Levin v. Hewes

Decision Date10 December 1912
Citation86 A. 233,118 Md. 624
PartiesLEVIN v. HEWES.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; James M. Ambler Judge.

Petition by Robert Levin for writ of mandamus against James Hewes. From an order dismissing the petition, petitioner appeals. Order reversed, and cause remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS PATTISON, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ.

Philip B. Perlman, S. S. Field, Edgar Allan Poe, and Eugene O'Dunne, all of Baltimore, for appellant

Edward M. Hammond and James Hewes, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

STOCKBRIDGE J.

This case not merely involves, but its determination depends upon the validity or invalidity of an act of the last session of the Legislature of this state, popularly known as "the People's Court Act." The General Assembly of Maryland, at the session of 1912, passed an act, chapter 823, bearing the following title: "An act to repeal section 629 of article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland, title, 'City of Baltimore,' subtitle, 'Justices of the peace and constables,' to repeal and re-enact with amendments section 206, subtitle 'Constables,' and 623, 624, 625, 627, 628 and 648, subtitle 'Justices of the peace and constables' of said article 4 and to add three additional sections to said article 4 to follow immediately after said section 625 as amended, and to be known respectively as sections, 625A, 625B and 625C." The act thus entitled was approved by the Governor on the 11th of April, and by its terms provided that it should take effect on the 2d of May following. The evident design in the passage of this law was to bring about certain radical changes in the trials of petty civil cases before justices of the peace. The provisions contained in the body of the act had reference only to such causes in the city of Baltimore, and defined and prescribed the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of justices of the peace in respect to such trials. No change was made in the existing law for any other portion of the state, or in the local laws relating to the powers and jurisdiction of justices in criminal cases.

The general scope of the act was as follows: Power was given to the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint 101 justices of the peace for the city of Baltimore, an increase of 5 over the number previously fixed by law. Of the total number, 6 were to be appointed from each legislative district, 1 from each of the wards comprising the district, and 6 at large, and the remaining 53 were to be appointed from the city at large from such ward or wards as the Governor might elect. After the appointments had been made, the Governor was empowered to designate, from the justices of the peace so appointed, a "presiding justice of the peace of the people's court and four associate justices." Those thus selected for these positions were to receive salaries of $2,500 and $2,100, respectively, in lieu of the fees previously paid to justices in the civil causes tried before them. Civil suits instituted before any of the 101 justices might be made returnable before the presiding justice of the people's court, or before the magistrate issuing the summons; and the right was given to either party to a litigation to have his case removed from the magistrate issuing the summons to the people's court for trial by presenting a request in writing for such removal. Other justices than those named to act as of the people's court were to receive a salary of $10 per annum in lieu of the costs, as theretofore provided. The hours of holding sittings for the trial of cases were also prescribed, and the place. The remainder of the act was taken up with the appointment of constables, prescribing their duties and fixing their compensation.

The appellant in this case, having been sued by William R. Fardwell before a magistrate not so assigned as one of the justices of the people's court, presented his request for a removal, as provided in the act and was refused, and thereupon made application to the superior court for a writ of mandamus to compel such removal. His application was dismissed upon the ground that the applicant had a right of appeal from any judgment which the justice might render to the Baltimore city court, and before that tribunal the petitioner could have the equity and right of his case determined. But it is not enough that a tribunal should be found in which a litigant can have his case fairly heard and determined; he is entitled to have it so heard and determined in the forum provided by law. Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 312; Wyman v. Spokane, 40 Wash. 443, 82 P. 875, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568, 111 Am. St. Rep. 915, 5 Ann. Cas. 775. The act of 1912 was intended to provide such tribunal; and, if the act was valid, then the law provided the appropriate forum in which either party was entitled, as matter of right, to have his case passed upon, and he could not be deprived of this right merely because there was some other forum before which, upon appeal, his case might be heard, and the equity and right of his controversy established. This is in exact conformity with the long-established practice in the city of Baltimore, with reference to suits brought before a magistrate, other than the one of the ward in which the defendant resided. In such cases the right of appeal existed equally with the present case; but the existence of that right has never been construed to take away from a defendant his statutory right to have such a case removed for trial before the justice of the ward or election district of the defendant, and the writ of mandamus has been not infrequently resorted to and allowed to enforce this statutory right of removal. If, therefore, chapter 823 of the acts of 1912 was valid legislation, the petitioner was entitled to the issuance of the writ; if invalid, the respondent, James Hewes, was right in his refusal to grant the application for removal, and the petition for the writ of mandamus was properly dismissed.

This leads to a consideration of the act of 1912, the validity of which is attacked as being in contravention of the Constitution of the state. The first objection which is made to this act, relates to the title, which is claimed to be in conflict with the provisions of section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution. This section requires that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title"; and it is insisted that the present act is not sufficiently descriptive of the contents of the act itself. This objection is one which is frequently made when the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature is called in question. In the case of County Commissioners of Calvert County v. Hellen, 72 Md. 603, 20 A. 130, this court had under consideration an act, the title of which was, "An act to create a treasurer for Calvert county, and to provide for the collection of taxes therein." In the body of the act provision was made that the treasurer might appoint a deputy and pay him a salary; and the contention was that, this not having appeared in the title, it was defective and void under the constitutional requirement, but the contention was not sustained. The rule by which to test the sufficiency of a title is stated in Bond v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 116 Md. 683, 82 A. 978, as follows: "It [the provision of the Constitution] has been invariably held to mean that the title shall sufficiently describe the subject-matter of the legislation, but that it need not give an abstract of the act." See, also, Worcester County v. School Commissioners, 113 Md. 309, 77 A. 605; Phinney v. Sheppard, 88 Md. 637, 42 A. 58; Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 744, 48 A. 746. In Devery v. Coler, 173 N.Y. 103, 65 N.E. 956, the rule was stated in this way: "It is sufficient if the title expresses substantially the subject. It is not necessary that the most perfect expression should be adopted. The object of the requirement of the Constitution is that legislators and the public may be informed by the title of the general nature of the provisions proposed to be enacted, and to prevent deception." In this case the title of the act apprised both the members of the Legislature and the public that a number of sections, relating to justices of the peace and constables in the city of Baltimore, were proposed to be repealed, and that some of them, at least, were to be re-enacted with amendments, and three additional sections were to be added. That was sufficient to put any one who was interested in the subject-matter upon inquiry; and there was nothing which could mislead as to the main object of the act. Every objection which can be urged against this act on the ground of supposed defect in the title was urged against the validity of a somewhat similar act (chapter 147 of the acts of 1990), relating to justices of the peace in Baltimore county. That act was before this court in the case of Herbert v. Baltimore County, 97 Md. 639, 55 A. 376, and the act was sustained; and, so far as the present contention rests upon objection to the title of the act, it must be regarded as conclusively settled by the Herbert Case.

The next objection to the validity of the act under consideration is a discrepancy between the title and the enacting clause of the first section. That clause reads as follows "Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, that section 629 of article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland, title, 'City of Baltimore,' subtitle, 'Justices of the peace and constables,' be and the same is hereby repealed and re-enacted so as to read as follows:" The discrepancy first appearing is that, by the title, section 629 is said to be...

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