Lett v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-4993 |
| Parties | KELVIN LETT, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kelvin Lett sues Defendants the City of Chicago (City), the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), Sydney Roberts, Sharon Fairley, Annette Moore, Helen O'Shaughnessy, Mark Grba, AFSCME Local 654, and AFSCME Council 31, claiming that Defendants violated federal and state law in connection with Lett's employment as an IPRA investigator. Defendants move to dismiss Lett's second amended complaint. [44] [47] [49] [52]. For the reasons explained below, this Court dismisses with prejudice Lett's federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.
Lett worked as an Investigator II with IPRA, now known as COPA. [41] ¶ 5.
The City is a municipal corporation and is party to a collective bargaining agreement with AFSCME Local 654 that includes a grievance and arbitration clause culminating in final and binding arbitration. Id. ¶ 6. AFSCME Local 654 is a public-sector labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of City employees in the job title of Investigator II with COPA. Id. ¶ 14. Further, AFSCME Council 31 is the umbrella organization for various local labor organizations, including AFSCME Local 654. Id. ¶ 15.
COPA is an office of municipal government charged with, among other things, the investigation of alleged police misconduct. Id. ¶ 7. It is the successor organization to IPRA. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Sharon Fairley is the former Chief Administrator of IPRA and COPA, Helen O'Shaughnessy is the former General Counsel of IPRA, Annette Moore is the former IPRA Chief of Staff, and Mark Grba is the former IPRA Deputy Chief. Id. ¶¶ 10-13.
Lett alleges that when Fairley took over as Chief Administrator of IPRA at the end of 2015, she instituted an official policy, practice, and custom of requiring employees under her control to investigate and dispose of cases as quickly as possible, without regard for the quality, completeness, thoroughness, or accuracy of the investigation. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. Specifically, Fairley told Lett and the rest of IPRA's staff that she wanted all the cases from prior IPRA administrations subject to re-review to be closed no later than June 30, 2016. Id. ¶ 24. Throughout all of 2016, Fairley held "clapping parties," during which all staff applauded each investigator who closed acase during the prior week. Id. ¶ 25. Fairley also purchased free lunches for those employees that closed cases the prior week. Id. ¶ 26.
Lett additionally claims that the City, IPRA, COPA, and Fairley, by official practice and custom, and by express acts, instituted a system that encouraged and rewarded investigators for investigative findings against officers. Id. ¶ 28. Lett alleges that on numerous occasions, the City and IPRA—through Fairley's actions—pressured investigators to change their reports to include findings, conclusions, and outcomes that the investigators did not believe were supported by their investigations. Id. ¶ 30. As a result, multiple investigators refused to sign off on investigations and reports. Id. ¶ 31.
Lett claims that, in June 2016, Fairley ordered him to alter his reports on a case involving a civilian shooting. Id. ¶ 32. More specifically, Lett alleges that Fairley told Lett to lie in his investigative report by stating that officers planted a gun on the victim. Id. ¶ 34. Lett protested and refused to do so, because he had no evidence to support that finding. Id.
Subsequently, Lett advised Grba that there was no evidence supporting Fairley's account. Id. ¶ 38. Grba and Lett then both approached Fairley; Grba advised Fairley that Lett had no evidence supporting the findings Fairley asked Lett to write and that Lett refused to follow through with Fairley's instruction. Id. ¶ 39. Fairley, however, responded that she "did not have time" to deal with Grba and Lett. Id. ¶ 40.
Following this incident, IPRA removed Lett from Grba's investigative team and pulled the case from him. Id. ¶ 41. Fairley also removed Lett from General Investigations and later ordered him transferred to the intake complaint section, and then to janitorial duties. Id. ¶ 42. Lett claims that Fairley transferred him in retaliation for Lett's refusal to lie in his investigative report. Id. ¶ 43.
Fairley also opened an internal investigation into Lett for allegedly disclosing confidential information and then she assigned O'Shaughnessy and Grba to conduct it. Id. ¶ 48. After the internal investigation, O'Shaughnessy and Grba ultimately recommended that Lett be found in violation of IPRA's confidentiality policy. Id. ¶ 49. Based upon their findings, Fairley ordered Lett fired in February 2017. Id. ¶ 51.
Lett initiated a grievance over his termination through AFSCME 654, which culminated in a grievance arbitration award dated July 2017. Id. ¶ 56. After a full evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator found that IPRA failed to conduct a full investigation, and therefore failed to satisfy its burden to terminate Lett. Id. ¶ 57. The arbitrator ordered that Lett be reinstated with back pay and his record be expunged of any reference to this discipline. Id. ¶ 58.
Lett claims that Fairley and Moore refused to comply with the arbitration award. Id. ¶ 60. They reinstated Lett effective August 2017, but placed him immediately on administrative leave with pay. Id. ¶ 60. Lett is now assigned to the FOIA office. Id. ¶ 63.
Lett brings a seven-count second amended complaint [41]. Counts I and II allege First Amendment retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual Defendants (Count I) and the City, IPRA, COPA, and Fairley (Count II). Id. ¶¶ 73-95. Count III alleges that all individual Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving Lett of protected property without due process. Id. ¶¶ 96-106. Count IV alleges that all individual Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving Plaintiff of his First Amendment right to freely associate. Id. ¶¶ 107-16.
Lett brings the remaining counts pursuant to Illinois law. Count V asserts that the City, COPA, IPRA, Roberts, Fairley, and Moore violated the Illinois Whistleblower Act by retaliating against Lett. Id. ¶¶ 117-23. Count VI seeks to confirm and enforce the arbitration award against the City, IPRA, COPA, and the AFSCME Defendants under the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. ¶¶ 124-46. Finally, Lett brings an indemnification claim against the City in Count VII. Id. ¶¶ 147-48.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim" showing that the plaintiff merits relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has "fair notice" of the claim "and the grounds upon which it rests," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A complaint must also contain "sufficient factual matter" to state a facially plausible claim to relief—one that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference" that the defendant committed the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility" that a defendant acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. This Court does not, however, accept a complaint's legal conclusions as true. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendants raise several arguments supporting dismissal of Lett's second amended complaint. This Court addresses the federal-law claims first, then moves to the state-law claims.
In Count I, Lett asserts that the individual Defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech by retaliating against him for refusing to alter his investigative report. [41] ¶¶ 73-82. Count II purports to state a Monell claim against the City, IPRA, COPA, and Fairley2 based upon the individual Defendants' conduct in Count I. Id. ¶¶ 83-95.
To make out a First Amendment retaliation claim, Lett must plead and prove three elements: (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) hesuffered an adverse action that would likely deter future First Amendment activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was "at least a motivating factor" in the Defendants' decision to retaliate. Santana v. Cook Cty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)).
To show that his speech is protected under the First Amendment, a public employee must establish that: (1) he made the speech as a private citizen; (2) the speech addressed a matter of public concern; and (3) the state's interests as an employer "in promoting effective and efficient public service" does not outweigh the employee's interest in expressing that speech. Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013)). Here, the first issue is dispositive.
Whether an employee speaks as an employee or a citizen depends upon whether he made the speech pursuant to his official duties; that is, when he speaks pursuant to his official duties, he does not speak as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. Id.; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Davis controls this Court's determination of whether Lett spoke as a...
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