Levin v. Goodman
| Decision Date | 21 January 1927 |
| Docket Number | 83. |
| Parties | LEVIN v. GOODMAN. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Eli Frank, Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Bill by Benjamin Goodman against Beatrice Levin, administratrix d. b n. of the estate of Dena Levin and another. Demurrer to bill was overruled, and the defendant named appeals. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT and PARKE, JJ.
Louis Hollander and David Ash, both of Baltimore, for appellant.
Randolph Barton, Jr., of Baltimore (Robert J. Caplan, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
This is an appeal by one of two defendants from the overruling of her demurrer to a bill in equity because of multifariousness in the bill, and because the relief prayed is such as should have been sought at law.
The allegations of the bill are substantially these: Wolf Levin was administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Dena Levin, and as such held a leasehold interest belonging to the estate in a house and lot at 1427 West Baltimore street in Baltimore city. Levin himself was carrying on a millinery business in that property and the adjoining property, 1425 West Baltimore street. Considering it advantageous for the estate and for himself that the property and the business should be sold together, he entered into a contract with Goodman, the complainant in the bill, by which he agreed as administrator to sell to Goodman the house and lot of his wife's estate for $7,500 and on his own behalf to sell the millinery business for $5,000. Goodman was required by the terms of the contract to pay at once, and he did pay to Levin, as administrator, $2,000 on account of the purchase price of the real property, and Goodman was given possession immediately upon signing the contract, to occupy it without rent pending the completion of the sale. The conduct of the business was taken over by Goodman, and he was required by the contract to receive all money taken in the usual course of business, keep an account of it, apply it first to the purchase of goods, and to hold the balance. It was provided expressly that, if by reason of any defect discovered in the title the sale should not be completed, the $2,000 paid by Goodman on account of the purchase price of the real property should be returned to him, and he should turn over to Levin the unexpended balance of money taken in the millinery business. There was a defect in the title. It was discovered that a strip two feet in width on one side of the lot sold was owned by Levin's deceased wife in fee simple, and was therefore now owned by her heirs, and not held by the administrator who had contracted to sell it, and the parties were not able to obtain title to the strip from the heirs. While negotiations for the cure of the defect were pending, Levin died, and the Baltimore Trust Company was appointed his executor, and for completion of the administration on the estate of his wife, Beatrice Levin was appointed administratrix d. b. n. Further negotiations for curing the defect having proved fruitless, Goodman, the purchaser, brought his bill against the representatives of both interests, and prayed that the sale might be rescinded by judicial decree; that an accounting be had under the supervision and control of the court; that the rights and obligations of the parties be determined; and that especially Beatrice Levin, administratrix, be required by decree to return to the complainant the sum of $2,000 paid by him.
Despite the fact that the agreement of sale was made by one man acting in two capacities, and made in the one instrument, it seems to us the transaction was a sale of two legally distinct properties, analogous to the sale of adjoining lands by distinct owners, and that it could not properly be considered a joint sale. Shipman v. Straitsville Mining Co., 158 U.S. 356, 360, 15 S.Ct. 886, 39 L.Ed. 1015; Hall v. Leigh, 8 Cranch, 50, 3 L.Ed. 484; Manistee Nav. Co. v. Salt & Lumber Co., 174 Mich. 1 140 N.W. 565. The fact that the sale of the business was dependent upon the completion of the...
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