Lerner v. Rump Bros

• Decision Date: 20 October 1925
• Citation: 149 N.E. 334,241 N.Y. 153
• Parties: LERNER et al. v. RUMP BROS. et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

241 N.Y. 153

149 N.E. 334

LERNER et al.

v.RUMP BROS. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 20, 1925.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Mrs. Flora Lerner for the death of Maurice Lerner, claimant, opposed by Rump Bros., employer, and the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, insurance carrier.From an order of Appellate Division, Third Department(212 App. Div. 747, 209 N. Y. S. 698), affirming an award of the State Industrial Board, the employer and insurance carrier appeal.

Orders reversed, award of Industrial Board vacated, and claim dismissed.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third department.

Merwyn H. Nellis, of Albany, for appellants.

Albert Ottinger, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondents.

POUND, J.

The State Industrial Board made findings herein as follows: On the morning of June 2, 1923, Maurice Lerner was working for his employer in his employer's plant, and, while showing fruit and vegetables to a customer of his employer in the refrigerator of said employer's plant, and because of the sudden transition from the superheated atmosphere on the outside of said refrigerating plant to the chilly atmosphere in the interior thereof, and as his duties necessitated his remaining in said refrigerator for 10 minutes, he received a chill that naturally and unavoidably caused a cold to develop, which lowered his disease resisting power, and as a result, pulmonary edema and cerebral embolism and septic endocarditis developed, and caused his death on November 22, 1923; the proximate cause of death being the injury that he received in the refrigerator of his employer's plant on June 2, 1923.An award made on these findings has been affirmed by the Appellate Division.

The question is whether, on the facts found, the conclusion could be reached that Lerner's death was due to an accidental injury which arose out of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law(Consol. Laws, c. 67).Death was due to disease.The disease was not an occupational disease, the natural and unavoidable result of the employment.A distinction exists between accidental injury and disease, but disease may be an accidental injury.The exception arises out of abnormal conditions which must be established to sustain an award.Two concurrent limitations have been placed on the right to recover an award when a disease, not the natural and unavoidable result of the employment is developed during the course of the employment, although it does not follow that compensation should be awarded in all cases coming literally within these limitations.First, the inception of the disease must be assignable to a determinate or single act, identified in space or time.Matter of Jeffreyes v. Charles H. Sarger Co., 198 App. Div. 446, 191 N. Y. S. 354;Id., 233 N. Y. 535, 135 N. E. 907.Secondly, it must also be assignable to something catastrophic or extraordinary.Matter of Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 366.The principle has been extended in England to include cases wherein prolonged and unusual exposure, although voluntary in its character, has brought on pneumonia or rheumatism.Coyle v. Watson, Ltd., [1915] A. C. 1;Glasgow Coal Co., Ltd., v. Welsh, [1916]2 A. C. 1.In these cases the exposure was directly related either to an accident or...