Levinson v. United States
| Decision Date | 10 March 1920 |
| Docket Number | 2504. |
| Citation | 263 F. 257 |
| Parties | LEVINSON v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
T. M B. Hicks and Max L. Mitchell, both of Williamsport, Pa., for plaintiff in error.
Rogers L. Burnett, U.S. Atty., and Jesse E. Sickler, Asst. U.S Atty., both of Scranton, Pa., and Mortimer C. Rhone, Sp Asst. U.S. Atty., of Williamsport, Pa.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and HAIGHT, Circuit Judges.
Against the estate of the Saunders Shoe Company, in bankruptcy, one Levinson had presented a claim for some $18,000, which he alleged was loaned to said company. On the other hand, the government alleged that the money in question represented a purchase by Levinson of the shoe company's stock, and that the said money had never been loaned to the company, and indicted Levinson for violating Bankruptcy Law, Sec. 29 (Comp. St. Sec. 9613), which provides:
'A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently * * * presented under oath any false claim for proof against the estate of a bankrupt.'
On the trial he was found guilty, and, on the court below having entered judgment on the verdict and imposed sentence, Levinson appealed to this court.
We have carefully examined the several assignments of error, and have found no error. Of these assignments, the first, second, and third concern rulings on the admissions of testimony. Without entering into a recital of them, we confine ourselves to saying we find no error in their admission.
The fourth assignment concerns the admission in evidence of certain statements made by Levinson in reference to the payments he had made to the bankrupt company, the nature of which payments were in issue in the present indictment. Over objection of the defendant, the court permitted the government to read such parts of such prior testimony as bore on that issue. We think the admission of these prior statements was admissible, and, as the offer to do so was coupled with consent that the defendant should read such other parts of the testimony as he saw fit, we can see no error. The defendant had appeared before the referee, had given testimony in such examination, and if his testimony there given was that the money he paid the shoe company was for the purchase of stock, we find no rule or principle of law which forbade his being confronted with such statements when in the trial of the case he testified such payments were loans.
The fifth assignment concerns the evidence of a bookkeeper of the company, who testified to a comparison of the books of the shoe company with certain statements of assets, alleged to have been made with the knowledge of Levinson, to a bank, and in which his alleged loan to the shoe company was not listed.
As to whether the government could, in the light of the situation of this case, have given such evidence in chief, we have not that question before us, and therefore express no opinion. The testimony here complained of was given on redirect examination, and was in reality an explanation of testimony elicited by defendant's counsel on cross-examination. This matter having been brought into the case by the defendant on cross-examination, we think the subsequent admission, on redirect examination, of a further explanation of what the defendant had himself introduced into the case, was well within the discretion of the trial judge.
The sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth concern the admission in evidence of the books of the shoe company, the explanatory testimony of accountants who had examined them, and statements as to the financial condition of the company, made to credit companies, and of which Levinson had knowledge. We think the various offers were pertinent and helpful aids in determining the real issue in the cause, namely, whether Levinson had really loaned his money to the company, or paid it to the company in purchase of its stock.
The tenth assignment of error raises the question which has been argued with deep earnestness and marked ability by the defendant's counsel. It is alleged to involve a situation where a man has in good faith submitted his claim to competent counsel and followed his advice,...
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In re Myers, Bankruptcy No. 97-10215-W. Adversary No. 98-80004-W.
...of law, and where the defendant acts on this advice believing that he has been properly advised, he is not guilty. Levinson v. United States, 263 F. 257 (C.C.A.3rd.1920); Remmers v. Merchants\'-Laclede Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 173 F. 484 (C.C.A.8th.1909). Before the advice of counsel may be ......
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Suarez v. Alonso (In re Alonso), Case No. 11-19198 (RG)
...in the Schedules. We have held that the advice of counsel may be an excuse for an inaccurate or false oath: Levinson v. United States, [263 F. 257 (3d Cir. 1920)], supra, and other Circuits have also done so: Dilworth v. Boothe, 5 Cir., 1934, 69 F.2d 621; Thompson v. Eck, 2 Cir. 1945, 149 F......
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In re Murray
...of law, and where the defendant acts on this advice believing that he has been properly advised, he is not guilty. Levinson v. United States, 263 F. 257 (CCA 3rd 1920); Remmers v. Merchants'-Laclede Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 173 F. 484 (CCA 8th 1909). Before the advice of counsel may be plead......
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In re Topper, 11592.
...disclosure to him of all the facts and that "In some cases this has been held a good defense" (citing as to the latter Levinson v. United States, 3 Cir., 1920, 263 F. 257). The District Court affirmed the decision of the Referee "with some reluctance and on the theory, supported by weighty ......