Levine v. N.Y. State Police
| Decision Date | 06 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-1181 (BKS/CFH) |
| Parties | RICHIE FOSTER LEVINE, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE POLICE, NEW YORK STATE POLICE TROOP B, JAMES W. MCMAHON, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police, DANA R. POIRIER, individually and in his official capacity as New York State Police Investigator, RENT-A-CENTER EAST, INC., successor-in-interest of Rent-Way, Inc. doing business as Rent-A-Vision, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Plaintiff pro se: Richie Foster Levine
For Defendants New York State Police, New York State Police Troop B, James W. McMahon, and Dana R. Poirier: Letitia James Brenda T. Baddam
For Defendant Rent-A-Center East, Inc.: Thomas B. Sullivan Ballard Spahr LLP, Daniel JT McKenna, Ballard Spahr LLP
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Richie Foster Levine brings this action asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and state law arising out of his September 12, 1997 arrest for misapplication of property. (Dkt. No. 1). Presently before the Court are (1) Defendant Rent-A-Center East, Inc.'s (“Rent-A-Center”) motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the claims against it (Dkt. No. 8), and (2) Defendants New York State Police (“NYSP”), New York State Police Troop B (“Troop B”), James W. McMahon, and Dana R. Poirier's (together, the “ ”) motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 21).[1] Plaintiff opposes both motions, and the parties have filed responsive briefing. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 16, 22, 23, 29). For the following reasons, Rent-A-Center's motion to compel arbitration is granted and the State Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
II. FACTS[2]
In April 1997, Plaintiff, who was nineteen years old at the time, entered into a “Rental Purchase Agreement” with Rent-A-Center[3] in Plattsburgh, New York. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 25; see Dkt. No. 21-2, at 4-5 (Rental Purchase Agreement)).[4] Pursuant to the Rental Purchase Agreement, Plaintiff rented merchandise on a weekly renewable basis and had the option of acquiring ownership rights in the rented property. (Dkt. No. 21-2, at 4-5). Rent-A-Center “attempted to serve a thirty-day demand for return of the merchandise on July 27, 1997 and to threaten criminal arrest . . . if the merchandise was not returned.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 26). Rent-A-Center then reported Plaintiff's breach of the Rental Purchase Agreement to New York State Police Troop B Investigator Dana Poirier, who “was advised to draft an accusatory instrument by Defendant [NYSP Superintendent James] McMahon's authorized supervisor at Troop B.” (Id. ¶ 27).
Plaintiff alleges that Investigator Poirier and Rent-A-Center's manager met and that Rent-A-Center “specifically worked with Defendant Poirier outside the scope of Troop B to ensure that the civil debt owed to” Rent-A-Center “would be prosecuted.” (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff alleges that Rent-A-Center had a “practice” to “force officers such as Defendant Poirier to be [its] civil debt collector.” (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff further alleges that neither Investigator Poirier nor Rent-A-Center spoke to Plaintiff “at any time about his civil debt before his arrest.” (Id. ¶ 30).
On September 4, 1997, Investigator Poirier drafted and signed an accusatory instrument accusing Plaintiff of Misapplication of Property, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of New York Penal Law § 165.00. (Id. ¶ 29; see Dkt. No. 21-2, at 7). The Information states:
Pursuant to rental agreement signed by [Plaintiff] ¶ 4/10/97 the following items have been retained by [Plaintiff] and no payment has been received by complainant since 6/14/97; Queen Size Bed, Mattress and frame, Total value $222.12. Certified letter of Demand for return of property sent to [Plaintiff] ¶ 7/31/97.
