Leverton v. Laird, 54369
Decision Date | 17 September 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 54369,54369 |
Citation | 190 N.W.2d 427 |
Parties | Ivan Gary LEVERTON and Marjorie N. Leverton, Appellees, v. Larry L. LAIRD and Charlotte L. Laird, Appellants. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mosier, Thomas, Beatty, Dutton & Braun, Waterloo, for appellants.
Swisher & Cohrt, Walterloo, for appellees.
The land in question is a vacated street in the city of Waterloo, Iowa. The street was formed by the filing of two separate plats in 1948 (Hilltop Place) and 1950 (Holmes Addition) respectively. The plats subdivided contiguous properties in such manner as to allow 30 feet from each plat to make up the full sixty-foot width of Meadow Lane. The dedication of the two subdivisions contains numerous restrictions which are so similar that restrictions referred to herein will be considered to appear in both dedications unless otherwise noted.
The plat provided with the abstract shows the location of the disputed property. The shaded area in question was vacated by the city of Waterloo.
Holmes Addition lies immediately south of Hilltop Addition. Lot 1 of Holmes Addition adjoins the now vacated portion of Meadow Lane and is owned by plaintiffs herein. The vacated portion of Meadow Lane is now owned by defendants.
Dedication of each of the two subdivisions contained the following clauses:
On July 7, 1964 the city counsel passed the following ordinance:
'Be it Ordained by the Council of the City of Waterloo, Iowa, as follows:
'3. * * *.'
Subsequently the city deeded the vacated street to Gertrude M. Small, owner of contiguous Lot 7 in Hilltop Place Addition, by a quitclaim deed which contained the restriction noted in paragraph 2 of the ordinance. In 1964, Small deeded to Orrin W. Hall, Jr., et ux, with the same restriction. On June 17, 1968, the Smalls, as husband and wife attempted to release the restriction contained in their deed to the Halls. Similarly, on November 12, 1968, the City of Waterloo by resolution attempted to remove the restriction against building on the vacated street. The Halls deeded the property to Mr. and Mrs. Laird, defendants herein, on June 21, 1968. The Lairds sold Lot 7 on August 8, 1969 and commenced preparations for building a house on the vacated street.
On August 12, 1969 plaintiffs notified defendants that any use of the vacated street 'in any manner which violates the terms of the vacation thereof' would be resisted 'even to the extent of bringing suit in the district court.' Defendants proceeded to commence construction and had made considerable progress with the basement when this action halted further progress about the middle of October, 1969.
The trial court found the language in the two plat dedications created an implied restrictive covenant against erection of a building on a vacated street in the addition. Defendants cite this action as a basis for reversal and add that even if usch restriction were created by implication the restriction would be illegal and void. Defendants also contend trial court erred in finding the equities were with plaintiffs.
Two other issues, i.e., whether the city could restrict use in the manner it first attempted and whether it could remove such restriction at a later date, need not be here decided in light of our disposition of the other three issues.
I. Do the restrictions set forth in the dedication of the two subdivisions apply by necessary implication to the vacated street? In this review de novo we hold they do. The trial court's decision was right.
The rules governing construction of instruments containing implied covenants in connection with real estate must be reviewed. In Stockdale v. Lester, 158 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 1968), we said:
* * *.
While it would appear from the first paragraph of the above quotation that implied covenants are entirely prohibited, the last paragraph recognizes intention of the parties as the determinative force. The latter principle is strengthened by the more liberal approach to construction of covenants found in other recent Iowa cases.
In Beeler Development Co. v. Dickens, 254 Iowa 1029, 1033, 1034, 120 N.W.2d 414, 416 (1963), we refused to be bound by the strictness of construction heretofore insisted on in some cases:
'* * * The better view is stated in Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky.1958), and quoted with approval in the more recent case of Macy v. Wormald, 329 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Ky.1959):
"Under the modern view, building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies."
A like move to regard restrictive covenants with greater favor is found in Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 180, 79 N.W.2d 733, 738 (1956):
Defendant cites 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 9, p. 888, as the general rule regarding implied covenants:
'* * * An implied covenant must rest on a statisfactory basis in the express contract of the parties, and it must appear that it was so clearly in their contemplation that they deemed it unnecessary to express it and, therefore, omitted to do so, or it must appear that it is necessary to imply such a covenant in order to give effect to and effectuate the purpose of the contract as a whole.'
The trial court found the restriction 'one house to a lot' necessarily implies that no house shall be constructed except on the lots. When the entire dedication and plat are examined together we are constrained to agree.
The filing of restrictive covenants with subdivision plats is a common practice designed to protect all of the property in the subdivision. When relatively large lots are laid out and precaution is taken to restrict building to no more than one house per lot, the clear intent of the subdivider is to provide uniformly large lots for the mutual protection of each owner. In this case 38 of the 40 lots in the two subdivisions have frontages of 100 feet or more. The two exceptions are 90 feet in width....
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...the owner of the estate benefiting from the covenant, in this case lot No. 2, can release the burdened estate. See Leverton v. Laird, 190 N.W.2d 427, 432-33 (Iowa 1971) ("Except as to the releasing parties themselves, the releases could not affect the rights created by the dedication.") (ci......
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United Properties, Inc. v. Walsmith, 2-64868
...will not be allowed to subvert the manifest intention as shown by the entire instrument in which the covenant appears." Leverton v. Laird, 190 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Iowa 1971), quoting Stockdale v. Lester, 158 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 1968). "Under the modern view, building restrictions are regarded ......
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