Letourneau v. Office Of Pers. Mgmt. .

• Decision Date: 08 July 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09-10309-JLT.
• Citation: 699 F.Supp.2d 374
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Parties: Nancy GILL & Marcelle Letourneau, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, et al., Defendants.

699 F.Supp.2d 374

Nancy GILL & Marcelle Letourneau, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09-10309-JLT.

United States District Court,D. Massachusetts.

July 8, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Gary D. Buseck, Mary L. Bonauto, Janson Wu, Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Amy Senier, Catherine C. Deneke, Claire Laporte, Matthew E. Miller, Vickie L. Henry, Foley Hoag LLP, Richard L. Jones, William E. Halmkin, David J. Nagle, Sullivan & Worcester LLP, Boston, MA, Paul M. Smith, Jenner & Block, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

W. Scott Simpson, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

TAURO, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This action presents a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ¹ as applied to Plaintiffs, who are seven same-sex couples married in Massachusetts and three survivors of same-sex spouses, also married in Massachusetts. ² Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that, due to the operation of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, they have been denied certain federal marriage- based benefits that are available to similarly-situated heterosexual couples, in violation of the equal protection principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ³ Because this court agrees, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [# 20] is DENIED and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 25] is ALLOWED, except with regard to Plaintiff Dean Hara's claim for enrollment in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, as he lacks standing to pursue that claim in this court.

II. Background ⁴ A. The Defense of Marriage Act

In 1996, Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed into law, the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). ⁵ At issue in this case is Section 3 of DOMA, which defines the terms “marriage” and “spouse,” for purposes of federal law, to include only the union of one man and one woman. In particular, it provides that:

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife. ⁶

In large part, the enactment of DOMA can be understood as a direct legislative response to Baehr v. Lewin, ⁷ a 1993 decision issued by the Hawaii Supreme Court, which indicated that same-sex couples might be entitled to marry under the state's constitution. ⁸ That decision raised the possibility, for the first time, that same-sex couples could begin to obtain state-sanctioned marriage licenses. ⁹

The House Judiciary Committee's Report on DOMA (the “House Report”) referenced the Baehr decision as the beginning of an “orchestrated legal assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage,” and expressed concern that this development “threaten[ed] to have very real consequences ... on federal law.” ¹⁰ Specifically, the Report warned that “a redefinition of marriage in Hawaii to include homosexual couples could make such couples eligible for a whole range of federal rights and benefits.” ¹¹

And so, in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, Congress sought a means to both “preserve[ ] each State's ability to decide” what should constitute a marriage under its own laws and to “lay[ ] down clear rules” regarding what constitutes a marriage for purposes of federal law. ¹²

In enacting Section 2 of DOMA, ¹³ Congress permitted the states to decline to give effect to the laws of other states respecting same-sex marriage. In so doing, Congress relied on its “express grant of authority,” under the second sentence of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, “to prescribe the effect that public acts, records, and proceedings from one State shall have in sister States.” ¹⁴ With regard to Section 3 of DOMA, the House Report explained that the statute codifies the definition of marriage set forth in “the standard law dictionary,” for purposes of federal law. ¹⁵

The House Report acknowledged that federalism constrained Congress' power, and that “[t]he determination of who may marry in the United States is uniquely a function of state law.” ¹⁶ Nonetheless, it asserted that Congress was not “supportive of (or even indifferent to) the notion of same-sex ‘marriage,’ ” ¹⁷ and, therefore, embraced DOMA as a step toward furthering Congress's interests in “defend[ing] the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.” ¹⁸

The House Report further justified the enactment of DOMA as a means to “encourag[e] responsible procreation and child-rearing,” conserve scarce resources, ¹⁹ and reflect Congress' “moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.” ²⁰ In one unambiguous expression of these objectives, Representative Henry Hyde, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated that “[m]ost people do not approve of homosexual conduct ... and they express their disapprobation through the law.” ²¹

