Leslie v. Starbucks Corp.

Decision Date07 October 2022
Docket Number22-CV-478 (JLS)
PartiesLINDA M. LESLIE, Regional Director of the Third Region of the National Labor Relations Board for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

DECISION AND ORDER

JOHN L. SINATRA, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Petitioner Linda M. Leslie, Regional Director of the Third Region of the National Labor Relations Board, seeks on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) an injunction against Respondent Starbucks Corporation under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. See Dkt 1. The Court initially stayed this matter pending the completion of the hearing in the underlying NLRB proceeding which was scheduled to begin just a few weeks after Petitioner filed the petition in this Court. See Dkt. 29.

On September 7, 2022, after Petitioner finished presenting its case-in-chief and Respondent began presenting its case-in-chief in the NLRB hearing, the Court lifted the stay and set deadlines for limited document discovery. See Dkt. 39. Respondent served document subpoenas on current and former Starbucks employees and the custodian of records for Workers United, the union that represents Starbucks employees. Workers United, which agreed to accept service of the subpoenas on behalf of Starbucks employees, moved to quash the subpoenas issued to those employees (Dkt. 42) and its custodian of records (Dkt. 43).

Petitioner also moved to quash the subpoenas. Dkt. 44. Respondent opposed all motions to quash. Dkt. 45; Dkt. 46; Dkt. 47. The Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, the motions to quash and set deadlines for document production, briefing on the petition, and a hearing at which the Court may allow the parties to present testimony from certain witnesses. Dkt. 49.

In the interim, Workers United, the charging party in the NLRB proceeding, moved to intervene or, alternatively, to participate as amicus curiae. Dkt. 32. Respondent opposes both intervention and amicus participation by Workers United. See Dkt. 37. Petitioner opposes Workers United's intervention but does not oppose amicus participation. See Dkt. 41. Workers United filed a reply in response to both oppositions and in further support of its motion. Dkt. 50.

For the reasons below, the Court denies Workers United's motion to intervene and grants, in part, its motion to participate as amicus curiae.

DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Intervene

Workers United seeks both of-right and permissive intervention. Petitioner and Respondent oppose both requests. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs both types of intervention.

A. Of-right Intervention

Rule 24(a) requires the Court to permit intervention, [o]n timely motion,” by anyone who:

(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

Courts in the Second Circuit interpret Rule 24(a)(2)[1] to require intervention when a movant: (1) files a timely motion; (2) asserts an interest related to the transaction underlying the action; (3) is situated so that, without intervention, the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; and (4) has an interest that the parties do not adequately represent. United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).[2] The movant “has the burden of showing that representation may be inadequate,” and “must at least overcome the presumption of adequate representation that arises when it has the same ultimate objective as a party to the existing suit.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 79 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978).

Evidence or allegations “of collusion, adversity of interest, nonfeasance, or incompetence may suffice to overcome the presumption of adequacy.” Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United States v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 326 F.R.D. 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying intervention as of right where proposed intervenors did “not showQ that the Government cannot adequately represent [their] interest,” and did “not suggest that there [was] any evidence of collusion, incompetence, nonfeasance, or any other badges of inadequacy on the part of the Government”). In a context similar to this one-where the union and charging party in a parallel NLRB proceeding sought to intervene in a Section 10(j) proceeding-the court noted it was:

difficult ... to find that the Board, possessed of expertise developed over the years, and which independently determines that a petition be filed with the court for a temporary injunction for the protection of the applicant, will not adequately represent the interest involved.

Reynolds ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 250 F.Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also McKinney v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:22-cv-02292-SHL-cgc, Dkt. 45, at 6 (W.D. Tenn. May 19, 2022) (quoting Reynolds').

Workers United asserts that it satisfies all of the Rule 24(a)(2) criteria because (1) its motion is timely, (2) it has a substantial interest in any relief resulting from this action because it is the primary beneficiary of such relief and because this proceeding arises from its charges, (3) it cannot protect its interests because it has no right to commence its own Section 10(j) proceeding and, without intervention, cannot fill any perceived gaps in Petitioner's presentation, and (4) it has a unique ability to present evidence and arguments about a nationwide chilling effect and would seek broader remedies than Petitioner. See Dkt. 32-1, at 7-9.[3]Petitioner and Respondent do not dispute that Workers United's motion is timely, but argue that Workers United cannot satisfy the other, interest-based factors for of-right intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)-specifically, that Workers United has no interest in this Section 10(j) proceeding that would be impaired absent intervention or inadequately protected by Petitioner. See Dkt. 37, at 2-6; Dkt. 41, at 5-10.

Assuming that Workers United has an interest related to the events underlying this action,[4] it has not demonstrated that the outcome of this proceeding would impair such interest if it were not allowed to intervene. This involves Petitioner's request for a Section 10(j) injunction, and any relief this Court is asked to grant would be on an interim basis-until the NLRB decides the issues before it. The Court cannot conclude that any temporary effect of any outcome of this proceeding on Workers United impedes its ability to protect its interests.

Nor has Workers United shown that Petitioner does not adequately represent its interest in this proceeding. Workers United essentially concedes that its ultimate objective matches Petitioner's. See Dkt. 32-1, at 8 (stating that “the interests of Workers United and the Board are aligned in many respects”). It therefore must overcome the presumption that Petitioner adequately represents its interest. But Workers United does not offer evidence of-or even allege-collusion, adverse interest, incompetence, or a similar infirmity that would hamper Petitioner's representation of its interests. Given the nationwide scope of the relief Petitioner requests, the Court anticipates that Petitioner plans to address any alleged nationwide chilling effect. See Dkt. 1, at 39-43. Any differences in the scope of remedies Workers United might seek do not justify full participation equal to a party. In sum, the Court agrees with the observation by other courts that it is difficult to believe Petitioner will fail to represent adequately Workers United's interest here. See Reynolds, 250 F.Supp. at 724; McKinney, Dkt. 45, at 6.

For these reasons, the Court denies Workers United's request to intervene under Rule 24(a).

B. Permissive Intervention

Under Rule 24(b), the Court may permit anyone to intervene who timely moves and “is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute or “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1). The Court “must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(3).

Whether to permit intervention under Rule 24(b) is “wholly discretionary with the trial court,” and that discretion “is very broad.” Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191, 192. When deciding whether to exercise discretion, courts consider the same factors relevant to the of-right intervention analysis. See Penn-Star Ins. Co. v. McElhatton, 818 Fed.Appx. 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2020). In addition, courts may consider “the nature and extent of the intervenorfs] interests” and whether the intervenor “will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.” Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191-92.

As to permissive intervention, Workers United relies on its arguments for of-right intervention and adds that it “does not seek to add complex new issues that would unduly complicate [or delay] the proceedings.” See Dkt. 32-1, at 9-10. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent argue otherwise, but both point out that Workers United does not share a “claim” at issue in this Section 10(j) proceeding. See Dkt. 37, at 4; Dkt. 41, at 6-7 & n.l.

The Court agrees. See Reynolds, 250 F.Supp. at 724 (denying permissive intervention because Rule 24(b) “is expressly predicated on an applicant...

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