Lesniak v. Ind. State Emps. Appeals Comm'n

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: Kirsch, Judge.
• Citation: Lesniak v. Ind. State Emps. Appeals Comm'n, 171 N.E.3d 1073(Table) (Ind. App. 2021)
• Decision Date: 28 June 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-356
• Parties: Alex LESNIAK, Appellant-Petitioner, v. INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES APPEALS COMMISSION, and Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellees-Respondents.

171 N.E.3d 1073 (Table)

Alex LESNIAK, Appellant-Petitioner,

v.INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES APPEALS COMMISSION, and Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellees-Respondents.

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-356

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED June 28, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Ryan P. Sink, Fox & Sink, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana Aaron T. Craft, Frances H. Barrow, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Alex Lesniak ("Lesniak") appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for judicial review of the decision of the Indiana State Employees Appeals Commission ("SEAC"), which upheld the Indiana Department of Workforce Development's ("DWD") decision to terminate Lesniak for just cause. On appeal, Lesniak raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it affirmed SEAC's decision and denied his petition for judicial review.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Lesniak began his employment at DWD on April 10, 2017 as an Audit Examiner III. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 245; Appellant's App. Vol. III at 230. In that role, his job responsibilities included taking a class in Successorship Training ("the Training"), which included both theory and applied learning components designed to educate and train DWD staff on merger and acquisition related matters. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 58, 230. On May 17, 2017, Lesniak successfully completed the theory-based portion of the Training but did not complete any of the applied learning portions of the Training because completion of the applied learning portion was not required at the time. Id. After his completion of the theory-based portion of the Training, Lesniak began to work on unemployment insurance cases. Id. at 230.

[4] Due to certain organizational changes in October of 2017, DWD reclassified Lesniak's position as an Unemployment Insurance Auditor II, which came with a thirty percent pay raise. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 245; Appellant's App. Vol. III at 86-87, 230. Also, in October of 2017, DWD determined that Lesniak (along with all other employees in Lesniak's section) needed to complete the applied learning portion of the Training. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 59, 231. On November 1, 2017, DWD informed Lesniak that he was required to complete the applied learning portion of the Training with an accuracy rate of ninety percent. Id. at 59, 62, 231. In December of 2017, Lesniak attempted the applied learning portion of the Training for the first time and received a score of forty percent, and DWD instructed him to take the applied learning portion of the Training again. Id. at 62-66, 88, 231. In February of 2018, Lesniak received additional instruction related to the applied learning component and completed the Training for the second time but received an accuracy rate of only twenty percent. Id. at 68, 231. DWD again informed Lesniak that he could retake the applied learning portion of the Training and receive training to help him pass. Id. at 231.

[5] On March 5, 2018, DWD met with Lesniak to discuss his 2018 work profile, which outlined his position's purpose, competencies, and performance expectations and goals.¹ Id. at 16-23, 231. On March 8, 2018, DWD again met with Lesniak to update his 2018 work profile, which included a requirement that if Lesniak did not successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training within three attempts, he would be placed on a sixty-day work improvement plan ("WIP"); the 2018 work profile was signed by Lesniak and his supervisor. Id. at 30-31, 231. This same requirement to successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training within three attempts or be placed on a sixty-day WIP was also imposed on other DWD employees working in the same position as Lesniak. Id. at 34-41, 231.

[6] Lesniak attempted to successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training for a third time, and on March 19, 2018, Lesniak was verbally informed that he had scored a seventy percent. Id. at 43, 100, 231. Lesniak was placed on a thirty-day WIP, which gave him notice of substandard performance for failure to successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training. Id. at 43, 231. Pursuant to Lesniak's March 19, 2018 WIP, he would "not be given any other opportunities" to successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training and was subject to reassignment, demotion, or termination if he was unsuccessful. Id. Lesniak emailed his supervisor about his dissatisfaction with both the applied learning portion of the Training and his WIP, and his supervisor told him that his WIP would remain in place, reminded him of the importance of passing the applied learning portion of the Training because DWD could not "continue letting [Lesniak] take the course and not pass," and that DWD would provide additional instruction to help him pass. Id. at 45, 231.

[7] Lesniak received additional instruction to help him pass the applied learning portion of the Training. Id. at 60, 232. DWD also modified Lesniak's WIP from thirty days to sixty days on April 20, 2018 because at that time Lesniak had not yet retaken the applied learning portion of the Training. Id. at 232. Lesniak eventually retook the applied learning portion of the Training for the fourth time and was informed on May 23, 2018, that he scored sixty percent and was unsuccessful. Id. at 60, 232. After he was unsuccessful on his fourth attempt, DWD held a pre-deprivation meeting with Lesniak on June 26, 2018, to discuss his inability to successfully complete the applied learning portion of the Training as required by his WIP, and on that same day he was terminated for failure to meet the terms of his WIP. Id. at 50, 232.

[8] Lesniak unsuccessfully sought relief from DWD's decision to terminate him from his appointing authority and the state personnel director. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 100, 104. On August 24, 2018, Lesniak filed a civil service complaint with SEAC, seeking administrative review of his termination and alleging that he was erroneously terminated from his position at DWD. Id. at 97-99. DWD filed a motion for summary judgment, a list of exhibits, and a brief in support of its position with SEAC on November 22, 2019. Id. at 229, 231, 242. Lesniak filed an objection opposing DWD's motion, a list of exhibits, and a brief in support of his position on January 3, 2020. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 105, 108, 125-26. DWD filed its reply on January 22, 2020. Id. at 220. SEAC granted DWD's motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2020 and dismissed Lesniak's complaint. Id. at 229-36.

[9] Lesniak filed a petition for judicial review of SEAC's order with the trial court on March 9, 2020. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 2, 23-28. On February 10, 2021, the trial court affirmed SEAC's order granting summary judgment in favor of DWD and denied Lesniak's petition for judicial review. Id. at 6-13. Lesniak now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Our review of an administrative agency's order is governed by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, pursuant to which we may set aside an agency's action if it is:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence.

Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). "A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is made without consideration of the facts and lacks any basis that may lead a reasonable person to make the decision made by the administrative agency." Hotmer v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. , 150 N.E.3d 705, 708-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Ind. Real Estate Comm'n v. Martin , 836 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. )

[11] In reviewing an agency's order, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Prosser , 132 N.E.3d 397, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Our supreme court has described our standard of review as follows:

Our review of agency action is intentionally limited, as we recognize an agency has expertise in its field and the public relies on its authority to govern in that area. We do not try the facts de novo but rather defer to the agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. On the other hand, an agency's conclusions of law are ordinarily reviewed de novo. While we are not bound by the agency's conclusions of law, an interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself. In fact, if the agency's interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not move forward with any other proposed interpretation.

Moriarity v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. , 113 N.E.3d 614, 619 (Ind. 2019) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but something less than a preponderance of the evidence." Prosser , 132 N.E.3d at 401. "Reviewing courts must consider the record in the light most favorable to the administrative proceedings and may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses." Pendleton v. McCarty , 747 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the agency action is on the party who asserts the invalidity. Parker v. Ind. State Fair Bd. , 992 N.E.2d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[12] Lesniak argues that SEAC's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was not based on just cause and relied on counting two of his two unsuccessful attempts that occurred before the three-attempt requirement was...