Lerner v. Richardson
| Decision Date | 27 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 72-1976. |
| Citation | 393 F. Supp. 1387 |
| Parties | Sidney LERNER v. Elliot RICHARDSON. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Thomas F. McDevitt, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Frank J. Bove, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
This is an action filed by the claimant for judicial review of the "final decision" of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare relating to the amount of disability benefits payable to the claimant under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. This Court has jurisdiction of the action by virtue of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court is the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. Neither the facts nor the law applicable thereto are in dispute. The issue presented is whether the method used by the Secretary to compute the monthly disability benefits payable to the claimant is in accordance with the law. The claimant also contends that Section 215 of the Social Security Act which sets forth the method for computing disability benefits is unconstitutional. Upon a review of the undisputed facts and the law applicable thereto, this Court rejects the claimant's contentions and grants the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.
Claimant became totally disabled on October 26, 1969, as a result of a heart condition. On January 28, 1970, the claimant filed an application for disability benefits. Based on this application a determination of award was made that the claimant was entitled to disability benefits as of May 1970. The claimant requested reconsideration on the ground that the formula which was used to compute the amount of his benefits was erroneous. After the reconsideration, a determination was made on October 8, 1970 that the amount of benefits being paid the claimant was correct. On March 29, 1971, the claimant filed a request for a hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on July 23, 1971 holding that the formula used to compute the claimant's benefits was correct and that the claimant was not entitled to additional benefits. On September 10, 1971, a request for review of the Administrative Law Judge's action was filed. The Appeals Council on February 25, 1972, upheld the Administrative Law Judge's decision.
The claimant is a medical doctor who was self-employed up until his disability in October 1969, except for the period from February 21, 1953 to February 25, 1955,1 during which time he served in the U.S. Air Force. Prior to 1965, self-employment income received by an individual in the exercise of his profession as a physician was specifically excluded from his earning record by the Social Security Administration. See § 211(c) of the Social Security Act. After the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. No. 89-97, Section 311(a)(1), 79 Stat. 380, July 30, 1965), this exclusion was eliminated. The amendment specifically provided that the elimination of the exclusion "shall apply only with respect to taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1965."
In computing the primary insurance benefits payable under the Act, the wage earner's "average monthly wage" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) is the critical factor.
Section 415(b) provides in part:
The claimant alleges that the Secretary erroneously computed his "average monthly wage". The claimant's "average monthly wage" was computed as follows: The number of benefit computation years is 13, i.e., the number of years elapsing after 1950 and before 1969 (when claimant became disabled) reduced by five.2 The total of the claimant's credited earnings in the best 13 years of his employment were divided by the number of months in 13 years and the quotient was translated by applicable tables into a primary insurance amount paid monthly to the claimant. In determining the claimant's "average monthly wage", all self-employment income obtained by the claimant in the practice of medicine before 1965 was excluded. The non-covered earnings, i.e., earnings derived from self-employment as a physician, were considered to be zero. The years in which the claimant derived his total income from the practice of medicine were included in establishing the number of benefit computation years (i.e., 18 years less 5, or 13 years). The earnings derived from self-employment as a physician prior to 1965 were not included in the total amount of covered earnings used in the computation. The result was that only the 8 years (1953, 1954, 1955 and 1965 through 1969) of the claimant's covered employment contributed positive amounts to his total earnings, but in determining the average monthly wage, the divisor was the number of months contained in 13 years, i.e., 8 years' wages were divided by 13 years to determine the average monthly wage during those 13 years.
The claimant contends that in his computation, the Secretary should have included the earnings derived from self-employment as a physician for the years 1950, 1951, 1952, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, or, in the alternative, should have excluded those years in computing the "average monthly wage."
The inclusion or exclusion of years of employment or categories of income covered by the various Social Security plans "are matters which, because of social considerations, address themselves to the Congress and not to this Court." Furst v. Weinberger, 1973-1974 Transfer Binder CCH Unemp.Ins.Rep. ¶ 17,291 (U.S.D.C.N.D.Ga.1973). The explicit statutory language, quoted above, clearly reflects the Congressional intent as to the method of computing Social Security benefits. Although the object of Social Security is to replace lost wages, the Act has not in the past, nor does it currently, include all wages and all self-employment income.3 The history of the Act shows that it has been repeatedly broadened both as to coverage and as to inclusions of wages and self-employment income. Congress has found it necessary to build into the Social Security System a formula designed to prevent the dissipation of the Social Security Fund by those groups who have made limited contributions to the fund, and to protect those individuals who have been in covered employment for a considerable portion of their working lives.
A case which has dealt squarely with the issue herein presented is Furst v. Weinberger, 1973-1974 Transfer Binder CCH Unemp.Ins.Rep. ¶ 17,291 (U.S. D.C.N.D.Ga.1973). In Furst, the claimants made the same challenge to the method used by the Secretary in computing wage benefits and the Court upheld the forumla employed by the Secretary which excluded the earnings derived from self-employment as a physician for the period prior to 1965. See also, Erickson v. Social Security Board, 149 F. 2d 270 (2d Cir. 1945); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F.Supp. 1299 (E.D.Pa. 1974); Polelle v. HEW, 386 F.Supp. 443, (U.S.D.C.N.D.Ill.1974); Aronowitz v. Weinberger, 361 F.Supp. 1159 (S.D. Ohio 1973); McEvoy v. Weinberger, 1973-1974 Transfer Binder CCH Unemp.Ins.Rep. ¶ 17,414 (U.S.D.C.S.D. Fla.1973).
Thus, we find that, contrary to the claimant's contention, the method used by the Secretary in computing the claimant's disability benefits was in accordance with Section 215 of the Social Security Act as intended by Congress.
The claimant also contends that even if the Secretary has computed claimant's benefits in accordance with the law and the intent of Congress, § 215 of the Social Security Act is unconstitutional in that: (a) the Act unlawfully discriminates against medical doctors included in Social Security since 1965; and (b) the Act deprives medical doctors of property without due process of law. The claimant's contention is without merit and is rejected.
Our starting point in testing the constitutionality of § 215 of the Social Security Act must be Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). In Flemming, the Supreme Court stated:
In judging the permissibility of the cut-off provisions of § 202(n) of the Social Security Act from this stand-point, it is not within our authority to determine whether Congressional judgment expressed in that section is sound or equitable, or whether it comports well or ill with the purposes of the Act. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 644, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307. Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as this, we must recognize that the...
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...Security Act, the wage earner's `average monthly wage' as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) is the crucial factor." Lerner v. Richardson, 393 F.Supp. 1387, 1388 (E.D.Pa.1975). Thus, at least in this disability insurance law, disability benefits are limited to benefits calculated on the basis of......