(Dkt. No. 21-2, at 7). Plaintiff was arrested on September 12, 1997, by “Police Officer S. Guay on the authority of Officer Dana R. Poirier.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 31). Plaintiff was arraigned before the Plattsburgh Town Court that same day; his bail was set at $500 and he was remanded to Clinton County Jail for four days. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). Plaintiff pled guilty to Misapplication of Property on September 30, 1997. (Id. ¶ 36). Plaintiff was sentenced to four days of time served and was ordered to pay Rent-A-Center restitution in the amount of $222.21. (Id. ¶ 37). Plaintiff alleges that he was not represented by counsel at his arraignment or guilty plea. (Id. ¶¶ 33-36).[5]
The Misapplication of Property subsection to which Plaintiff pled guilty provides:
1. A person is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a future time, . . . (b) he intentionally refuses to return personal property valued in excess of one hundred dollars to the owner pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement provided that the owner shall have made a written demand for the return of such personal property in person or by certified mail . . . and he intentionally refuses to return such personal property for a period of thirty days after such demand has been received or should reasonably have been received by him.
N.Y. Penal Law § 165.00(1)(b); see id. (describing the required contents of the written demand).
Section 165.00 states that the term “rental agreement” as used in subsection (1)(b) “shall be defined as in” New York General Business Law § 399-w(1). Id. § 165.00(1)(c). General Business Law Section 399-w, in turn, defines rental agreement as “the total legal obligation that results from a written rental contract between a person and the owner for the rental of personal property.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-w(1)(c). However, Section 399-w “shall not apply to” “rental purchase agreements as regulated by article eleven of the personal property law.” Id. § 399-w(3). A “Rental-purchase agreement” under Article 11 of New York Personal Property law “means an agreement for the use of merchandise by a consumer for personal, family, or household purposes, for an initial period of four months or less, that is renewable with each payment after the initial period and that permits the lessee to become the owner of the property.” N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 500(6) (1986).
Based on the above, Plaintiff asserts that he and Rent-A-Center entered into a “Rental Purchase Agreement” which is not subject to criminal prosecution under Penal Law § 165.00. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 38-46 ()). Both Sagesse and Quinn concluded that the New York “legislature clearly intended to preclude from criminal prosecution[] an alleged breach of a ‘Rental-Purchase agreement' governable under Article 11 of the Personal Property Law.” Quinn, 135 N.Y.S.3d at 620-21 (citing Sagesse, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 906).
On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate his 1997 conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(1)(a) on the ground that “no crime occurred.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 47). On consent of the Clinton County District Attorney, the Plattsburgh Town Court vacated Plaintiff's conviction on March 4, 2021. (Id.; see Dkt. No. 21-2, at 13 ()).
Plaintiff alleges that he has “suffered 23 years with a conviction for a crime he did not commit.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 65). Plaintiff further alleges that the “damage of 23 years of employment denials based on [his] 1997 conviction cost him numerous jobs, including a position at the New York City Housing Authority.” (Id. ¶ 188).
Plaintiff's Complaint asserts eleven claims for relief: (1) violation of his First Amendment freedom of association, (2) violation of his Fourth Amendment rights for arrest without probable cause, (3) violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, (4) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights, (5) false arrest, (6) malicious prosecution, (7) Monell liability, (8) conspiracy under Section 1985(3), (9) negligence, (10) “cat's paw theory, ” and (11) denial of his fair trial rights. (Id. ¶¶ 97-191).
III. RENT-A-CENTER'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Defendant Rent-A-Center moves to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against it and asks that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Rent-A-Center pending arbitration. (Dkt. No. 8).
On March 17, 2015, Plaintiff entered into a “Rental-Purchase Agreement” numbered “faq01352” with Acceptance Now, an affiliate entity of Rent-A-Center, for the rental of bedroom furniture and a service and warranty plan. (Dkt. No. 8-2, at 5, 7). Plaintiff and Rent-A-Center simultaneously executed a “Consumer Arbitration Agreement” (the “Agreement”). (Id. at 7-11; see also id. at 5 ()). The Agreement states that it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and provides that, except as otherwise provided, “you and RAC hereby agree that, in the event of any dispute or claim between us, either you or RAC may elect to have that dispute or claim resolved by binding arbitration on an individual basis in accordance with the terms and procedures set forth in this Agreement.” (Id. at 7). As relevant here, the “What Claims Are Covered” section of the Agreement provides:
You and RAC agree that, in the event of any dispute or claim between us, either you or RAC may elect to have...
To continue reading
Request your trial