Levinson v. United States, 5742.
| Decision Date | 05 March 1931 |
| Docket Number | No. 5742.,5742. |
| Citation | 47 F.2d 451 |
| Parties | LEVINSON v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Leonard H. Freiberg and Nathan Vigran, both of Cincinnati, Ohio., for appellant.
Frank J. Hier, of Cincinnati, Ohio (Haveth E. Mau, of Cincinnati, Ohio, on the brief), for the United States.
Before MOORMAN, HICKS, and HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judges.
Levinson, with four others, was indicted under section 37 of the Penal Code (18 USCA, § 88) for a conspiracy to violate section 29b (11 USCA § 52(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, the charge being that the defendants conspired among themselves, in contemplation of the bankruptcy of the Standard Outfitting Company, to conceal from the trustee in bankruptcy thereafter to be appointed certain property belonging to the bankrupt estate. Upon the trial the case was dismissed as to two of the defendants. Another, Heckle, pleaded guilty and was sentenced. The other two, Levinson and Murphy, were convicted. Levinson appeals.
The Standard Outfitting Company was a corporation engaged in selling furniture at retail. Rebecca Levinson, the wife of appellant, nominally owned all of its corporate stock. Appellant managed the company, made its purchases, paid its employees, and perhaps actually owned the company. The evidence shows that he made large purchases of furniture on behalf of the company and turned the furniture over to Murphy to be disposed of. The government contends that this was done to force the company into bankruptcy and conceal the furniture or the proceeds of the sale thereof from its trustee. The defendants admitted buying the furniture, turning it over to Murphy, and the bankruptcy of the outfitting company. Their defense was, especially as to Murphy, that Murphy had loaned money to Levinson and to the outfitting company which they were unable to pay, and, in order to collect his debts, Murphy took the furniture in payment thereof.
Two errors are assigned: The first is that the court should have directed a verdict of not guilty. We think the indictment sufficiently charged a conspiracy and that there was substantial evidence to support it. Israel v. United States, 3 F.(2d) 743 (6 C. C. A.). The other error relates to the court's charge. It appears that counsel for Murphy requested the court to charge the jury that if Murphy, by advances which he had made to the outfitting company, had become a creditor of that company, and was a creditor of it at the time the furniture transactions took place, it was not a criminal offense for him to undertake to get a preference or to get property from the company in payment of the debts which the company owed him. The court refused to give this charge, but stated to the jury that Murphy would be a creditor of the Standard Outfitting Company to the extent of any money that he had advanced to it, and that for any money he had advanced to Levinson personally he would be a creditor to that extent of Levinson; and then...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Sabbeth
...of a debt, constituted a preference but not a concealment of assets. See id. at 224. In so holding, the Court cited Levinson v. United States, 47 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1931), see id., another case upon which Sabbeth Both Alper and Levinson, however, involved what is now § 152(1), the language a......
-
Edwards v. United States, 16057.
...is not fraudulent and is not the subject of unlawful concealment. United States v. Alper, 2 Cir., 156 F.2d 222, and Levinson v. United States, 6 Cir., 47 F.2d 451. The only issue of fact which the jury was required to determine was whether or not the transfer of the cash register as charged......
-
United States v. Alper, 257.
...appellant was to pay the bankrupt's debt. To this extent the transfer was a preference, not a concealment of assets. See Levinson v. United States, 6 Cir., 47 F.2d 451. The court was requested to charge on this subject but refused to do so. The fifth request read as follows: "If the defenda......