Lester v. People

• Decision Date: 19 June 1894
• Citation: 37 N.E. 1004,150 Ill. 408
• Parties: LESTER v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

150 Ill. 408

37 N.E. 1004

LESTER

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1894.

On rehearing.

For former opinion, see 23 N. E. 387.

PER CURIAM.

In the petition for rehearing the point is made, among others, that the court failed to determine the motion made in this court to dismiss the appeal. The effect of the judgment of reversal was, as a matter of course, an overruling of the motion, but it is probable that sufficient attention to the point was not given in the opinion.

The first ground upon which the motion was predicated is that the proceeding is a criminal case, and therefore, if reviewable at all, it only can be done on writ of error. It is insisted that the holding in respect of this question in the principal case of Lester v. Berkowitz, 125 Ill. 307, 17 N. E. 706, cited and relied upon in the opinion in this case, was dictum merely. We are of opinion that this proceeding, although criminal in form, is purely a civil remedy intended to enforce the private right of the party litigant. There is, as held in Howard v. Durand, 36 Ga. 346, a clear distinction, both upon principle and by the authorities, between that class of cases where it is sought to vindicate the authority or dignity of the court and those where the proceeding is remedial, and intended to compel the doing or omission of an act necessary to the administration of justice in enforcing some private right. In People v. Compton, 1 Duer, 512, it is said that ‘a solid and obvious distinction’ exists between contempt cases, strictly, and those acts denominated ‘contempts,’ which are punished as such only for the purpose of enforcing a civil remedy. In Crook v. People, 16 Ill. 534, we said: ‘Proceedings as for contempt are recognized as a right of the party in interest, and distinguishable from merely criminal contempts.’ The authorities sustaining and recognizing this distinction are numerous, from among which may be cited, in addition to those already noted, Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187; Tome's Appeal, 50 Pa. St. 285; Cobb v. Black, 34 Ga. 162; Hawley v. Bennett, 4 Paige, 163; Androscoggin & K. R. Co. v. Androscoggin R. Co., 49 Me. 392; Ruhl v. Ruhl, 24 W. Va. 279; Ex parte Bollig, 31 Ill. 96;Buck v. Buck, 60 Ill. 105;Robbins v. Gorham, 25 N. Y. 588. The late case of People v. Diedrich, 141 Ill. 669, 30 N. E. 1038, is practically conclusive of every question arising upon this branch of the case. When the contempt consists of something done or omitted in the presence of the court, tending to impede or interrupt its proceedings or lessen its dignity, or, out of its presence, in disregard or abuse of its process, or in doing some act injurious to a party protected by the order of the court, which has been forbidden by its order, the proceeding is punitive, and is inflicted by way of punishment for the wrongful act, and to vindicate the authority and dignity of the people, as represented in and by their judicial tribunals. In such cases, although the application for attachment, when necessary to be made, may be made and filed in the original cause, the contempt proceeding will be a distinct case, criminal in its nature, and may properly be docketed and carried on as such, and the judgment entered therein will exhaust the power of the court to further punish for the same act and offense. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 42; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 238;New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 392;Ingraham v. People, 94 Ill. 428, and cases supra. Cases of that character are clearly distinguishable from cases where a party to a civil suit, having the right to demand that the other party do some act for his benefit and to his advantage in the litigation, obtains an order of the court commanding it to be done, and, upon refusal, the court, by way of execution of its order, proceeds as for contempt, for the purpose of advancing the civil remedy of the other party to the suit. In this class of cases, while the authority of the court will be incidentally vindicated, its power has been called into exercise for the benefit of a private litigant, and not in the public interest, or to vindicate any public right, and the proceeding is regarded as coercive merely. In People v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N. Y. 247, 4 N. E. 259, the court of appeals of that state, referring to this class of coercive orders, say: ‘And, if imprisonment is ordered, it is awarded, not as punishment, but as a means to an end, and that end the benefit of the suitor in some act or omission compelled, which is essential to his particular rights of person or property. * * * If, in this class of cases, there exist traces of vindication of public authority, they are faint, and are utterly lost in the characteristic, which is strongly predominant, of protection to private rights imperiled, or indemnity for such rights defeated.’ In Phillips v. Welch, supra, the court, after saying that, ‘if the contempt consists of the refusal of the party to do something he is ordered to do for the benefit or advantage of the other party, the process is civil,’ then adds that this distinction is consistent with all the decisions, and in no other way can they be rendered consistent with each other. It is wholly unimportant whether the original order be for the payment of money, for the delivery of deeds or writings, the production of books, or the doing or omitting to do any other act or thing for the benefit of the adverse party to the civil litigation. The order of which he is alleged to be in contempt was entered solely to advance the private right in the civil proceeding, and any penalty inflicted is by way of execution of that order. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 396, and cases in note. Nor is the mode of punishment adopted by the court at all important. If punishment is imposed for a criminal contempt, the power of the court to further punish for the same act and offense is exhausted. In the class of cases where the penalty inflicted is intended to be coercive, the party in contempt can only be relieved by compliance with the order. If the defendant had been committed until he complied with...