Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 30180.
Decision Date | 28 March 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 30180.,30180. |
Citation | 109 P.3d 1104,141 Idaho 362 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | Edward M. LETTUNICH, d/b/a Lettunich Land & Livestock Succeeded by Lettunich Land & Livestock, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEY BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a federally chartered corporation authorized to do business in Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. |
White Peterson, PA, Nampa, for appellant. T. Guy Hallam Jr. argued.
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd, Boise, for respondent. Warren E. Jones argued.
Edward M. Lettunich, d/b/a/ Lettunich Land & Livestock, succeeded by Lettunich Land & Livestock, LLC (Lettunich), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of KeyBank National Association (KeyBank). This Court affirms the decision of the district court.
Lettunich was in a cattle business partnership with his brother, which had previously operated as a family business for many years. After differences arose, the brothers decided to dissolve the partnership and, as part of that dissolution, a court ordered the cattle sold at auction. The sale was scheduled for April 26-28, 2000. Lettunich wanted to resolve the dissolution by buying out his brother's interest in the partnership's real property as well as the Black Angus cattle the partnership had selectively bred. Lettunich approached KeyBank in March 2000 to negotiate a loan package including the real property, the cattle and an operating loan. Lettunich met with Brian Faulks, KeyBank's relationship manager, to explain the nature of his operations and the type of financing he would need. The proposed package consisted of three separate loans: one for the real estate, a term loan for the cattle and an operating line of credit for the cattle business. Each loan was to exceed $50,000. On April 25, Faulks sent Lettunich a separate commitment letter for each loan, each of which contained the following clauses:
The commitment letter relating to the real estate loan named Larry Williams as a borrower and required his signature, in addition to Lettunich's, as a guarantor. The cow term loan required that Larry Williams provide a $500,000 guaranty. Because Lettunich and Williams could not agree on their future management roles or ownership interests, Williams did not sign any of the commitment letters.
On April 25, the day before the court-ordered cattle sale, Lettunich and his brother had still not reached an agreement regarding the buy-out and Lettunich's brother would not agree to delay the sale. That evening, Lettunich met with Faulks and discussed the breakdown of the deal between Lettunich and his brother. In his affidavit, Lettunich states:
Lettunich signed all three commitment letters on April 26, the first day of the cattle sale. Several days after Lettunich purchased the cattle, KeyBank sent Lettunich a letter which read,
Lettunich filed suit against KeyBank claiming breach of an oral contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. KeyBank moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of frauds barred Lettunich's claims. Lettunich argued the doctrines of part performance, equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel prevented KeyBank from raising the statute of frauds as a defense. The district court granted KeyBank's motion for summary judgment holding the statute of frauds bars enforcement of the alleged contract; Lettunich's part performance did not preclude application of the statute of frauds; the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude application of the statute of frauds; the covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply in light of the court's finding that the oral promise to loan money was unenforceable; and no issue of fact existed as to Lettunich's fraud claim. In a subsequent order, the district court granted KeyBank's request for attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-120(3). Lettunich filed a timely appeal.
On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. State v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 355-56, 924 P.2d 615, 617-18 (1996). The Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho at 356, 924 P.2d at 618. If there are conflicting inferences contained in the record or if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the district court but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852, 908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). "The question of a trial courts compliance with the rules of civil procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an appellate court exercises free review." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257, 939 P.2d 574, 576 (1997) (citing Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906, 781 P.2d 241, 243 (Ct.App.1989)).
The relevant section of the statute of frauds provides:
I.C. § 9-505(5). Each of the three loans negotiated by Lettunich exceeded $50,000 and, thus, the statute of frauds provision applies. The commitment letters cannot be used to satisfy the writing requirement of I.C. § 9-505(5) because they were never executed. Each letter stated that the borrowers "must accept and commit to all three" loans and the "[c]onditions for all three loans, jointly and severally apply." Because Larry Williams never signed as a guarantor on the real estate loan and never provided the $500,000 guaranty for the cattle term loan, none of the commitment letters ever became effective.
Lettunich argues there was an oral agreement between the parties. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Lettunich, even if we infer there was an oral agreement between the parties at...
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