Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc.

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WHEELER, C.J.
• Citation: Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928)
• Decision Date: 28 September 1928
• Parties: LEVY v. DANIELS' U-DRIVE AUTO RENTING CO., INC., ET AL.

143 A. 163

108 Conn. 333

LEVY v. DANIELS' U-DRIVE AUTO RENTING CO., INC., ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

September 28, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; L. P. Waldo Marvin Judge.

Action by William Levy against the Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Company, Incorporated, and others, to recover damages for breach of contract. Named defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and judgment rendered for named defendant on plaintiff's refusal to plead over, and plaintiff appeals. Error, judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Josiah H. Peck and Jacob Schwolsky, both of Hartford, for appellant.

John C. Blackall and David R. Woodhouse, both of Hartford, for appellee Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The complaint alleged these facts: The defendant, Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Company, Incorporated, rented in Hartford to Sack an automobile, which he operated, and in which Levy, the plaintiff, was a passenger. During the time the automobile was rented and operated, the defendant renting company was subject to section 21 of chapter 195 of the Public Acts of Connecticut, 1925, which provides:

" Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased."

While the plaintiff was a passenger, Sack brought the car to a stop on the main highway at Longmeadow, Mass., and negligently allowed it to stand directly in the path of automobiles proceeding southerly in the same direction his automobile was headed, without giving sufficient warning to automobiles approaching from his rear, and without having a tail light in operation, and when, due to inclement weather, the visibility was reduced to an exceedingly low degree. At this time the defendant Maginn negligently ran into and upon the rear end of the car Sack was operating, and threw plaintiff forcibly forward, causing him serious injuries. The specific acts of Maginn's negligence are set up at length in the complaint; it is not essential at this time to recite them. The plaintiff suffered his severe injuries in consequence of the concurrent negligence of both defendants.

The defendant demurred to the complaint upon several grounds upon only one of which the trial court rested its decision; namely, that the liability of the defendant must be determined by the law of Massachusetts, which did not impose upon persons renting automobiles any such obligation as the Connecticut act did. This is the only ground of demurrer which was presented in the argument of the appeal. Since all of the grounds of demurrer were raised by the appeal, we have examined the others, and deem it sufficient in disposing of them to say that none is well taken.

It is the defendant's contention in support of this ground of demurrer that the action set forth in the complaint is one of tort, and, since Massachusetts has no statute like, or substantially like, the Connecticut act, it must be determined by the common law of that state, under which the plaintiff must prove, to prevail, the negligence of the defendant in renting a defective motor vehicle and in failing to disclose the defect. If this were the true theory of the complaint, the conclusion thus reached must have followed. " The locus delicti determined the existence of the cause of action." Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691, 692; Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 A. 794. Under the law of Massachusetts, the plaintiff concededly would have a cause of action against Sack and Maginn for their tortious conduct in the operation of the cars they were driving. The plaintiff concedes the correctness of this. His counsel, however, construe the complaint as one in its nature contractual. The act makes him who rents or leases any motor vehicle to another liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the motor vehicle while so rented or leased. Liability for " damage caused by the operation of such motor vehicle" means caused by its tortious operation. This was undoubtedly the legislative intent; otherwise the act would be invalid. The plaintiff concedes this to be the true construction of these words, and the defendant acquiesces in this construction.

The complaint alleges a tortious operation of the automobile rented to Sack by the defendant, causing the injuries to the plaintiff as alleged, and constituting an action ex delicto. The statute gives, in terms, the injured person a right of action against the defendant which rented the automobile to Sack, though the injury occurred in Massachusetts. It was a right which the statute gave directly, not derivatively, to the injured person as a consequence of the contract of hiring. The purpose of the statute was not primarily to give the injured person a right of recovery against the tortious operator of the car, but to protect the safety of the traffic upon highways by providing an incentive to him who rented motor vehicles to rent them to competent and careful operators, by making him liable for damage resulting from the tortious operation of the rented vehicles. The common law would not hold the defendant liable upon the facts recited in the complaint for the negligence of Sack in the operation of this automobile. Huddy on Automobiles (8th Ed.) § 200, and cases cited. The rental of motor vehicles to any but competent and careful operators, or to persons of unknown responsibility, would be liable to result in injury to the public upon or near highways,...