without deference. Hartog Foods v. United States, 291 F.3d 789, 791 (Fed.Cir.2002). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), a trial begins with a statutory presumption of correctness for the factual components of a Customs classification decision. To overcome the presumption, the party challenging that decision must produce a preponderance of evidence on a disputed factual question. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997). In the resolution of disputed facts, “the merchandise itself is often a potent witness.” Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citations omitted).

Classification under the HTSUS is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). GRI 1 requires that tariff classification, in the first instance, “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. The chapter and section notes of the HTSUS are not optional interpretive rules but statutory law. Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1999). Once imported merchandise is determined to be classifiable under a particular heading, a court must look to the subheadings to find the correct classification of the merchandise in question. Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

Tariff acts are construed to carry out the intent of Congress, which is initially determined by looking at the language of the statute itself. Rubie's Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). When “a tariff term is not defined in either the HTSUS or its legislative history, the term's correct meaning is its common or dictionary meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1044, 1048 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citations omitted). In the absence of a showing of a commercial designation, the common meaning and commercial meaning of a tariff term are presumed to be the same. Id. at 1048–49;see also Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed.Cir.1999). In construing tariff terms, the court may “consult lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable information” or may rely on its “own understanding of the terms used.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citationomitted). Although “not legally binding,” the Explanatory Notes (“ENs”) to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“Harmonized System” or “HS”), maintained by the World Customs Organization, “may be consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision.” Degussa Corp. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1044, 1047 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2006)). Where a tariff term has various definitions or meanings and has broad and narrow interpretations, the court must determine which definition best expresses the congressional intent. Richards Medical Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed.Cir.1990).

In this action, plaintiff claims classification of the Bodyshaper in subheading 6212.90.00, HTSUS (“[b]rassieres, girdles, corsets ... and similar articles ... whether or not knitted or crocheted: Other”), at 6.6% ad val. The government advocates classification of the Bodyshaper in subheading 6114.30.10, HTSUS (“Other garments, knitted or crocheted: Of man-made fibers: Tops”) at 28.2% ad val.

Based on the factual findings and conclusions of law set forth below, the court determines that the Bodyshaper is properly classified in subheading 6114.30.10, HTSUS. The court rejects plaintiff's classification claim because the Bodyshaper does not answer to the article description for heading 6212, HTSUS.

A. Findings of Fact Pertaining to the Bodyshaper

The following uncontested facts were agreed to by the parties in the joint pretrial order entered by the court on November 29, 2011: ⁷

1. The marketing name for Lerner style 9843233 is the “Bodyshaper.” JPO, Schedule C ¶ 14.

2. The commercial invoice describes the Bodyshaper as a “[l]adies 92 pct nylon 8 pct spandex knitted top bodyshaper w/ shelf bra.” JPO, Schedule C ¶ 4.

3. The Bodyshaper is made of knit fabric that is 92% nylon and 8% spandex. JPO, Schedule C ¶¶ 8–9.

4. The Bodyshaper is an upper body garment designed to be worn next to the skin and without...