Leshefsky v. American Employers' Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 04 January 1936 |
Citation | 199 N.E. 395,293 Mass. 164 |
Parties | LESHEFSKY v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS' INS. CO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Donnelly, Judge.
Action of contract by Rebecca Leshefsky, administratrix of the estate of Harris Leshefsky, deceased, against the American Employers' Insurance Company. The superior court on trial without a jury found for the defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions sustained and judgment entered for plaintiff subject to hearing in superior court on question of damages.
N. Efron, of Boston, for plaintiff.
H. L. Barrett, of Boston, for defendant.
This is an action of contract brought against the surety on a bond as sole defendant for damages for breach of the bond. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 235, § 13. The case was tried before a judge sitting without a jury who found generally for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted to this finding. No motion for request for a ruling of law made by either party is set forth or referred to in the bill of exceptions.
The bill of exceptions states that the The bill states further that The facts so appearing are set forth in the bill of exceptions which states that it ‘contains all of the evidence material to the questions raised herein.’
The statement in the bill of exceptions that ‘the following facts appeared’ must be construed ‘to mean that they were undisputed, or in other words that they were admitted.’ Neal v. Scherber, 207 Mass. 323, 325, 93 N.E. 628, 629. Compare Pye v. Faxon, 156 Mass. 471, 473, 31 N.E. 640. The recital of those facts in the bill of exceptions refers to the bond in such a way that the copy thereof attached to the plaintiff's declaration must be regarded as incorporated in such recital. Apart from the admitted facts no evidence is set out in the bill of exceptions. The exception to the finding for the defendant, therefore at most presents for decision only the question whether as matter of law on the admitted facts this finding was permissible. Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 143, 140 N.E. 803;Ashapa v. Reed, 280 Mass. 514, 516, 182 N.E. 859.
The defendant contends, however, (a) that the exception to the finding presents no question of law for decision and (b) that even if it does no error of law is disclosed.
Doubtless a general finding for the defendant in a case tried by a judge sitting without a jury implies a ruling that such a finding was permissible as matter of law on the evidence. But in the ordinary case of a trial on evidence an exception to a general finding is not sufficient to bring such an implied ruling before us for review. For this purpose there must be an exception to a specific ruling of law, or to the denial of a request for a specific ruling of law or of a pertinent motion. In re Keohane, Petitioner, 179 Mass. 69, 73, 60 N.E. 406;Stowell v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 288 Mass. 555, 193 N.E. 234, and cases cited. See, also, Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 181, 141 N.E. 875, 30 A.L.R. 798;New Bedford Cotton Waste Co. v. Eugen C. Andres Co., 258 Mass. 13, 16, 154 N.E. 263. This requirement rests upon the principle that no exception lies to the finding of a judge on a question of fact (Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85, 91),and that a separation of the questions of fact and of law involved therein must be made so that the question of law is brought specifically to his attention. Where, however, all material subsidiary facts have been found or are agreed, though inferences of fact may be drawn therefrom, the separation of the questions of fact and of law involved in a general finding based thereon has been largely made and a motion or a request for a specific ruling of law would serve little purpose. In such a case an exception to a general finding brings before us the question of law whether it was permissible on the subsidiary facts established. See Andrews v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 246 Mass. 572, 576, 577, 141 N.E. 507;Bianco v. Ashley, 284 Mass. 20, 26, 187 N.E. 101. Compare the somewhat analogous situation in the case of an appeal under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 96, from a decision on facts agreed as evidence. Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, 432, 115 N.E. 746, and cases cited.
Material facts admitted include the following: including the balance of the 1929 tax, interest and costs. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 60, § 68. The bond describes the obligee, the plaintiff in this case, as ‘the holder of a mortgage,’ which is the mortgage referred to in the admitted facts, and recites that the ‘mortgagee has made demand upon the owner of the equity that certain taxes be paid upon said property.’ The conditions of the bond are more fully set forth in the margin.1
The nature of the obligation of the principal obligor with reference to the real estate tax in question, for which the defendant is surety, it to be determined from the bond as a whole. The language of the specific condition thereof with respect to the real estate tax-which had already become payable when the bond was given-imports an absolute promise on the part of the principal obligor to pay such tax or to cause it to be paid on or before a fixed date, April 20, 1930. The word ‘indemnify’ is used in the bond with reference only to water liens. But even if it had been used with reference to this real estate tax an additional promise of indemnity would not restrict the effect of an absolute promise of payment. Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 115, 121;Shattuck v. Adams, 136 Mass. 34, 36;Goewey v. Sanborn, 277 Mass. 168, 172, 174, 175, 179 N.E. 237. The bond, however, was on the express condition, limiting the effect of the promise of the obligor to pay the real estate tax or to cause it to be paid, that the mortgage should not have been paid in full. And the plaintiff was not personally liable for the tax though she could pay it and add the amount thereof to the amount of her mortgage, but the taxes constituted a lien on the mortgaged real estate paramount to the lien of her mortgage and...
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