In the floor debate, members of Congress repeatedly voiced their disapproval of homosexuality, calling it “immoral,” “depraved,” “unnatural,” “based on perversion” and “an attack upon God's principles.” ²² They argued that marriage by gays and lesbians would “demean” and “trivialize” heterosexual marriage ²³ and might indeed be “the final blow to the American family.” ²⁴

Although DOMA drastically amended the eligibility criteria for a vast number of different federal benefits, rights, and privileges that depend upon marital status, the relevant committees did not engage in a meaningful examination of the scope or effect of the law. For example, Congress did not hear testimony from agency heads regarding how DOMA would affect federal programs. Nor was there testimony from historians, economists, or specialists in family or child welfare. Instead, the House Report simply observed that the terms “marriage” and “spouse” appeared hundreds of times in various federal laws and regulations, and that those terms were defined, prior to DOMA, only by reference to each state's marital status determinations. ²⁵

In January 1997, the General Accounting Office issued a report clarifying the scope of DOMA's effect. It concluded that DOMA implicated at least 1,049 federal laws, including those related to entitlement programs, such as Social Security, health benefits and taxation, which are at issue in this action. ²⁶ A follow-up study conducted in 2004 found that 1,138 federal laws tied benefits, protections, rights, or responsibilities to marital status. ²⁷

B. The Federal Programs Implicated in This Action

Prior to filing this action, each Plaintiff, or his or her spouse, made at least one request to the appropriate federal agency or authority for treatment as a married couple, spouse, or widower with respect to particular federal benefits available to married individuals. But each request was denied. In denying Plaintiffs access to these benefits, the government agencies responsible for administering the relevant programs all invoked DOMA's mandate that the federal government recognize only those marriages between one man and one woman.

1. Health Benefits Based on Federal Employment

Plaintiffs' allegations in this case encompass three federal health benefits programs: the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (the “FEHB”), the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (the “FEDVIP”), and the federal Flexible Spending Arrangement program.

Plaintiff Nancy Gill, an employee of the United States Postal Service, seeks to add her spouse, Marcelle Letourneau, as a beneficiary under Ms. Gill's existing self and family enrollment in the FEHB, to add Ms. Letourneau to FEDVIP, and to use her flexible spending account for Ms. Letourneau's medical expenses.

Plaintiff Martin Koski, a former employee of the Social Security Administration, seeks to change his “self only” enrollment in the FEHB to “self and family” enrollment in order to provide coverage for his spouse, James Fitzgerald. And Plaintiff Dean Hara seeks enrollment in the FEHB as the survivor of his spouse, former Representative Gerry Studds.

A. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program

The FEHB is a comprehensive program of health insurance for federal civilian employees, ²⁸ annuitants, former spouses of employees and annuitants, and their family members. ²⁹ The program was created by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, which established (1) the eligibility requirements for enrollment, (2) the types of plans and benefits to be provided, and (3) the qualifications that private insurance carriers must meet in order to offer coverage under the program. ³⁰

The Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) administers the FEHB and is empowered to negotiate contracts with potential carriers, as well as to set the premiums for each plan. ³¹ OPM also prescribes regulations necessary to carry out the program, including those setting forth “the time at which and the manner and conditions under which an employee is eligible to enroll,” ³² as well as “the beginning and ending dates of coverage of employees, annuitants, members of their families, and former spouses.” ³³ Both the government and the enrollees contribute to the payment of insurance premiums associated with FEHB coverage. ³⁴

An enrollee in the FEHB chooses the carrier and plan in which to enroll, and decides whether to enroll for individual, i.e. “self only,” coverage or for “self and family” coverage. ³⁵ Under OPM's regulations, “[a]n enrollment for self and family includes all family members who are eligible to be covered by the enrollment.” ³⁶ For the purposes of the FEHB statute, a “member of family” is defined as either “the spouse of an employee or annuitant [or] an...