Lett v. Renico
| Citation | 507 F.Supp.2d 777 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 04-10018. |
| Parties | Reginald LETT, Petitioner, v. Paul RENICO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Marla R. McCowan, Michigan State Appellate Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Petitioner.
Brenda E. Turner, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, Janet A. Napp, Wayne County Prosecutor's Office, Detroit, MI, for Respondent.
The question presented by petitioner Reginald Lett's petition for writ of habeas corpus is whether the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied United States Supreme Court precedent, specifically Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), when it found that Lett could be subjected to a second trial for first-degree murder after a state trial judge declared a mistrial during Lett's first trial when the jury did not reach a verdict after four hours of deliberation and the judge failed to give any reason for doing so. Lett is a state prisoner currently confined at the St. Louis Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed through counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Lett contends that his state court conviction of second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, following his second trial in 1997 violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the state trial judge's decision to grant a mistrial did not amount to the exercise of sound discretion, there was no manifest necessity for terminating jury deliberations, and the state supreme court's conclusions to the contrary amount to an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The Court, therefore, will grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting death of Adesoji Latona at a party store in Detroit, Michigan on August 29, 1996. Latona was a taxicab driver who apparently was confronted by a group of three men, including Lett, as he entered a liquor store in Detroit, Michigan. An argument broke out inside the store when one of the men in the group, Charles Jones, took issue with Latona's earlier action of throwing him out of the cab. Latona's girlfriend, Djuana Bradley, testified that Jones confronted Latona in the store. Other witnesses described Jones as being angry, and when Latona pushed Jones, a "tussle" ensued. Bradley and the petitioner tried to intervene, and Bradley said she saw the petitioner draw a gun. She ran to the back of the store and heard two gunshots.
Afterward, petitioner Lett gave a statement to the police in which he admitted that he was at the party store and saw Jones "[get] into it with this guy." Lett said that he retrieved a gun from the car outside when he saw Latona push Jones, and thereafter Lett went back into the store. Lett admitted that he and Jones had fought with Latona inside the store before Lett first went outside. When he saw the men still fighting upon reentering the store, Lett said he fired the gun once into the air, then he ran back outside.
The medical examiner testified at the first trial that Latona died from two gunshot wounds, one to the head and one to the chest.
Other witnesses testified at trial as well. Two other witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination could not be located for trial, and their prior testimony was read to the jury. The first trial spanned a ten-day period, and it appears from the record that testimony was taken intermittently over parts of four days, although the proceeding itself took place over parts of seven days. The trial judge instructed the jury on June 12, 1997 and sent the jurors out to begin deliberations at 3:24 p.m. that day. They were excused shortly thereafter at 4:00 p.m. The opinion filed by the Michigan Supreme Court in this case reports that during deliberations, the jury sent a total of seven notes to the trial judge, see People v. Lett, 466 Mich. 206, 209 n. 2, 644 N.W.2d 743, 745 n. 2 (2002), but the record in this court contains no evidence of that. Apparently, the jury returned to deliberate on June 13, 1997, although the record does not contain the time of day deliberations recommenced. It is clear, however, that shortly after noon on that same day, the jury returned to the courtroom to discuss a note inquiring what would happen if the jurors could not agree. The following then ensued:
(At about 12:49 p.m. — jury discharged)
(At about 12:50 p.m. — proceedings concluded)
Trial. Tr. at 320-21 (June 13, 1997).
A second trial occurred in November 1997 before a different judge at which the defendant was convicted of felony firearm and the lesser offense of second-degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the petitioner to sixteen to forty years imprisonment on the second-degree murder conviction and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that there was no necessity to declare the mistrial after the case had been submitted to the first jury and therefore the second trial placed him in jeopardy twice, in violation of his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, rejecting the State's argument that the petitioner had consented to the mistrial, finding in, stead that "[t]he trial court declared the mistrial sua sponte and there is absolutely no indication in the record that defendant consented to this action." People v. Lett, 2000 WL 33423221, *2 (Mich.App. April 21, 2000) (unpublished). The court then determined that because the trial judge declared a mistrial without a hearing, consideration of any alternatives, giving the jury a "deadlock instruction," or even determining that the jury in fact was deadlocked, the mistrial was declared improperly and the retrial violated the petitioner's double jeopardy rights as guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions, and that court reversed his convictions. People v. Lett, 2000 WL 33423221 at * 3-*4.
The State appealed that decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. A majority of that court held that the retrial did not violate the constitutional bar against successive prosecutions because there was sufficient justification for the declaration of mistrial. The court reasoned that although the trial judge did not herself attempt to justify the decision to declare a mistrial, the record contained "sufficient justification for the mistrial declaration." People v. Lett, 466 Mich. 206, 218, 644 N.W.2d 743, 750 (2002). The court endorsed the well-accepted proposition that a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial upon determining that a jury is deadlocked is entitled to great deference, and consideration of alternatives or holding a hearing on the subject is not mandatory. Id. at 221, 644 N.W.2d at 751-52. Nor is it necessary to give the jury additional instructions to address the possible deadlock. Id. at 222-23, 644 N.W.2d at 752. The court then concluded:
The jury had deliberated for at least four hours following a relatively short, and far from complex, trial. The jury had sent out several notes over the course of its deliberations, including one that appears to indicate that its discussions may have been particularly heated. Most important here is the fact that the jury foreperson expressly stated that the jury was not going to reach a verdict. We conclude that, in the absence of an objection by either party, the declaration of a mistrial in this case constituted a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Id. at 223, 644 N.W.2d at 753 (footnote omitted). Two justices dissented on the ground that the record contained no evidence that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in deciding to declare a mistrial, as United States Supreme Court precedent requires. Id. at 226-28, 644 N.W.2d at 754-55. The court reversed the state court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for consideration of other appellate issues not addressed by that court, which are not pertinent here. On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the remaining issue lacked merit and affirmed the petitioner's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Renico v. Lett, 09–338.
...barred by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), from obtaining federal habeas relief. The District Court agreed and granted the writ. 507 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Mich.2007). On appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 316 Fed.Appx. 421 (2009). The State petit......