Lester v. Peabody Coal Company
| Decision Date | 09 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | BRB 02-0193 BLA |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Black Lung Complaints |
| Parties | SHERMAN F. LESTER, JR. Claimant-Respondent v. PEABODY COAL COMPANY Employer-Petitioner DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Party-in-Interest |
Appeal of the Order Dismissing Claim and Canceling Hearing of Richard A. Morgan, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.
Leonard Stayton, Inez, Kentucky, for claimant.
Mark E. Solomons with Laura Metcoff Klaus and W. William Prochot (Greenberg Traurig, LLP), Washington, D.C., for employer.
Jennifer U. Toth (Eugene Scalia, Solicitor of Labor; Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor; Rae Ellen Frank James, Deputy Associate Solicitor; Michael J. Rutledge, Counsel for Administrative Litigation and Legal Advice), Washington D.C., for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor.
Stephen A. Sanders, Prestonsburg, Kentucky, for Appalachian Citizens Law Center, Inc., as amicus curiae in support of claimant.
Sandra M. Fogel (Culley & Wissore), Carbondale, Illinois, as amicus curiae in support of claimant.
William H. Howe and Mary Lou Smith (Howe, Anderson & Steyer, P.C.), Washington, D.C., for Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc., as amicus curiae in support of employer.
Before: DOLDER, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, SMITH, McGRANERY, HALL and GABAUER, Administrative Appeals Judges.
En Banc
DECISION and ORDER
Employer appeals the Order Dismissing Claim and Canceling Hearing (01-BLA-0731) of Administrative Law Judge Richard A. Morgan approving the withdrawal of claimant's second claim filed pursuant to the provisions of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act).[1] The procedural history of this case is as follows. Claimant's original claim for benefits, filed on May 15, 1995, was abandoned after its denial by the district director on February 28, 1996, for failure to establish total disability due to pneumoconiosis. Claimant filed the present claim for benefits on March 24, 1998. In a Decision and Order issued on October 11, 2000, the administrative law judge credited claimant with at least twelve years of qualifying coal mine employment, and found that new evidence submitted after the denial of the original claim was insufficient to establish total disability due to pneumoconiosis, and thus insufficient to establish a material change in conditions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §725.309 (2000). Accordingly, benefits were denied.
Claimant appealed the denial to the Board by letter dated October 24, 2000, and attached a medical report from Dr. Gaziano dated February 9, 2000, which was not included in the record before the administrative law judge. In an Order dated December 18, 2000, the Board construed claimant's correspondence as a request for modification pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §725.310 (2000), and thus dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the district director for modification proceedings. After the case was forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a formal hearing, claimant filed a motion to withdraw his claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §725.306, upon the advice of his counsel that withdrawal was in claimant's best interests. In an Order issued on October 25, 2001, the administrative law judge approved withdrawal of the claim over employer's objection, and cancelled the hearing.
In the present appeal, employer urges reversal of the order allowing withdrawal, contending that the administrative law judge lacked authority under Section 725.306 to approve withdrawal of a claim, such as this, which had already been adjudicated and denied. In the alternative, employer maintains that if the administrative law judge correctly interpreted the provisions at Section 725.306, the regulation is invalid. The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (the Director), initially filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that employer lacked standing to assert claimant's interests and that employer was not presently harmed by withdrawal of the claim. Employer opposed the motion, arguing that withdrawal of the claim resulted in employer's immediate loss of rights, which conferred standing on employer and rendered the appeal ripe for review. The Board, by Order dated May 7, 2002, granted claimant's motion for joinder in the Director's motion to dismiss the appeal, denied claimant's motion to hold the briefing schedule in abeyance, and scheduled oral argument in this case. The Director subsequently withdrew his motion to dismiss, conceding that employer has standing to appeal and that the case is ripe for review, and agreeing with employer's position that the administrative law judge lacked authority under Section 725.306 to approve withdrawal of this claim. Claimant responds, urging the Board to dismiss employer's appeal for lack of standing, and arguing that Section 725.306 is both valid and properly applied by the administrative law judge.[2]
The Board's scope of review is defined by statute. If the administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by substantial evidence, are rational, and are consistent with applicable law, they are binding upon this Board and may not be disturbed. 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated into the Act by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
Turning first to the issue of standing, employer asserts that it is a party "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the administrative law judge's order allowing withdrawal of the claim, and, as such, employer has standing to bring this appeal, consistent with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §802.201(a)(1). Claimant, however, maintains that employer suffers no present harm from the order of withdrawal because its immediate impact is to relieve employer from liability for benefits and the added expense of defending the claim; additionally, any future harm which might result from withdrawal of the claim is speculative and therefore not ripe for review.[3] Claimant also argues that prudential considerations further limit the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction over employer's appeal,[4] as employer lacks standing to argue what is in claimant's best interests, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); and employer is not within the zone of interests that the Department of Labor sought to protect in promulgating Section 725.306(a)(2). See Jonida Trucking, Inc. v. Hunt, 124 F.3d 739, 21 BLR 2-203 (6th Cir. 1997). Claimant thus asserts that this appeal must be dismissed for lack of standing.[5] It is well settled that a party "must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Employer thus lacks standing to challenge the administrative law judge's finding that withdrawal of the claim is in claimant's best interests pursuant to Section 725.306(a)(2). See Hunt, supra. However, provided that employer can demonstrate that withdrawal of the claim results in present harm to employer, see generally Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1988); City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1989), employer may assert its own constitutional and statutory rights, see Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980); Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, MD,58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Boone], 102 F.3d 1385, 31 BRBS 1 (CRT) (5th Cir. 1996); Int'l Bd of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cunningham, 224 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1955); and employer may pursue its legal rights and interests under the Act in its capacity as a party within the zone of interests regulated by the underlying statute herein. See generally Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Because a withdrawn claim is considered not to have been filed, see 20 C.F.R. §725.306(b), withdrawal of the instant duplicate claim would result in a destruction of the record associated therewith, and a nullification of the October 11, 2000 Decision and Order denying benefits. Consequently, although employer suffers no present economic harm upon withdrawal of the claim, employer is adversely affected thereupon by its loss of vested litigation rights, including various due process rights and defenses; the right to introduce all of the evidence filed in connection with this duplicate claim into the record of a subsequent claim, see 20 C.F.R.§§725.414, 725.456; and the advantages flowing from the administrative law judge's prior favorable decision. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Dept. of Defense, Office of Dep. Schools v. FLRA, 879 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1989); Boone, supra. The immediate loss of employer's rights upon withdrawal of the claim, which can be redressed by reversing the order approving withdrawal, renders employer's appeal ripe for review. Boone, supra; see Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2001). We therefore hold that employer has standing to pursue this appeal before the Board.
Employer next maintains that claims filed under the Act are subject to the usual constraints of the doctrine of res judicata, see Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben 488 U.S. 105, 12 BLR 2-89 (1988), and that the administrative law judge lacked authority to approve the withdrawal of a duplicate claim, such as this, which has already been adjudicated and denied on the merits. Employer notes that there is no explicit statutory authority for such a...
To continue reading
Request your trial