LeRoy v. State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations

• Citation: 231 N.E.2d 212,249 Ind. 383
• Decision Date: 01 November 1967
• Docket Number: No. 30908,30908
• Parties: Raymond LeROY et al., Appellants, v. STATE COMMISSION FOR the REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL CORPORATIONS of the State of Indiana et al., Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 212

231 N.E.2d 212

249 Ind. 383

Raymond LeROY et al., Appellants, v. STATE COMMISSION FOR the REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL

CORPORATIONS of the State of Indiana et al., Appellees.

No. 30908.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 1, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1968.

Bowen, Myers, Northam & Givan, Indianapolis, for appellants.

John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Anthony Champa, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

MOTE, Judge.

This appeal comes to us from the Starke Circuit Court wherein the Judge thereof sustained a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' complaint against the Appellees.

The Assignment of Errors is as follows:

'1. The court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by the Appellee State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana.

2. The court erred in holding and deciding that the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is not required to follow the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.

3. That the finding and decision of the court was contrary to law.'

Aside from the technical question raised as to whether the motion to dismiss would serve the same purpose as a demurrer, which we hold under the circumstances in the affirmative, the only question (in two parts) presented by this appeal is whether (1) the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act of Indiana, the same being Ch. 365 of the Acts of 1947, as amended and found in Burns' Ind.Stat. § 63--3001 et seq., has any application to the case at bar; and (2) whether the same must be followed by the State Commission established by the provisions of the School Corporation Reorganization Act of Indiana, General Assembly 1959, as amended, the same being found in Burns' Ind.Stat. 1966 Cum.Supp. § 28--6101 et seq.

Even a cursory examination of the provisions of the two said Acts leads to the conclusion that the former mentioned Act does not apply to the lattter Act in this particular proceedings and it would be difficult to imagine a situation in which there would be any application, for the reason that the proceedings before the said State Commission, although necessary, are not final and for the further reason that the contemplated statutory functions of said State Commission generally, as here, are ministerial and not judicial. This reasoning can be supported by a line of respectable authorities.

In McGraw v. Marion County Plan Commission (1960), 131 Ind.App. 686, 174 N.E.2d 757, it was stated:

'It has been decided that the word 'decision' as used in such a statute refers only to judicial decisions, meaning decisions involving a judicial act. Ross v. Becker (1907), 169 Ind. 166, 170, 81 N.E. 478. Purely ministerial decisions or administrative acts are not within the concept of such terms. Potts v. Bennett et al., (1895), 140 Ind. 71, 76, 77, 39 N.E. 518; Collins v. Laybold, (1914), 182 Ind. 126, 104 N.E. 971; In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., (1930), 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65. It is clear that the hearing and action before the Plan Commission can only lead to some action or non-action on the part of the County Commissioners, as they alone have the power to accept, amend or reject what the Plan Commission proposes. There is no finality to the Plan Commission's action. Its recommendations are not binding on any one.'

We shall not lengthen this opinion by further citations. The School Corporation Reorganization Act of 1963 does not vest in the State Commission authority for finality of action herein.

Concerning Appellees' motion to dismiss, the case of State ex rel. Calumet National Bank of Hammond v. McCord et al. (1963), 243 Ind. 626, 189 N.E.2d 583, this Court held and stated:

'However, even though the motion to dismiss is improper procedurally, this court has held that such a motion will be treated in unusual instances as a demurrer if the complaint or petition could not possibly be amended to state a good cause of action in connection with the controversy.'

Therefore, our conclusion is that the trial court did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss, nor did it err in holding and deciding that the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is not required to follow the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.

We find and conclude also that Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the finding and decision of the trial court was contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

JACKSON and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

HUNTER, C.J., dissents with opinion, in which ARTERBURN, J., concurs.

HUNTER, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons:

This is an appeal from an action commenced in the LaPorte Circuit Court by the filing of a verified complaint for a judicial review under the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act (Burns' § 63--3001, et seq.). The action was brought by school trustees of three (3) school townships and twenty-two (22) residents and taxpayers of eight (8) school townships, including the advisory board members on behalf of other taxpayers of LaPorte County similarly situated.

This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment in the action wherein the appellants sought judicial review of the action and decision of the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations. Such decision was the purported Commission approval, after a hearing, of a final comprehensive plan for the reorganization of the school corporations of LaPorte County, Indiana.

The appellees, defendants below, are the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations of Indiana, its members and members of the LaPorte County Committee for the Reorganization of School Corporations. The case was venued to the Starke Circuit Court, where judgment was entered on a motion to dismiss the complaint in favor of the appellees.

The prayer of plaintiff's complaint sought a declaratory judgment and asks that such order, finding and determination of the State Commission be set aside.

This case comes directly to this Court under the provisions of the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act, Burns' Ind.Ann.Stat. § 63--3001 et seq., the legislative intent of which is, as expressed in § 63--3001, as follows:

'It is the intent to establish a uniform method of administrative adjudication by all agencies of the state of Indiana, to provide for due notice and an opportunity to be heard and present evidence before such agency and to establish a uniform method of court review of all such administrative adjudication. (Acts 1947, ch. 365, § 1, p. 1451.)'

The act provides for a direct appeal in such cases to the Supreme Court as in civil causes, and this was done in the instant case.

The Attorney General on behalf of the State Commission filed a motion to dismiss the action for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the cause of action and the persons of the defendants. The appellee commission asserts that the action of the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations did not constitute an order or determination made by an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act of 1947, as found in Burns' (1951 Repl.) 1963 Supp., § 63--3001 et seq. The motion further stated that the plaintiffs were not, singularly or collectively, parties aggrieved by any of the actions of the defendants for the reason that they have no vested rights or privileges in the organization or operation of the common schools of the State of Indiana other than those given them by the General Assembly of Indiana, and the form of action herein instituted by the plaintiffs is not among the rights and privileges they have been given.

The motion to dismiss alleges that a good cause of action cannot be made and the cause therefore should be dismissed. The trial court considered the motion to dismiss as a demurrer and assumed that all the facts well pleaded were true, and that the motion therefore admitted for the purpose of the proceedings submitted that the State Commission did not comply with the provision of the Act governing its functions.

The issues which this Court is required to consider are:

(1) Whether or not the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is required to follow the provisions and procedures set forth in the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act, and

(2) the issue within specification 1(b) of appellee's motion to dismiss as follows:

'(b) That the plaintiffs herein, singly or collectively, are not 'parties or persons aggrieved' by any actions of any of the defendants referred to in plaintiffs' complaint for reason that none of the plaintiffs, singly or collectively, have any vested rights or privileges in the organization or operation of the common schools of this state other than that given them by the General Assembly of Indiana, which does not include the form of action herein instituted by the plaintiffs.'

There are also specifications in appellees' motion and in their brief that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved parties within the meaning of the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.

We first consider the principal issue of whether or not the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is subject to and required to follow the provisions and procedures set forth in the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.

In order to answer this question, it should first be determined whether or not the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana is an 'agency' within the definition provided by the Administrative Adjudication Act. The pertinent section of the act reads as follows:

'The word 'agency' whenever used in this act (Sections 63--3001--63--3030) shall mean and include any officer, board, commission, department, division, bureau or committee of the state of Indiana other than courts, the...