Lester v. South Carolina Workers' Compensation Com'n, No. 2733

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: CURETON
• Citation: 328 S.C. 535,493 S.E.2d 103
• Parties: Ric LESTER, d/b/a Fair Play Video, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 17 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 2733

Page 103

493 S.E.2d 103 328 S.C. 535 Ric LESTER, d/b/a Fair Play Video, Appellant,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondent. No. 2733. Court of Appeals of South Carolina. Submitted Sept. 9, 1997.
Decided Oct. 6, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1997.
Certiorari Granted June 17, 1998.

Page 104

[328 S.C. 537] Alex B. Cash, of Rosen, Rosen & Hagood, Charleston, for appellant.

Janet Godfrey Wilson, of S.C. Workers' Compensation Commission, Columbia, for respondent.

CURETON, Judge.

Ric Lester appeals from an order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), affirmed by the circuit court, finding he violated the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (Act), by failing to maintain workers' compensation coverage for his employees. We affirm. ¹

Facts

In November 1992, Lester opened a video casino in Charleston, South Carolina. Lester did not hire any employees during 1992 and had no payroll for that year. Beginning in January 1993, he employed a series of "rollover" and temporary employees.

Diane Elizabeth Smith began working at Lester's video casino in April of 1993. During the time Smith worked at the [328 S.C. 538] casino, Lester employed at least four persons.

Page 105

Smith was shot during a robbery that occurred at the casino on May 8, 1993. She made a claim for workers' compensation benefits.

The Commission directed Lester to appear and show cause why he should not be found in violation of the provisions of the Act for failing to maintain workers' compensation insurance during the period of February 1, 1993 until May 26, 1994. At the hearing on the rule to show cause, Lester argued that, pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2) (1985), he was exempt from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act throughout 1993. The single commissioner disagreed and found Lester responsible for claims arising from any compensable accident occurring during the period in question. The full commission and the circuit court affirmed the single commissioner's decision.

Standard of Review

In an appeal from the Commission, the circuit court and this court may not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (1996); Stephen v. Avins Constr. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 478 S.E.2d 74 (Ct.App.1996). See Lyles v. Quantum Chem. Co. (Emery), 315 S.C. 440, 434 S.E.2d 292 (Ct.App.1993). This court may find facts in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence when determining jurisdictional questions. Kirksey v. Assurance Tire Co., 314 S.C. 43, 443 S.E.2d 803 (1994).

In this case, the issue of interpretation of the statute is a question of law for the court. Charleston County Parks and Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 459 S.E.2d 841 (1995) (the determination of legislative intent is a matter of law).

Discussion

Lester argues that he was exempt from the requirements of the Act in 1993 because his payroll was less than $3,000 in 1992. We disagree.

[328 S.C. 539] South Carolina Code Ann. § 42-1-360 (1985) provides, in pertinent part, that the Act shall not apply to:

(2) Any person who has regularly employed in service less than four employees in the same business within the State or who had a total annual payroll during the previous calendar year of less than three thousand dollars regardless of the number of persons employed during that period.

Here, the single commissioner, while recognizing the language of § 42-1-360(2) is "apparently unequivocal," determined that the section does not apply under the facts of this case. Specifically, the commissioner found:

I find as a fact that despite the apparently unequivocal meaning of S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2) (1985), the Legislature could not have intended the plainly absurd result which would be the consequence of...