Levin v. Levin
| Decision Date | 30 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | CV-1285 |
| Citation | 645 N.E.2d 601 |
| Parties | Donald Eugene LEVIN, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Barbara Joan LEVIN (Lahnen), Appellee (Petitioner Below). 55S01-9412- |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
James C. Spencer, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Mark Peden, Foley, Foley & Peden, Martinsville, for appellee.
This case presents a question of first impression brought on by advancing reproductive technology: whether a husband who consents to the heterologous artificial insemination of his wife is the legal father of the resulting child.
We find that the appellant here is the legal father of the child and is, accordingly, responsible for the child's support. Therefore, we grant transfer and affirm.
The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Donald Levin and Barbara Levin Lahnen were married in 1970. Because Donald was sterile, the couple decided Barbara should be inseminated artificially. In 1977, they consulted with an Indianapolis physician and both agreed to go forward with Barbara's artificial insemination. The procedure was successful. Barbara became pregnant and gave birth on September 17. Barbara and Donald were listed as the parents of the child on the birth certificate.
Donald supported the child and held him out as his own from 1977 to 1987. The couple ultimately divorced in October 1987. The divorce decree included the child as a child of the marriage and required Donald to pay child support. Thereafter, Donald terminated his personal relationship with the child, but continued to pay support.
In June 1992, Donald filed a motion for relief from judgment under Ind.Trial Rule 60(B), requesting that the trial court vacate its child support order because the child was not his biological son. 1 Shortly thereafter, Barbara filed a motion to increase his support obligation. The court denied Donald's motion. It later granted Barbara's request for increased child support.
Donald appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Levin v. Levin (1993), 626 N.E.2d 527. Subsequently, Donald filed his petition for transfer to this Court.
Donald presents four issues on appeal which we consolidate as follows:
(1) Whether he, as a nonbiological father of a child conceived through artificial insemination, is obligated to pay child support.
(2) Whether his child, conceived through artificial insemination, is a "child of the marriage" under the Dissolution of Marriage Act.
We affirm the decision of the trial court by holding that Donald is legally responsible for the child and that the child is a "child of the marriage."
Donald alleges he was entitled to relief from his child support obligation under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because he is not the biological father of the child. That section of the rule provides for relief for reasons other than mistake, surprise, neglect, fraud, default without notice or grounds that could be rectified with a motion to correct error. 2 The decision of whether to grant or deny such a motion is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court. Shotwell v. Cliff Hagan Ribeye Franchise (1991), Ind., 572 N.E.2d 487. The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just. Soft Water Util., Inc. v. LeFevre (1973), 261 Ind. 260, 267, 301 N.E.2d 745. A trial court's grant or denial of relief of a party's motion premised on Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Am. Fletcher Nat. Bank v. Pavilion, Inc. (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 156. We will not reweigh the evidence in conducting this review. Shotwell, 572 N.E.2d at 489.
Any claim filed under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) must be made within a reasonable period of time after the judgment is entered. Fairrow v. Fairrow (1990), Ind., 559 N.E.2d 597. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Graham v. Schreifer (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 800. Relevant to the question of timeliness is prejudice to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party's delay. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc. (7th Cir.1985), 770 F.2d 692.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Donald's Trial Rule 60(B)(8) claim was time-barred. Donald waited five years from the dissolution of his marriage to contest his support obligation. This is not a reasonable period of time as contemplated under the Rule, as there is no justifiable reason for his delay.
Donald contends that he was not represented by counsel and was thus unaware of his legal rights. That contention is more appropriately characterized as one under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) as one for mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. Cf. Summit Account and Computer Service v. Hogge (1993), Ind.App., 608 N.E.2d 1003. He would have been barred, however, by the one-year time limit under this subdivision of the rule. Donald cannot now attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Trial Rule 60(B)(1) by attempting to rely on Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Id.; see also Blichert v. Brososky (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 1165. The excuse that he was unaware of his legal options is insufficient to justify the length of this delay. It was proper to deny him relief on these grounds.
The Court of Appeals also correctly found Donald equitably estopped from denying his child support obligation. Levin, 626 N.E.2d at 530. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles, and it is designed to aid in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result. First Nat. Bank of Logansport v. Logan Mfg. Co., Inc. (1991), Ind., 577 N.E.2d 949. Our use of this doctrine is not limited to circumstances involving an actual or false representation or concealment of an existing material fact. Paramo v. Edwards (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 595. Rather, equitable estoppel is an remedy available if one party through his course of conduct knowingly misleads or induces another party to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith without knowledge of the facts. Id. at 598.
The trial court found that Donald induced Barbara to go forward with the artificial insemination. He consented both orally and in writing to the procedure. This consent constituted Donald's promise to become the father of the resulting child and to assume his support. Moreover, Donald held the child out as his own for fifteen years. He made no objection to declaring the child a child of the marriage in the dissolution decree in 1987. Barbara relied in good faith upon Donald's actions and consequently bore a child for which she believed both she and Donald would be responsible. Accordingly, Donald is now estopped from denying his obligations toward this child. 3 To hold otherwise would be unjust.
Finally, Donald argues that he is not responsible for child support because the child is not a child of the marriage under the Dissolution of Marriage Act. Ind.Code Ann. ch. 31-1-11.5-1 (West 1979 & 1994). We disagree.
"Child" is defined under the Act as "a child or children of both parties to the marriage and includes...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 04-443.
...of man with whom she had ten-year intimate relationship based on theories of "oral contract or promissory estoppel"); Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ind.1994) (husband who orally consented to artificial insemination of wife estopped from denying fatherhood of child); R.S. v. R.S., ......
-
Dunkin v. Boskey
...passage of time before repudiation established that he ratified procedure and was therefore liable for child support]; Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 [consent of husband to wife's artificial insemination meant obligation to support because child was a `child of the marriage,......
-
Ddunkin v. Boskey
...passage of time before repudiation established that he ratified procedure and was therefore liable for child support]; Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 [consent of husband to wife's artificial insemination meant obligation to support because child was a 'child of the marriage,......
-
Marriage of Buzzanca, In re
...passage of time before repudiation established that he ratified procedure and was therefore liable for child support]; Levin v. Levin (Ind.1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 [consent of husband to wife's artificial insemination meant obligation to support because child was a "child of the marriage,"......
-
Parentage Prenups and Midnups
...not support a court order on support as the woman was a nonparent and there was no authorizing statute).155. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 603-04 (Ind. 1994) (equitably estopping husband from denying support duty where he consented to AHR with donor semen).156. See, e.g., Tirey......