Levy v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.

Citation196 A.2d 475
Decision Date08 January 1964
Docket NumberNo. 3307.,3307.
PartiesRoswell S. LEVY, Appellant, v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District

Samuel C. Klein, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Francis X. Quinn, Washington, D. C., for appellee. John F. Gionfriddo, Charles Collins and Robert Anderson, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

MYERS, Associate Judge.

Appellant originally was a policyholder with American Mutual Liability Insurance Company. Because of dissatisfaction with American Mutual, he did not renew his policy with that company but instead obtained insurance with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. In his application therefor he reported that he had never had a policy cancelled and had never been refused insurance — which was correct.

In accordance with standard procedure among insurance carriers, State Farm mailed a "previous experience" inquiry to American Mutual, which returned the form indicating that ten claims had been filed by Levy and that it had declined to renew his policy due to his "loss frequency." Because of this information, admittedly incorrect, State Farm rescinded its policy, but in notifying Levy of its action rephrased the original statement of American Mutual and advised appellant that rescission was based upon a "material misrepresentation" in his application.

Levy brought an action sounding in libel against State Farm and American Mutual seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The pretrial order limited the causes of action to libel against American Mutual and State Farm, plus breach of contract against State Farm only. After trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of State Farm and against American Mutual for $2,500 compensatory damages plus an equal amount for punitive damages. Upon motion, the trial judge granted judgment for American Mutual, notwithstanding the jury verdict. This appeal followed.1

Appellant claims error was committed by the trial judge in granting the judgment n. o. v. His principal complaint is the finding by the trial judge that the communication from American Mutual which gave rise to this cause of action "was qualifiedly privileged as a matter of law" and that the evidence adduced at trial "was not sufficient as a matter of law to establish the actual or express malice which is required to overcome such a defense." [Emphasis supplied by trial judge.] We are of the opinion that the trial judge properly granted the judgment n. o. v., but not for the reasons stated in his ruling thereon.

The trial judge has the responsibility to first determine whether the publication in question is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The jury must then decide whether in fact the statement was so understood2 It is only when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not libelous.3 The burden is upon the complainant to prove the defamatory nature of the publication.4 If the meaning of the words as published is unambiguous and fairly susceptible of but one meaning, it is for the court to say whether the meaning is defamatory. However, if the language is capable of two meanings, one actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to determine which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by persons of ordinary understanding under the circumstances.5

It is our opinion that the language used by American Mutual — that it had "declined to renew for reason of loss frequency" — even though...

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24 cases
  • GUILFORD TRANSP. INDUSTRIES v. Wilner
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • October 12, 2000
    ...be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not libelous. Levy v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C.1964) (footnote omitted). The court should not, however, indulge farfetched interpretations of the challenged publication. ......
  • Smith v. Clinton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 26, 2017
    ...defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it was not libelous." White , 909 F.2d at 518, quoting Levy v. Am. Mutual Ins. Co. , 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1964). Here, plaintiffs do not point to any statement in which the Secretary directly accused them of lying, so their claim......
  • Howard University v. Best
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • November 9, 1984
    ...reasonably be understood in a defamatory sense, can it rule as a matter of law that it was not libelous. Levy v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., supra note 36, 196 A.2d at 476; Sullivan v. Meyer, 67 App.D.C. 228, 91 F.2d 301 (1937). The plaintiff has the burden of proving the defamatory......
  • Zimmerman v. AL Jazeera Am., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 31, 2017
    ...defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it was not libelous." White , 909 F.2d at 518 (quoting Levy v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. , 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1964) ); see also Jankovic I , 494 F.3d at 1091. The next element of a defamation claim—publication—requires a defendant to h......
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