Lestapies v. Ingraham

• Decision Date: 22 March 1846
• Citation: 5 Pa. 71
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: LESTAPIES <I>v.</I> INGRAHAM, Assignee of the Estate of A. LAUSSAT.

5 Pa. 71

LESTAPIES v. INGRAHAM, Assignee of the Estate of A. LAUSSAT.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 10 and 11, 1846.

March 22, 1846.

March 10 and 11.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia county.

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Ingraham, for the plaintiff in error.—Lestapies was a citizen, within the meaning of the convention with France of July 4, 1836. The words of the first article are: "Le gouvernement Français à l'effet de se libérer complétement de toutes les réclamations élevées contre lui par des citoyens des Etats-Unis pour saisies," &c. Pamph. Laws U. S. 1832, appendix, p. 34. A treaty, after its ratification, is a general public law, and as such receives the interpretation of the courts. The true meaning is drawn from the words, parties, circumstances, object, and whole subject-matter. It is matter of notoriety, that numbers of Dutch, Germans, Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen, inhabited this country, before and after 1810 — some of whom died here, after many years' residence, during which they carried on extensive commercial operations, of great advantage to the republic, without actual naturalization, though some had declared their "intentions." The rights of such persons would be protected, and their losses indemnified, under this treaty, the object of which was to take care of our commerce, without regard to the birth of those who carried it on, provided they were domiciled, or, in the words of the treaty, "citizens" of the United States by residence. Nor does any expression occur in the English or French version of the treaty to show that any other meaning was attached by its framers to the word "citizen" than that of "domiciled inhabitant." The common idea that the privilege of voting, which is political purely, makes the citizen, has led to the error in this case; for no decision has taken naturalization as its ground. Domicil, and in many instances domicil for commerce, is the leading principle; The Ann Green, 1 Gall. Rep. 274, 467; Murray v. The Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 2 Dall. Rep. 41, 42; Livingston v. Gilchrist, 7 Cranch, 507; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat. Rep. 46 — a very remarkable case; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227, 245; The Freindschaft, 3 Wheat. Rep. 14; Carneale v. Bates, 10 Wheat. Rep. 181; 1 Marten's Rec. des princ. Traités, 690, edit. Gottingen, 1791; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. Rep. 500; Wilson v. Marryat, 1 Bos. & Pul. 430; Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace's Rep. 51; Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 546; Chase v. Clark, 5 Mass. Rep. 70; Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch, 343. A Cherokee Indian, or a negro, who has no right to vote, (Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts, 553,) but has the right to carry on trade, would have been entitled to indemnity under this treaty.

The case, however, does not require the aid of this doctrine; for the right to recover is perfect without it. The transaction itself, in 1809, was perfectly innocent. The voyage to Spain was legal; and the question is precisely what it would have been between Laussat, if alive and solvent, and Lestapies, calling for an account. The assignment makes no difference; Williams v. Twelves, 3 Whart. Rep. 485, 4 Whart. Rep. 500. His property has gone to increase this fund; and Laussat and those claiming under him could not set up that it was illegal, which it was not, in bar of an account; Tenant v. Elliott, Farmer v. Russell, 1 Bos. & Pul. 3, 296; Watts v. Brooke, 3 Ves. Jun. 611; Austin v. Winston, Wise v. Craig. 1 Hen. & Munf. 33, 578; Bettely v. Reed, 4 Adol. & Ell. N. S. 511; Faikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 2069; Petrie v. Hannay, 3 Term Rep. 419; Ex parte Bulmer, 13 Ves. Jun. 316; Booth v. Hodgson, 6 Term Rep. 405. The cases of Anderson v. Moncrieff, 3 Desaus Chan. Rep. 124, and Berkshire v. Evans, 4 Leigh's Rep. 223, are strongly in point.

J. M. Read, for defendant in error.—There was, in fact, but one question in the court below, which has branched into two here; but the plaintiff in error has no case, if the question decided below is against him. Since the United States became a nation, in 1776, they have made many treaties with different powers. They were nearly involved in a war with France, in support of the rights of their citizens; and they are at war with Mexico for the same purpose. But it will hardly be contended that they ever meant to go to war to support the claims of an alien arising out of the act of his own government. The word "citizen" has always been used in one sense since the treaty with France of 1778, and is found in that of 1788, of 1803, for the cession of Louisiana, and the various treaties with Spain, and Denmark, and Mexico, with the same meaning. It has always been understood to mean those whose political rights here were perfect. The messages of President Jackson, during his administration, and the executive documents always used the word in that sense; 1 Laws U. S. (Rush's ed.) 262; Pamph. Laws, 1819, 64; Ib. 1831, 31; Ib. 1840, 11; Pres. Mess., Dec. 2, 1834; Ib. Jan. 15, 1836. It is true that mere birth in all cases does not constitute citizenship, as in Duane's case, (Wall. Rep. 51;) but Duane was born a British subject, and removed during a civil war to the jurisdiction of Britain, before the Declaration of Independence, and was strictly an alien. Judge Cooper was a naturalized citizen, or he would have sued as an alien. The cases cited on the other side are cases of prize and war — peculiar questions, — and settle, that persons may become "citizens" by domicil of other countries for war, but not for redress and indemnity. Besides, the award of the commissioners is conclusive; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Peters, 193; 5 Peters, 710; Lee v. Thorndyke, 2 Metc.; 7 Paige, 750; Cramond v. Yard, 5 Rawle, 18; Aycinena v. Peries, 6 Watts & Serg. 243.

Can the assignee and creditors of Laussat set up this defence? They certainly may, because, first, the transaction was unrighteous, and, second, if there be any delictum, the defendant is in the better condition: that is the general principle of law. The plaintiff would make out his claim through a fraud upon this treaty. Montefiore v. Montefiore, 1 W. Black. Rep. 363, is on all fours with this case. 1 Story's Equity, 298, 316, (last ed.,) where the cases between parties to agreements against public policy are collected. De Melton v. De Mello, 2 Campb. 420; 12 East. 234; 4 Hill, 424.^(a)

March 22. GIBSON, C. J.

It appears, that in the year 1809, Mr. Laussat, a citizen of the United States, shipped, in his own name, for the port of St. Sebastian, certain sugars and bags of coffee, a part of which belonged to the plaintiff, a citizen of France; and that the property was seized and confiscated at that place by the authority of the French government. This action is brought to recover the plaintiff's share of the compensation received for the spoliation, under the treaty of 1831, by the defendant's predecessor in the trust created by Mr. Laussat for the benefit of his creditors. The treaty gave the right of reclamation to citizens of the United States; and we would find it a question not free from difficulty, were we bound to decide it, whether a foreign merchant, domiciliated here for purposes of trade, is such a citizen. It is well settled, that a subject or citizen of one country may become a subject or citizen of another, by a change of his domicil, in time of peace, and acquire the commercial character and rights of a native. But is the title to extra-territorial protection a commercial or a political right? He is doubtless entitled to the civil right of protection within the country of his domicil; but there is no dictum of a judge or a text-writer for the position that the government is bound to follow and watch over his property, whithersoever he may choose to send it. It may be legitimately captured in time of war, even by the...