Lester v. Ladrigan
| Decision Date | 27 June 1916 |
| Citation | 98 A. 124 |
| Parties | LESTER et al. v. LADRIGAN, Deputy Sheriff. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; Howard B. Scott, Judge.
Replevin by Roy C. Lester and another against D, Louis Ladrigan, Deputy Sheriff. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. No error.
Defendant Ladrigan is a deputy sheriff, who had attached the truck in question as the property of one Millspaugh, at the suit of one Lawton on January 30, 1914. On January 31, 1914, the plaintiff Lester, with one Wood, executed and gave to the defendant an officer's receipt for the truck, and thereupon the defendant delivered the truck to the receiptors. The receipt thus given was in the ordinary form, containing an agreement to deliver the truck to the officer on demand, or in default thereof to pay the sum of $1,500 or, if the demand was made after judgment, to pay the judgment, not exceeding that amount. It also contained the usual estoppel clause, agreeing that the receiptors "are hereby estopped from denying that the property herein described has been attached by said officer, and that we have received the same from him, and that the same is the property of said defendant, and is of the value herein named." Lawton having obtained judgment in his favor against Millspaugh, the defendant demanded the truck from Lester and Wood, that he might levy execution upon it. They thereupon delivered the truck to him, and immediately thereafter Lester and the other plaintiff, MacComber, who did not sign the receipt, replevied the truck in this action of replevin, claiming to be the owners thereof and entitled to immediate possession. The trial court has found that the plaintiffs are the owners of the truck, and that Millspaugh never owned it. Other facts are stated in the opinion.
Nehemiah Candee and John Keogh, both of South Norwalk, for appellant. Carl Foster and Charles E. Williamson, both of Bridgeport, for appellees.
BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). We have examined the evidence, which has been certified for that purpose, and conclude that all the assignments of error based upon refusals to correct the finding should be overruled. Other reasons of appeal assert that the plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct, and by the officer's receipt, from claiming title to the truck; and that the court erred in excluding a registry receipt offered to show that the truck was registered in Millspaugh's name, and in excluding the testimony and records of the town clerk of Darien to show that Millspaugh listed the truck for taxation as his property in 1913 and 1914. This last ruling was based on the ground that it did not appear that Millspaugh so listed the truck with the plaintiffs' knowledge or consent, and it was clearly correct. As to the registry receipt, it does not appear from the finding that the court finally ruled it out, or that the defendant excepted. The evidence shows that it was at one time excluded, and its admission not at that time pressed because the fact of a dealer's registration in Millspaugh's name and of the plaintiffs' knowledge of such registration had been already admitted in evidence. Under these circumstances the defendant has not been harmed, if any error was committed, because the defendant had the benefit of the fact of such registration, both in the trial court, and, on the motion to correct the finding, in this court also.
We take up next the alleged estoppel by conduct. It is found that the plaintiffs bought the truck and hired it to Millspaugh, who was using it under this contract when it was attached. The defendant's brief claims that Lester was present when the attachment was made, but there is no direct finding of that fact, nor was there any request for that finding. It is found that "at the time of the attachment" Lester made no claim of ownership or interest in the truck, either to the defendant Ladrigan or to the attaching creditor; but we cannot infer from this...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Collins v. Lewis
...is the claim of the defendant that the attachment was a trespass, and in support of that claim he cites Lester v. Ladrigan, 90 Conn. 570, 98 A. 124, L. R. A. 1916F, 939. In that case, a truck was attached as the property of M, but the court found that M "never owned it." In the present case......
-
Collins v. Lewis
... ... It is the claim of the ... defendant that the attachment was a trespass, and in support ... of that claim he cites Lester v. Ladrigan, 90 Conn ... 570, 98 A. 124, L.R.A. 1916F, 939. In that case, a truck was ... attached as the property of M, but the court found that ... ...
-
Flaxman v. Capitol City Press, Inc.
...Cotey v. Wilkenda Land Co., supra. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's silence did not give rise to an estoppel. Lester v. Ladrigan, 90 Conn. 570, 573, 98 A. 124, L.R.A. 1916F, 939; Copp v. Williams, 135 Mass. 405; Magaw v. Beals, 242 Mass. 321, 136 N.E. 174, 176; Johnson v. Lang, 71......
-
Flaxman v. Capitol City Press, Inc.
...Co., supra. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's silence did not give rise to an estoppel. Lester v. Ladrigan, 90 Conn. 570, 573, 98 A. 124, L.R.A. 1916F, 939; Copp v. Williams, 135 Mass. 401, 405; Magaw v. Beals, 242 Mass. 321, 136 N.E. 174, 176; Johnson v. Lang, 71 N. H. 251, 51 A. ......