Leveque v. Leveque, Docket No. 12385

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
• Writing for the Court: J. H. GILLIS
• Citation: 199 N.W.2d 675,41 Mich.App. 127
• Parties: Alberta N. LEVEQUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph C. LEVEQUE and Sandra Leveque, Defendants-Appellees
• Docket Number: Docket No. 12385,No. 2,2
• Decision Date: 26 May 1972

Page 675

199 N.W.2d 675 41 Mich.App. 127 Alberta N. LEVEQUE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joseph C. LEVEQUE and Sandra Leveque, Defendants-Appellees. Docket No. 12385. Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2. May 26, 1972.
Released for Publication Aug. 18, 1972.

Page 676

Morton Leitson, [41 Mich.App. 128] Leitson, Dean, Dean, Segar & Hart, Flint, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard L. Lehman, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an entry of summary judgment of no cause of action.

Stipulated facts are as follows: Plaintiff's husband and defendant Joseph Leveque are brothers. Defendants reside in Flint, Michigan, and own their home as tenants by the entireties. On April 20, 1970, defendants were away from home visiting Joseph Leveque's mother and grandmother in Carlton, Michigan. Planning on returning early that same evening, they hired a babysitter to stay with their children in the interim.

Pursuant to prior arrangements, plaintiff was to pick up the mother and grandmother in Carlton the following day and drive them to Traverse City, Michigan. Plaintiff and her husband knew defendants were in Carlton and called there suggesting that time could be saved if defendants would bring the mother and grandmother to plaintiff's home when defendants returned to Flint that evening. [41 Mich.App. 129] Thus plaintiff would save time on the trip to Traverse City the following day. This was agreed upon.

During the conversation with the defendants and because the defendants were going to arrive back in Flint later than originally planned, Joseph Leveque requested that plaintiff go to his home in Flint, take the babysitter home and keep his children at plaintiff's house until such time as defendants returned to Flint. Defendants would then pick up the children when they dropped off the mother and the grandmother. Plaintiff agreed to do this.

Plaintiff, thereupon, in accordance with said agreement, went to defendants' house. While in the process of carrying defendants' infant child down the front stairs of defendants' porch, plaintiff suffered a fall due to a defective step.

It was stipulated that the condition of the porch steps was such that if plaintiff was a licensee, there would be no liability while if she was an invitee, there would be liability. Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court held that plaintiff was a licensee as a matter of law, and, hence, proceeded to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. The sole question presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding plaintiff's legal status to be that of a licensee as a matter of law, and, thereby, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Courts of this State have held that the status of an invitee is tested not only by the theory of 'economic benefit,' but also upon the concept of 'invitation.' Preston v. Sleziak, 383 Mich. 442, 449--450, 175 N.W.2d 759 (1970); Genesee Merchants Bank and Trust Co. v. Payne, 6 Mich.App. 204, 208, 148 N.W.2d 503 (1967). Likewise, the weight of authority clearly holds that a social...